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This dissertation retells the history of pirates in the anglophone world, 1688-1707. It argues that 
the appellation “pirate” became applied to some within global seafaring communities as part of a 
contest among people of middling means to define the purpose and organisation of overseas 
expansion. These merchants, landowners, priests and politicians acted as part of an “Age of 
Projects”, a societal impulse triggered by the hardships of war, in which people attempted unlikely 
schemes for financial as well as political and social gain. Many of their plans were colonial or 
imperial in scope, and pirates – imagined as the absolute enemy of thalassocracy – retained a 
particular value within them, as they could be pinpointed as signifiers of larger moral and 
ideological deviance within the societies who hosted them. Defining who was or was not a pirate, 
eradicating or returning them to landed society, and rooting out their abettors became a means for 
individuals to demonstrate control over movements of people and, in turn, to advance a particular 
vision of empire.  
By exploring how pirates were created as part of this phenomenon, the thesis uses the 
methodologies of global history. Each chapter is oriented around a project in which the eradication 
of pirates became central, and traces the local, regional and global contexts which influenced its 
attempted realisation. In particular, Chapter 1 considers how admiralty courts attempted to suppress 
“piratical” Franco-Irish connections in Europe and the Atlantic. Chapter 2 traces the relationship 
between the Company of Scotland’s Darien Scheme and Caribbean piracy. Chapter 3 examines 
how the Earl of Bellomont attempted to use the existence of Madagascar pirates to transpose Irish 
colonisation strategies to North America. Chapter 4 focuses upon how Anglicans on both sides of 
the Atlantic used the sheltering of pirates in Pennsylvania to aid the creation of a missionary 
society. Chapter 5 covers three attempts to colonise Madagascar, which formed part of a larger 
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During the spring of 1694, the residents of the small town of Newport, Rhode Island, eagerly 
awaited the arrival of visitors from overseas. In recent years, slave-trading ships had begun to 
recruit there for voyages to Madagascar, where they took on their enslaved human cargos, 
alongside goods stolen from Mughal and Safavid shipping in the Red Sea. In April of that year, 
the arrival in Newport of one such vessel prompted a fevered reaction in the town. Rumours 
circulated that the craft was eventually bound for the Indian Ocean, where locals believed ‘the 
mony was as plenty as stones & sand’, obtainable by any means as ‘the people there are infidels 
and it is no sin to kill them’. Nathaniel Coddington, a merchant of Congregationalist stock in 
the town, was less enthused by this ship’s arrival. He lamented its impact on his community, 
describing that ‘servants from all parts of the country came running from their masters, sonns 
from their parents’ and that, among the elders of the town, it was ‘with grief spoken the 
endeavours some men made to send away the youth of the lands’.1 
Scenes such as these should not be considered a simple example of lawlessness or state 
absence, but, in microcosm, a rational response to scaled and layered inequalities. Newport 
struggled on account of Boston and New York City drawing almost all of the trade with 
Europe, the American northeast being constantly drained of specie through its role 
provisioning the Caribbean, and from the enormous outflowing of silver from Potosí in South 
America into China and South Asia, starving the Western Hemisphere of currency. The causes 
and consequences of these voyages, therefore, were at once local, regional and global. Actions 
taken by these sailors had their costs. Those of means in Newport lost access to labour, while 
both Red Sea trading communities and pilgrims who sailed for Mecca on Hajj, endured regular 
attacks by predominantly European sailors. Yet, for the North American investors, ships’ crews 
and Malagasy leaders who hosted such vessels in Madagascar, there were enormous benefits. 
Successful mariners were able to obtain riches that would elevate them wherever it was that 
they chose to eventually settle while their backers could hope for greater socio-economic status 
within their local communities. These voyages of a kind never before attempted offered 
                                                 
1 ‘The true account of Nathaniel Coddington, 22 September 1699’, F.L. Gay Transcripts, 1632–1786: Kidd 




individuals the opportunity to cut against prevailing economic currents, but could also disturb 
existing balances of power, both within and between societies. 
One of the most striking features of this final decade of the seventeenth century was just 
how widespread was the concern about pirates. Whether in Edinburgh or London, New York 
City or Surat, mercantile and political elites voiced alarm over their existence and expressed 
concern for the damage they inflicted on global trade. When situated against the broad sweep 
of the history of pirates across the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this attention appears 
exceptional. Since the accession of James VI, King of Scotland, to the crowns of England and 
Ireland in 1603, sailors from all three kingdoms took part in acts of seizure and plunder, be 
they along the coast of Munster, in the Red Sea or in the Caribbean. Yet, in doing so, they 
never quite attracted widespread attention comparable to what they had received 1690s, and 
they were identified only occasionally as pirates. At the same time, a characteristic of reputed 
pirates at the end of the seventeenth century was their almost exclusive targeting of Catholic 
or Islamic shipping, largely avoiding vessels from Protestant regions.2 While achieving an even 
greater level of fame, “pirates” operating in the Caribbean after 1716 seized vessels 
indiscriminately as to their origins and were largely pursued because they attacked their fellow 
subjects.3 The 1690s are, therefore, unique, in that a large amount of attention was dedicated 
to reporting, discussing and considering those who robbed foreigners in places it is difficult to 
believe that many of the commentators expressing concern could have identified on a map. 
The question remains, therefore, why did contemporaries expend so much time and effort 
pursuing pirates during the 1690s? 
The only reason that we can know about this episode in Newport, and many others like it, is 
because figures like Nathaniel Coddington chose to commit them to paper. Many movements 
of people and goods during the early modern period doubtless went unremarked upon or 
remained unknown, even those of a more violent or predatory nature, because they did not 
damage the interests of those with the status or institutional mechanisms with which to 
complain. These sailors who departed for Madagascar attracted the appellation “pirate”, 
ostensibly because they took part in acts of aggression and plunder at sea. Yet their actions 
                                                 
2 Henry Avery explicitly stated that his crew would avoid Protestants: ‘Declaration of Henry Avery, 28th 
February 1695’, Miscellaneous Records, IOR H/36, fo.181, The British Library (BL). 





alone were only a necessary, rather than a sufficient, condition for them to be considered as 
such. Considering those appalled by the activities of these pirates reveals the many interests 
served by the sailors being criminalised. Coddington, for instance, saw that the arrival of 
Madagascar ships into Newport served to discredit the Quakers who dominated political life 
in the town. That the colony’s leaders failed to act against trade with pirates strengthened the 
case of his Congregationalist allies to the west in Connecticut when they laid claim to parts of 
Rhode Island. Across the Atlantic, in Lambeth Palace, similar reports were gladly received by 
Henry Compton, the Bishop of London. The prelate seized upon any chance to emphasise the 
threat posed by radical American dissenters, as he promoted an Anglican missionary society 
intended to bring them into the Church of England.4 By the later 1690s, Newport had been 
placed under investigation by the English Board of Trade for hosting pirates, and, in this 
moment of suspicion, the disgraced Anglo-Irish peer the Earl of Bellomont saw opportunity.5 
Drawing upon his experiences in Ireland, he proposed a naval stores scheme that he claimed 
would wrench the region from its reliance upon this “illicit” trade, securing for himself favour 
and fortune in the process. Indeed, to understand how contemporaries initially became 
concerned that the Indian Ocean was filled with English “pirates”, one has to consider the 
falling fortunes of the English East India Company (EIC). Despite a long history of sailors 
targeting Mughal and Safavid treasure shipments, they drew especial attention to the practice 
in the mid-1690s, a time when their monopoly had been weakened, a “pirate” colony beyond 
their control had grown up on Madagascar, and a rival Scottish company contemplated 
founding a settlement there.6 Just as many contexts and interests swirled around these voyages 
to the Indian Ocean, the same was true for the manhunts and trails for piracy which followed. 
To detractors, these sailors seemed to represent a kind of conspicuous connectivity, 
exemplifying global linkages which they sought to pin down in order to sever or appropriate 
for their own ends. 
This thesis, therefore, answers this question by arguing that it is only possibly to understand 
the ‘war against the pirates’, by considering global movements of people, the history of 
                                                 
4 Considered in chapter 4. 
5 Bellomont’s disgrace is discussed in chapter 3. 




European expansion and colonialism, as well as the immediate circumstances of the 1690s.7 
The global war that erupted following William III’s invasion of England in 1688 affected the 
poor and the elite of his new subjects in markedly different ways. Many of limited means were 
forced to leave their homes and disperse into existing global networks of trade, while landed 
and mercantile elites feared that an uncontrolled haemorrhaging of people and money would 
see them fold before Louis XIV and France. In response, many of political influence across 
Stuart dominions began to advocate that these territories scattered around the globe should be 
united into some kind of thalassocratic empire, achieved by asserting control over the flows of 
people and goods that linked them. Yet while a looming Catholic threat provided a familiar 
call to arms, it did not offer a solution.8 In this moment of crisis, individuals saw opportunity 
and, drawing upon older colonial and imperial ideas, began to construct innumerable projects 
and plans to control these movements. As an ancient imperial construct defined initially by 
Roman statesmen as the absolute enemy of thalassocracy and of commerce, the pirate came to 
play a pivotal role in determining the legitimacy of these many schemes. The ability to define 
who was or was not a pirate, to eradicate or return them to landed society and to root out their 
abettors was to demonstrate control over movements of people and, in turn, make the case for 
a particular vision of empire. What follows, therefore, is a story of how pirates were 
constructed and exploited by private interests competing to define an empire in practice, rather 
than simply in theory. 
The period under discussion here – 1688 to 1707 – has been termed the ‘Age of Projects’, a 
name intended to convey a distinguishing feature of the era to which both pirates and many 
contemporary schemes can be traced. The term has been used sparsely in scholarship, but 
originates in Daniel Defoe’s description of the period following William III’s invasion of 
England as ‘this projecting age’ in his 1697 Essay Upon Projects.9 In the Essay, Defoe argues 
that desperate people turned to unlikely means to obtain money as a consequence of war, while, 
at the same time, it drove others of ‘necessity, [to] turn their thoughts to honest invention, 
                                                 
7 The phrase ‘war against the pirates’ is coined in: Robert C. Ritchie, Captain Kidd and the War against the 
Pirates (1989). 
8 Peter Lake, ‘Anti-Popery: The Structure of a Prejudice’ in Richard Cust and Ann Hughes (eds.), Conflict in 
Early Stuart England: Studies in Religion and Politics, 1603–1642 (1989), pp.72–106. 
9 Brent S. Sirota, The Christian Monitors: The Church of England and the Age of Benevolence (2014), pp.69–




founded upon the platform of ingenuity and integrity’.10 While he claimed the poor lacked the 
initiative to institute projects, Defoe believed that those of at least middling status – merchants, 
politicians, gentry – could use them to institute forms of national improvement. He outlined a 
number of schemes himself in the text, ranging from women’s education to banking, the 
employment of sailors and programmes of road building.11 Defoe called this widespread 
interest in projects a national ‘humour’ resulting from war, but the conflict that erupted in 1688 
was notable as a global, rather than purely European, phenomenon. This study proposes that 
the “projecting” impulse was not just solely or uniquely an English phenomenon, but rather 
was one that extended across the anglophone world. The more detailed context of the Age of 
Projects and its causes are discussed later in this introduction, but it is important to define what 
is meant by the term. The terms scheme, design and project are here used interchangeably to 
refer to planned undertakings involving multiple people. All of them were at once colonial, 
that is to say intending a settlement of people, and imperial, directed towards the 
transformation of a region’s extant population, whether transient or settled. These projects took 
many forms, ranging from plantation schemes, to new commercial ventures and the creation 
or transformation of clubs, societies and institutions. Similar schemes had, of course, been 
proposed and implemented in the past, but, as Defoe notes, there was simply a far higher 
concentration of them during the 1690s than at any time in living memory. 
The history of pirates in the early modern period has been of growing interest to scholars in 
the last decade. A general consensus maintained in most book-length studies in English is that 
there was an intrinsic connection between pirates and European imperial expansion. An older 
historiographical tradition views them as intractable enemies of empires, an avant garde of 
sorts, cast out of landed society and free to advocate radically modern beliefs around social 
hierarchy, race or sexuality.12 In contrast, a more recent turn has shifted focus away from the 
actions of pirates at sea towards their reception and actions on land. The narrative woven by 
some historians is now that pirates were initially pioneers who facilitated the growth of 
                                                 
10 Ibid., p.33. 
11 Ibid., passim. 
12 For example see: B.R. Burg, Sodomy and the Pirate Tradition: English Sea Rovers in the Seventeenth-
Century Caribbean, 2nd ed. (1995); Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant 
Seamen, Pirates and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700–1750 (1987); J.S. Bromley, ‘Outlaws at Sea, 
1660–1720: Liberty, Equality and Fraternity Among the Caribbean Freebooters’ in Idem, Corsairs and Navies, 
1660–1760 (1987), pp.1–20; Christopher Hill, ‘Radical Pirates?’, Idem, The Collected Essays of Christopher 




European expansion, before later becoming the pretext for a kind of inexorable expansion of 
state authority outward from the metropole in London.13 Both perspectives owe something to 
seventeenth-century interest in the ancient world. On the subjects of pirates, early modern 
thinkers first looked to Marcus Tullius Cicero’s description of them as hostis humani generis 
(enemies of all) in 70 BC, in practice meaning the enemies of Rome in the Mediterranean.14 
Others quoted a passage from St Augustine’s City of God, which claimed to report a 
conversation between a sailor and Alexander the Great, in which the former was said to argue 
that Greek (and therefore pagan) expansion simply replicated the actions of “pirates” writ 
large.15 The historiography thus either accepts Cicero’s definition of pirates as the enemies of 
empire, or St Augustine’s as its outriders. 
Emblematic of the more recent turn in the academic history of pirates is Mark Hanna’s 
monograph study, Pirate Nests and the Rise of the British Empire. It has supplied an 
authoritative retelling of the history of pirates in the Atlantic, with particular attention to the 
‘colonial hinterlands’, detailing how these sailors initially participated in English overseas 
expansion, before their eventual criminalisation during the 1690s.16 Hanna’s overall argument, 
if not his methods, is familiar from some of the political and economic histories of this period. 
Throughout, he engages with the question of whether imperial administration was effectively 
extended westwards by the time a “British Empire” formed in 1707, or if provincial autonomy 
endured.17 While offering many new insights, recent histories of pirates have tended to work 
                                                 
13 Mark G. Hanna, Pirate Nests and the Rise of the British Empire, 1570–1740 (2015); Kevin P. McDonald, 
Pirates, Merchants, Settlers, and Slaves: Colonial America and the Indo-Atlantic World (2015); Douglas R. 
Burgess, The Politics of Piracy: Crime and Civil Disobedience in Colonial America (2014); Margarette 
Lincoln, British Pirates and Society, 1680–1730 (2014); Niklas Frykman, ‘Pirates and Smugglers: Political 
Economy in the Red Atlantic’ in Philip J. Stern and Carl Wennerlind (eds.), Mercantilism Reimagined: Political 
Economy in Early Modern Britain and its Empire (2014), pp.218–241; Thomas K. Heebøll-Holm, Ports, Piracy 
and Maritime War: Piracy in the English Channel and the Atlantic, c.1280–c.1330 (2013); Karin Bowie, 
Scottish Public Opinion and the Anglo-Scottish Union, 1699–1707 (2007), pp.39–44. 
14 Philip de Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World (1999), pp.149–157; L.H.G. Greenwood (ed.) (trans.), 
Cicero: The Verrine Orations, vol.2 (1935), IV, 9, 21. 
15 Ibid., IV, 9, 21; Walter Miller (ed.) (trans.), De Officiis (1913), III, 29, pp.385–386. Marcus Dods (trans.), 
The City of God (2009), p.101; Michel La Vassor, Letters Written by a French Gentleman, Giving a Faithful 
and Particular Account of the Transactions at the Court of France (1695), p.39 
16 Hanna, Pirate Nests, pp.418–425.  
17 Those who view centralisation as more successful: Christian J. Koot, Empire at the Periphery: British 
Colonists, Anglo-Dutch Trade, and the Development of the British Atlantic, 1621–1713 (2011), pp.225–232; 
Owen Stanwood, The Empire Reformed: English America in the Age of the Glorious Revolution (2011), 
pp.204–220; David Armitage, ‘Making the Empire British: Scotland in the Atlantic World 1542–1707’, Past & 
Present, vol.155, Vo.1, no.1 (1997), pp.57–63; Alison Gilbert Olson, Making the Empire Work: London and 




towards this same understanding of empire defined by centre–periphery relationships, with 
particular attention to Stuart dominions in the Americas and England. 
Departing from the existing literature on early modern pirates, this thesis has taken influence 
from what has come to be known as the ‘global turn’ in scholarship. For at least the past two 
decades, historians have sought to locate the modern experience of globalisation within the 
eras that they study, seeing many approaches created or reworked to give this impulse form. 
World, global, entangled, Atlantic, oceanic, transnational and new imperial histories, as well 
as global microhistories and histoire croisée, have all aspired, in different contexts, to become 
the means through which scholars understand the impact of the global upon the individual and 
the local.18 The oft-cited target for these approaches has been the nation-state, both as a 
conceptual framework and an inevitable endpoint for research. In seeking to move beyond 
national constraints, these approaches have divided primarily between the comparative and the 
connective.19 The former have been less controversial, on account of largely leaving national 
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boundaries untouched, but the same cannot be said for those who emphasise connectivity.20 
Influenced by postcolonial scholarship, connective histories have privileged multidirectional 
flows of goods, people and ideas, shifting concern onto the relational and away from historical 
objects. In anglophone scholarship, this tendency is most clearly manifest in Sanjay 
Subrahmanyam’s argument that “nationalist” readings of history have ‘blinded us to the 
possibility of connection’, going so far as to argue that the very appearance of individuals in 
documentary sources constitutes evidence that ‘they are already plugged into some network, 
some process of circulation’.21 
The methodologies promoted in connected histories have allowed what follows to move 
away from several elements of the new histories of early modern pirates and piracy, the first 
of which is their maintenance of the centre–periphery paradigm. Although a concept initially 
developed to challenge the determinism of national narratives, pirates have become integrated 
into a story of two antagonists, of London metropole and American periphery, a struggle that 
is seen to foreshadow the outbreak of the American Revolution.22 While understandable, such 
an approach leads to a privileging of particular regions, as well as interpretations of pirates and 
their opponents. This thesis instead substitutes a bipolar model with a layered understanding 
of geographical scale, moving through local, regional and global contexts, emphasising how 
the three interlaced, allowing individuals to appeal to multiples centres and normative 
structures as they pursued their own objectives.23 While such an approach may appear 
unwieldy, to achieve a sharper level of focus, the methods of global microhistory have been 
employed. Archival work is used to produce a “micro” level, often through biography, which 
is then juxtaposed against a “macro” level of context, created by reading across multiple 
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relevant areas of secondary literature.24 This method allows the freedom to zoom in and out on 
particular individuals to appreciate the many local, regional or global connections and contexts 
of which they were a part. Each chapter, therefore, begins by sketching the macro level, 
consisting of the relevant longue durée circulations of people and goods, as well as histories 
of European colonialism, before then proceeding to consider the micro level, consisting of 
biographies or close studies of pirates and particular projects within the main date range. The 
subjects are then considered in relation to the themes, networks and colonial histories detailed 
in the macro sketch. This approach, alongside a focus on projects, decentres the story of pirates 
during this period from particular historical “units”, such as colonies or national institutions, 
onto how individuals sought to draw upon many different connections to institute schemes that 
they believed would transform their societies and influence the process of overseas expansion 
as a whole.25 
Geographically this dissertation considers a loose anglophone world, which includes people 
from Scotland, Ireland, England and the wider world, as well as those naturalised or 
endenizened. It is a history organised around sovereign allegiance, rather than with an eye 
towards nations as they would later exist.26 The recent historiography of pirates has, in contrast, 
told overwhelmingly English stories. Consulting the indexes of recent histories of pirates yield 
a scattering of references to Ireland and Scotland, but of course no entry at all for England, it 
being a given constant. This asymmetry is fairly glaring, considering that the four most famous 
criminal trials before the high courts of admiralty in England and Scotland during this period 
were of Thomas Vaughan (1696), William Kidd (1701), Thomas Green (1705) and the crew 
of Henry Avery (1696), respectively being born in Ireland, Scotland, England and a 
combination of the three.27 This approach takes cues from the new British history, which 
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stressed the connectedness of England, Scotland and Ireland across the early modern period, 
even if its advocates never successfully extended this approach outwards.28 Yet, while this 
work remains focused on Stuart subjects and dominions, it does not choose to ignore their ties 
to people and places beyond, far from it. The pirates and projects discussed here were shaped 
a great deal by their fellow subjects, but also constituted by their relationships with peoples 
from Spain, India, the Low Countries, the Swahili Coast, the Americas, France and other 
regions. The actions of particular individuals were often informed by direct entanglement 
through commerce, shared religious convictions or kinship, but also indirectly through 
perception, such as a belief in the threat or opportunities presented by a particular people.29 
Connections between subjects remained a highly significant factor binding the anglophone 
world together, but they did not exist to the exclusion of, or always outweigh, relationships 
with many others. 
A final element of this thesis, and one shared with Mark Hanna, is that it proceeds without 
reference to one particular historical theme. Pirates are generally considered to be committing 
a commercial crime, but, as has been demonstrated by recent work on “mercantilism”, early 
modern actors did not necessarily consider the economic to be discrete, either conceptually or 
practically, from other areas of life.30 Equally, as Daniel Defoe argued, projects had 
implications for many different areas of early modern society, so any study that considers the 
Age of Projects should cross more than one particular approach as traditionally understood by 
historians.31 Commercial, religious and legal historical perspectives are most common here, 
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but also present are elements of political, intellectual, migration and cultural history. Moving 
across different approaches and historiographies has also imbued this work with particular 
sensitivity towards language employed during the period of study; while terms and 
terminology are frequently shared with the present day, meanings change. In particular, it seeks 
to recover what contemporaries actually understood when they chose to use words like ‘pirate’, 
‘piracy’, ‘empire’ and others. The manoeuvring to define these specific words throughout are 
not merely interesting asides, but part and parcel of the events detailed here. 
It was never the intention, when either researching or initially writing for this study, to seek 
to work with these trends and developments in scholarship for its own sake. This has been a 
source-led doctorate, and one in which the archival research itself has made the case for the 
analytical value of these schools of thought. Research has been undertaken across North 
America, as well as in Edinburgh, Dublin and London, providing material from thirty-four 
archives and research libraries. Archive work has made it possible to reconstruct the story of 
events in this period and the many connections that supported the anglophone world in ways 
difficult for previous studies, which have tended to over-rely upon material from London, 
specifically at the National Archives and the British Library. Both hold important and relevant 
collections and are used extensively here, but much of what they contain appears different 
when situated alongside material from other repositories. 
This is not a study of English outlaws at sea or their reception on land, but of how pirates 
were actively created during a crisis moment in the history of a loosely-formed and diverse 
anglophone world. The struggle against common and absolute enemies was a persistent feature 
which bound empires together, so any emergent global thalassocracy required adversaries 
fitting to its maritime orientation. The attendant scramble to construct, define and suppress 
pirates provides a lens to view how individuals attempted to harness the benefits of overseas 
expansion for themselves, an objective they pursued through appeals to many different local, 
regional and global contexts. It does not map how they did so as part of an inexorable rise of a 
“British Empire”, integrated by the actions of English parliamentarians or imperial officials. 
Instead it focuses upon individual schemes, imagined on Irish plantations, in Jamaican ports 
or in New England towns, whose adherents saw opportunity in the climate of innovation 
fostered by two wars, first against France and latterly against the pirates. Thus interest in pirates 




intensification and growing prominence of debates about how an empire should look and the 
desire of individuals of often middling social status to carve a place within it for themselves. 
*** 
The popular understanding of early modern pirates as it exists today has become essentially 
ahistorical, a creation of English literature only distantly influenced by actual people and 
events. The romantic image of a daring, comic or deviant outlaw, absolved of the 
responsibilities that came with a life spent on land, continues to endure, even as modern legal 
systems remain unchanged in their commitment to punish acts of piracy severely.32 Scholarship 
is not immune to this creation, so any historical research opting to investigate pirates at length 
is obliged to consider and to historicise the sailors in question, to unpack precisely what was 
meant by this term in any given period and establish who it referred to. This means asking 
what was meant by the English word pirate by the late seventeenth century, who the people 
which attracted this designation actually were, as well as what the crime of piracy was 
considered to be in law. 
A timeless, fundamental characteristic of pirates and piracy is the committing of organised 
acts of aggression and taking at sea by the crew of one craft upon another, a practice known in 
its most neutral form as maritime predation.33 As a behaviour, it has been common globally 
for thousands of years. Ancient Greek sources recorded frequent seizures of their shipping in 
the eastern Mediterranean as early as BC 1700, while coastal raiding became similarly 
common in both China and the Red Sea during the following millennium.34 These practices 
continued throughout the middle ages and by the thirteenth century had become an enduring 
part of life at sea. At this time, Japanese ships regularly attacked Chinese sailors in the South 
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China Seas; Islamic and Byzantine vessels in the Mediterranean became targets for islanders 
from the Aegean; and, in the Baltic, shipping out of Hanseatic towns was harried by crafts 
fitted out in Danish ports.35 Chokepoints in global trade, such as the straits of Malacca, Hormuz 
or, later, Florida, were ideal sites for these aggressors to seize goods, as well as people as 
hostages and slaves.36 Yet, however destructive these actions may appear, they should be 
considered disruptive rather than detrimental to commercial exchange. Stolen goods invariably 
had to be sold, and captive-taking could lead to trade and migration – a common occurrence, 
for instance, between Christians from Southern Europe and Muslims from North Africa in the 
late-medieval Mediterranean.37 Acts of aggression and taking redirected trade networks 
globally for many centuries, conducive towards their expansion into often new and unexpected 
places. 
While maritime predation itself was ancient, only a limited number of the sailors above 
would have qualified as pirates in the eyes of their contemporaries. The word has been 
translated today into many languages to mean those who committed maritime predation while 
unlicensed by a sovereign, state or corporate body, yet during the early modern period, many 
terminologies existed to describe aggression at sea. By the sixteenth century, seaborne raiders 
frequenting the coasts of Ming China were described in Mandarin as haizei and wokou, 
referring respectively to those who originated from within the imperial system and those from 
beyond (predominantly inferring Japanese). Subjecthood and foreignness, therefore, became 
built into Chinese terminology surrounding maritime predation.38 Ottoman Turkish similarly 
had no direct equivalent of pirate. Its speakers instead imported variants of corsaro from Italian 
to describe the predominantly Christian sailors who attacked their vessels in the Mediterranean, 
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creating a vocabulary intended to describe religious conflict.39 The extent to which each of 
these terms overlapped or differed from one another is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
together they emphasise that, while maritime predation was practiced globally, attendant 
languages to describe it were constructed, changed over time and influenced by regional, as 
well as local, contexts. 
Across the centuries, pirates have to be considered as sharing much with other sailors, but 
were also part of a distinctly European tradition of describing and seeking to regulate maritime 
predation. Etymologically, pirate is derived from the ancient Greek peirates, and, as already 
touched upon, the cognate pirata was developed into a category of enemy by the political elite 
of the Roman Republic.40 Retaining a sensitivity towards differences in terminology, the 
admittedly patchy scholarship identifies two distinct groups as “pirates” by the middle ages. 
The first were Vikings, who were described as such in the writings of the chroniclers who 
recorded their ventures southwards to trade and attack coastal settlements.41 The second group 
tended to be Muslim sailors operating out of North Africa and parts of the Middle East, whose 
maritime conflict with Christians became sustained during the twelfth century.42 The history 
of the pirate was, therefore, initially confined to Europe and the Mediterranean, being either a 
participant in the reified confessional conflicts of the Mediterranean or a more independent 
coastal raider. 
This dual nature of pirates endured into the early modern period. A particular continuity of 
practice and terminology existed in the Mediterranean, where, by the 1500s, the Knights of 
Malta and the Ottomans continued the struggle that had begun there with the Crusades. Yet it 
was only the latter who became known as the “Barbary pirates” in English.43 In parallel, an 
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Atlantic context emerged to this history. The first pirates in the Caribbean – as described by 
Spanish military and political figures – were Huguenot sailors, who first entered the region 
during the 1530s intent upon attacking Iberian shipping. Four decades later, they were followed 
by the Dutch Sea Beggars as part of their own war against Phillip II.44 All the while, coastal 
raiding continued throughout the European Continent. The Baltic and the North Sea were 
frequented by privately owned vessels that attacked shipping, many operating out of Bremen 
from the mid-fifteenth century.45 Similarly, the Munster Coast in Ireland provided a base from 
which sailors plundered vessels on England’s shores well into the seventeenth century.46 A 
significant characteristic of the 1600s was that this latter group of coastal raiders began to move 
further afield in pursuit of more lucrative cargos. Coastal raiders followed the Huguenot and 
the Sea Beggars to the Caribbean, but also ventured to the Red Sea, intent upon capturing 
ships.47 So, although predatory behaviours at sea were common worldwide by the late 
seventeenth century, Europeans understood pirates operating globally to be a relatively recent 
phenomenon. 
Two letters written in the prosperous city of Calicut (today Kozhikode, in the Indian state of 
Kerala) on the Malabar Coast demonstrate how pirates were conceived within this newly global 
context. The first, dated 23 November 1696, was penned by an agent for the English East India 
Company (EIC) and relays a sequence of events that began with the arrival of a 300-ton vessel 
under English colours into the harbour earlier that month. From shore, this vessel’s sails 
blended in with the thousands of European trade ships that arrived into the city every year. Yet, 
upon entering the harbour, the unnamed craft altered course and struck its flag, the sailors 
aboard replacing it with Danish colours. It then turned to fire a broadside towards three 
anchored vessels of Mughal, English and Persian origin. Taken by surprise, the few mariners 
aboard them surrendered. The master of the hostile vessel, said to be a Dutch resident of New 
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York, then issued a ransom of £10,000 apiece from any resident of Calicut willing to pay, but 
received no reply. In an attempt to raise the stakes, the crew then pulled down their Danish flag 
and ‘hoisted bloody colours’, setting fire first to one ship and then another, reducing the people 
and goods kept below their decks to ash. No ransom money materialised, however, prompting 
the captain and some of his crew to take a small boat for the shore to press their demands. They 
were granted an audience with the city’s ruler, Bharani Tirunal Manavikrama, stating that they 
would loot the city if the money was not provided, emphasising that they ‘acknowledged no 
countrey men, they had sold their countrey, and were sure to be hanged if taken’.48 The 
narrative is then cut short by the scribe recording the events. The nameless ship and unknown 
crew departed sometime thereafter, having failed to extract the riches they sought. A significant 
characteristic here is how the swapping-out of the flags foreshadowed the growing violence of 
the sailors’ intent, first obscuring their place of origin before moving to reject allegiance and 
nationhood outright. How much of this episode actually occurred and how much was 
deliberately embellished, or distorted by rumour, is unclear. 
A second letter, written seven years later in 1703, conveys “pirates” that were altogether less 
remarkable. Its writer was George Wooley, a ship’s captain for the EIC, who had fallen ill 
shortly after his arrival in Calicut. During his extended recovery, he was able to observe life in 
the port closely, especially the coming and going of merchant vessels. He remarked that ‘I have 
seen no difference between a pirate and merchant ship: both black and white stocking off with 
all sorts of merchandises ... returning with coffers of money’. Furthermore, he also remarked 
that employees of the Company were in the habit of assisting European vessels of often unclear 
national origins, which he identified as pirates.49 The crews described in these two letters had 
substantial differences. In the first example, the writer conveys the spoil inflicted by a group 
of desperate outlaws, people whose extra-national status served to explain their rejection of 
morality altogether. In the second, pirates appear altogether more mundane, as traders moving 
with an expanding global economy, although ultimately beyond the control of any one 
sovereign or corporate body. 
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Moving to consider how common lawyers defined piracy as a crime, similarly striking 
differences are visible. To date, there exists no book-length study of piracy in law dedicated to 
the early modern period, though a number of scholars have taken an interest for the sake of 
finding preludes to later debates in international law.50 With varying degrees of emphasis, 
scholars agree both that it is not possible to clearly define the crime of piracy before the 
eighteenth century and that at the time it was a subject of much confusion. Piracy’s definition 
was especially a problem in England, Ireland and the Americas, as it had only been a crime in 
Roman law when the Offences at Sea Act (1536) placed the criminal jurisdiction of admiralty 
courts under the common law, a legal system in which it had no felony equivalent.51 As a 
consequence, lawyers tended to reach for whichever crimes under, or transgressions of, the 
common law they believed equated most closely with piracy, such as robbery, murder, treason, 
assault and theft.52 At the same time, the jurisdictions of the English and Irish High Court of 
Admiralty affected anglophone conceptions of pirates, as they only held the undisputed right 
to prosecute sailors from England, Ireland, Scotland and these kingdoms’ overseas 
possessions. Contemporaries, therefore, only saw fellow subjects convicted, while the 
nebulous character of the crime allowed for subtly different understandings to be applied in 
order to secure a conviction. 
By considering the contents of these two letters and the instability of piracy as a crime in 
law, the images people in the late seventeenth century had of pirates and who they actually 
were can be established. The most straightforward definition to establish is a broad one of 
piracy as capital crime. Encompassing its various usages, it was seen to be a hostile act(s) 
performed at sea without any form of sanction that a prosecuting authority recognised, most 
commonly, but not always, resulting in the seizure of property or people. 
More complex are the vernacular imaginings of the pirate, which were not simply analogous 
to this definition at law. The first variant of which was allegorical and most succinctly laid out 
by the Scottish Admiralty Advocate Alexander Higgins in 1705: 
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Pirats properly have no country, but by the nature of their guilt, separate themselves, and renounce 
on the matter, the benefit of all lawful societies: they are worse than ravenous beasts, in as far as 
the fatal reason gives them a greater faculty and skill to do evil: and whereas such creatures follow 
the bent of their natures, and that promiscuously extinguish humanity in themselves.53 
The pirate Higgins refers to existed as an extra-national other, for whom existing beyond the 
laws of landed society had caused moral degeneration into something approaching what 
Thomas Hobbes identified as the state of nature. This status of the pirate is further testified to 
by its association with other practices believed to be deviant, including Islam, witchcraft and 
sodomy – a figure comparable, for Protestants at least, to the Jesuit or “savage”.54 This 
imagining was, once again, accompanied by a reading of Cicero’s description of pirates as 
hostis humani generis, in this context to be understood as beyond all recognised (Roman) law. 
The translation of this phrase into English is similarly revealing, as pirates are described as 
either ‘enemies of all’, ‘enemies of mankind’ or ‘enemies of all nations’.55 The widespread use 
of these exact phrases in print when discussing subjects other than pirates further underscores 
their status as different, as exceptional, as other. English writers used them to describe Satan, 
witches, atheists, the Pope, Turks and, frequently after 1688, Louis XIV.56 In fact, a small 
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number of accounts associated not just the French king but also James II/VII (hereafter James 
II) directly with pirates.57 The allegorical pirate was always perceived as amoral, rootless and 
malevolent in intent. If a man or woman of means was informed that pirates existed somewhere 
distant, this was the image that likely formed in the mind, making it the understanding of the 
pirate that was most commonly deployed rhetorically and in print. 
Equally, a material understanding of pirates existed, related to the actual identities and 
behaviours of individual sailors. The language used to describe the material pirate varied 
immensely and could also include ‘freebooters’ (from Dutch), ‘buccaneers’ (from French), 
‘renegados’ (from Spanish), ‘sea rovers’ (from Dutch), picaroons (from Spanish) and, even 
without a letter of marque, ‘privateers’ (a contraction of private and volunteer). This prolific 
borrowing and coining of terminology suggests that there was a persistent need to understand 
material pirates with a level of moral relativism and that English-speakers who knew these 
sailors accepted that they differed according to time and place. 
From the early 1690s, anglophone people referred to as pirates were most often those 
displaced by the impact of a war stretching far beyond Europe. Scotland, for instance, suffered 
its worst decade in living memory, with conflict contributing to declining trade and famine, 
uprooting many into Ulster, where Scots once again settled plantations on lands vacated by 
defeated Irish Catholics.58 In Connacht, Leinster and Muster, officials reported that, after the 
Jacobites were defeated in 1691, Catholics also fled their homes en masse, a practice so 
common as to be known as ‘going out upon your keeping’.59 Many of them made their way to 
France and the Caribbean, from where some launched attacks upon English shipping, doing so 
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under French colours or of their own accord and prizing the EIC shipments laden with bullion, 
which departed for the Indian Ocean.60 Indeed, the outbreak of war in 1688 had an especially 
drastic impact on England’s commercial traffic. The English East and West Indies fleets 
suffered heavy losses; at least four thousand ships originating from England alone were lost 
during the conflict.61 In the Caribbean, English plantations felt the consequences of war most 
severely. William Beeston, the governor of Jamaica, reported concerns about depopulation in 
1693, complaining that, in the first four years of the war, over half of the island’s people – 
enslaved, free blacks and Europeans – had either been killed, fled into the service of the French 
and the Dutch or set out to join the ‘buccaneers’ in the Bahamas.62 At the same time, the region 
of North America spanning from New Jersey to Maine also suffered. A military coalition of 
the Huron, the French and the Abenaki spilled southwards out of the Great Lakes region, the 
former seeking to reclaim their lands from the expansionist Haudenosaunee and English 
colonists.63 Persistent fears of invasion motivated some colonists to enter the maritime 
networks that were already developing between the northeast and the Indian Ocean. As one 
captain of a vessel on the coast of India wrote to an EIC agent in 1691, ‘wee designe noe harme 
of any of our country, it is the troublesomeness of the tymes att home that occations us to come 
out on this account’.64 These sailors traded and dispersed across the ocean’s many littoral 
societies, taking service with numerous different sovereigns, while others attacked Mughal 
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treasure shipments that converged at Surat.65 These were the people whom contemporaries 
called pirates in the 1690s. A cross-section of the multitude driven from Britain, Ireland and 
the Americas, they departed on unlikely ventures to find riches in places far and distant. Many 
died or returned penniless, but the most successful speculated on land, became plantation 
owners, brokered east India goods and acted as recruiters for trading voyages. In their own 
way, therefore, the poor became active participants in the Age of Projects. 
Throughout this dissertation, unsanctioned maritime predation is seen to have been 
conceptualised in these three ways by the late seventeenth century. Piracy as a crime in law 
applied only to Stuart subjects and although a broad consensus existed about its meaning, it 
retained nuances that could be manipulated for purposes beyond the administration of justice. 
The second was the allegorical pirate, who represented an extra-national other, a deviant whose 
image was not moored in contemporary actions or events, but functioned as a useable rhetorical 
device. The third was the material pirate, European or occasionally North African sailors who 
committed acts of maritime predation globally and whose numbers increased significantly as 
a consequence of war after 1688. Individuals across the anglophone world were able to conflate 
and differentiate between these usages as they pleased, making the pirate an eminently 
malleable enemy of empire and a valuable resource for those seeking to direct processes of 
overseas expansion. 
*** 
In the years immediately following the 1688 Revolution, it was not just the poor who looked 
beyond their immediate locality for opportunities. People of wealth and status began to 
conceive of more elaborate projects and schemes for personal advancement, seeing opportunity 
within the precarity experienced by the anglophone world during its first truly global war. 
Public authorities and patronage brokers were now willing to entertain novel commercial 
ventures, institutional creations and plantation schemes which otherwise would have been 
ignored in previous decades. Yet while this war sparked the Age of Projects, the schemes of 
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which it was comprised had far deeper historical roots. It was the long-term changes that swept 
through the anglophone world across the seventeenth century made this phenomenon possible. 
One of the most conspicuous developments that Stuart dominions underwent across the 
seventeenth century was the growing commercial involvements of its denizens beyond Europe. 
Scottish merchants and settlers, for example, undertook numerous colonial ventures in North 
America, from Nova Scotia, to the Carolinas and the Jersies.66 At the same time, they made 
gradual inroads into trade with New England, the Middle Colonies and the Caribbean, as well 
as securing a place for themselves within the trans-Atlantic carrying trade. This admittedly 
modest success meant that, by the 1690s, Scottish merchants were itching to expand further.67 
In parallel, Irish traders and colonists came to also have an important role in the Atlantic. Cork 
and Limerick became significant ports as the century proceeded, exporting beef, butter and 
other provisions to feed the rapidly expanding slave populations of the Caribbean and the 
Chesapeake.68 Merchants in Boston and New York City also came to assume a similar place 
to their Irish counterparts, with the Congregationalist heartlands supplying large quantities of 
provisions to the colonies of Virginia, Maryland, Jamaica and Barbados.69 In England these 
changes had an even more profound impact. Coming to account for as much as twenty percent 
of the kingdom’s national income by 1700, overseas trade, especially links across the Atlantic 
and trade with the east through the EIC, saw the kingdom annually import hundreds of 
thousands of pounds in goods such as calico silks, sugar, tobacco, spices and coffee.70 
Concurrently and less conspicuously, informal trade links began to also grow up with other 
peoples. By the later 1660s, New York’s Dutch population continued their trade with 
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Amsterdam even after the English conquest (1664); Irish Catholic merchant forged 
connections with French plantations in the Caribbean, such as Guadeloupe and Martinique, 
while an enduring traffic in goods conducted by English buccaneers proceeded into Spanish 
ports such as Cartagena and indigenous communities in the Gulf of Darién.71 These 
Commercial networks became the webs that spanned and bound the anglophone world 
together, and exchange with other peoples continued in spite of the passage of protectionist 
legislation by English parliament from the mid-seventeenth century.72 
Despite this rapid expansion, Stuart subjects had difficulty with a persistent and intractable 
economic problem, which they shared with all Europeans. Lack of stable currency was an issue 
from at least the 1500s, as Europe and the Americas suffered from the global imbalances in 
the world economy, which directed the majority of precious metals out of the Americas into 
China and the Indian Ocean.73 The Nine Years War (1688–1697) simply served to make this 
shortage more acute, as greater tax burdens extracted an already limited supply of specie from 
the population.74 ‘Scarceness of coin’ was widely cited as a problem.75 Together, these changed 
economic conditions played an important role in creating the Age of Projects. The profits 
promised by overseas trade, combined with a relative scarcity of specie, spurred those with the 
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requisite status and access to capital to entertain new commercial opportunities, many of which 
simply did not exist before the latter part of the century. 
The exploitation of these particular trades was also fuelled by shifting social demographics. 
Across the early modern period, the middle section of anglophone societies, or “middling sort”, 
grew rapidly, creating a far higher proportion of gentry farmers in rural areas, as well as 
professionals and merchants in cities.76 In England, the rising export of woollen cloth – 
especially into Southern European ports after the 1550s – facilitated both enclosure across the 
countryside and a greater number of merchants and artisans in cities. By 1700, urban areas 
come to hold five percent of the population in Scotland and Ireland, while thirteen percent of 
England’s population resided in towns.77 Irish social change was driven by particular 
circumstances, however. Military conflicts and subsequent colonisation facilitated the 
displacement of Catholics by Protestant settlers, causing the population of Catholic Old 
English and native Irish aristocracy to decline, along with their overall share of landholding.78 
Most significant in the ascendency of these Protestant settlers was their being granted 2.5 
million acres following the Cromwellian Conquests of the 1650s.79 Equally, in the Chesapeake 
and the Caribbean, land and labour became gradually concentrated into the hands of wealthier, 
rather than small-time, planters, a change that was accelerated through the transition to 
enslaved labour in the second half of the seventeenth century.80 These were socio-economic 
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changes that ensured a higher proportion of the anglophone world’s population no longer 
worked the land. By 1750, as much as 33% of England’s population were employed outside of 
agriculture, a trend mirrored in a threefold increase in the number of sailors employed on 
English ships between 1580 and 1680.81 It was the growing quantity of merchants as well as 
current and would-be colonisers, who stood best placed to take advantage of this newly mobile 
population. 
The political conflicts of the seventeenth century, which continued to play out across the 
1690s, also empowered this middle section of society. Debates about the extent of royal 
prerogative and the precise religious forms that could safeguard Stuart domains from Catholic 
influence were a persistent source of civil strife after 1603.82 These two issues became 
especially incendiary when James II assumed the throne in 1685. His favouring of Catholics 
in Ireland and alleged persecution of religious dissenters in Scotland during the earlier years 
of his reign convinced many of his Protestant subjects that his intention was to eventually 
impose Catholicism across his realms.83 At the same time, his creation of the Dominion of New 
England in North America and attempts to work around or pack England’s Parliament 
convinced many that he intended to rule as an absolute monarch.84 His Protestant subjects were 
especially distressed by both trends against the background of Louis XIV’s territorial 
expansion on the European Continent. These anxieties eventually culminated in William III’s 
invasion of England on 5 November 1688, deposing James in England and, following armed 
conflicts, in Scotland and Ireland too. While the impact of this invasion was markedly different 
across the king’s new domains, it served to empower legislatures across William’s new 
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territories. Representative bodies benefitted from the passage of the Scottish Claim of Right 
(1689) and English Bill of Rights in England (1689), the restoration of legislative assemblies 
in the former territories of the Dominion of New England that same year and, eventually, the 
establishment of regular parliaments in Ireland after 1692.85 Together, these constitutional 
changes enhanced the ability of local elites to influence political decision making. A further 
significant consequence of this constitutional change was that the 1688 Revolution knitted 
together transatlantic political interest groups in the Atlantic, as well as sparking an enduring 
debate in England about how Stuart subjects should interact with the east.86 Thus a new 
political reality emerged. The anglophone world continued to face a Catholic threat, but the 
capacity for individuals or interest groups to influence political decisions as to how it might be 
met grew markedly. 
These political upheavals also served to shatter Anglican hegemony on public worship, 
which had been installed following the Restoration of the Stuarts. By this point, antipopery 
had been a unifying position for reformers for over a hundred years, yet the question of which 
form of Protestantism could best replace – and protect against – Catholicism was never 
decisively resolved.87 The institution of common Anglicanism in England, Scotland and 
Ireland after 1660 had been intended as a means to control the animosities that religious 
disputes had fomented, seeing Stuart possessions in the Americas become a haven for 
Catholics and Protestant dissenters.88 Despite this institution of uniconfessional regimes on 
one side of the Atlantic, non-Anglican Protestants saw their fortunes rise after 1688. William’s 
invasion ultimately saw the Anglican Church completely lose its established status in Scotland, 
ensured the maintenance of some religious toleration at law in England and a reduction of 
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status for the Church of Ireland to match their Presbyterian rival in Ulster.89 With the state now 
unwilling to protect the Anglican Church as it had done in previous decades, a range of new 
possibilities presented themselves for Protestant religious minorities. Non-Anglican 
Protestants could now hope for preferment and an influence they could not have previously 
achieved, while their preachers now saw an opportunity to secure new converts. Anglican 
clergy, in contrast, had to now find a way to permanently live with open religious dissent or to 
redefine how their confession operated in order to fight for converts in a religious 
marketplace.90 
These four themes heavily influenced the Age of Projects’ forms and participants. After 
1688, projectors of middling means could consider relatively new and lucrative economic 
opportunities in the Americas or the east, conceiving of ventures that took advantage of a 
growing population of landless people. At the same time, expanded opportunities for political 
engagement and a loosening of the religious hegemony enjoyed by the Anglican Church also 
allowed previously ostracised groups to court public authority, a key component in the 
outcome of all schemes outline here. 
A significant exponent of projects before the 1690s was the natural philosopher and 
physician William Petty. Educated in the Netherlands and originally an associate of the 
reformer Samuel Hartlib, Petty gained a measure of prominence after conducting a survey of 
Ireland during the Cromwellian Land Confiscations.91 His widely read works of what he called 
‘Political Arithmetick’ were produced and circulated in manuscript between 1672 and 1676 
while he was living in Ireland.92 In these different texts, Petty is notable for advocating the 
benefits of calculating how land and labour could be reduced to numbers in order that both 
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might be utilised efficiently, yet his understanding of population was considerably more 
holistic than many of his contemporaries. The later published version of Political Arithmetick 
underscored the significance of maintaining a high population for agriculture, manufacturing, 
artisanry, overseas trade and the military, which he collectively identified as the pillars of any 
commonwealth.93 Attracting and retaining sailors, he wrote, was especially important, as 
‘every Seaman of industry and ingenuity, is not only a Navigator, but a Merchant, and also a 
Soldier’.94 This perspective likely resulted from his having spent time on board ships during 
his youth, experiences he built upon through his position as Judge of the High Court of 
Admiralty in Ireland from 1678.95 The accumulation of specie was also significant for Petty. 
Borrowing the idea of balance of trade from earlier thinkers such as Francis Bacon and Thomas 
Mun, he argued that a polity’s economy should be understood numerically and that the total 
value in specie of imports should exceed those of exports.96 He understood the need to think 
of land and sea together, emphasising that a numerous, efficiently managed population 
involved in overseas trade was the foundation of any society’s wealth, which he measured 
narrowly as the accumulation of coinage. 
Historians have long called this thinking political economy and see Petty as the most 
significant of its foundational thinkers.97 Yet it would be incorrect to imagine his theories of 
population, commerce, manufacturing and agriculture remained within the purely economic 
sphere, hermetically sealed from any other concerns. Across his lifetime, Petty bent to fit with 
whatever political changes stirred across Britain and Ireland. While he was from Ireland’s 
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growing population of Protestant gentry, Petty was at once viewed as useful and distrusted by 
successive governments, being persistently denied the patronage granted to his long-time 
friends Thomas Hobbes and Samuel Pepys.98 He formulated many projects for financial gain, 
but also because he had particular ideas that he sought to put into practice. In 1674, he 
promoted a number of schemes to the Lords Justices of Ireland, all intended to aid the 
conversion of the island’s population to Protestantism. This aspiration had, of course, been a 
periodic preoccupation of English and Irish Protestants for some years and so was 
unremarkable in intention. Yet his methods were primarily attempts to put what he had devised 
as political arithmetick into action. They included intensive plantation schemes and linen-
manufacturing projects to encourage overseas trade, as well as forms of social engineering, 
such as public schemes to marry English women to Irish men, to rebuild the houses of Catholics 
and to distribute the Bible widely in Irish. Such a wide-ranging programme of “improvement”, 
he argued, would make Ireland useful for England and for the Protestant cause, but, of course, 
allowed him to test out his own theories in the process.99 Time and again, Petty continued to 
advocate projects in this vein, extending to similar plans for the Americas and a population 
redistribution scheme within England, Scotland and Ireland.100 
While remembered more for his ideas, Petty sought to bridge the gap between ideology and 
practice. As a landowner of middling status, his persistent challenge was to triangulate his own 
financial interests, the application of his ideas and the need to secure the support of a potential 
patron. Many of the schemes explored in this study took direct influence from Petty, as he was 
read even more widely after his death in 1687, according him a level of status that was denied 
to him in life.101 Like Petty, those that came to advance particular projects in the 1690s saw 
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enormous potential in overseas trade and sought to influence political decision making, to 
utilise landless populations and to position themselves as advocates of the Protestant cause. He 
was, then, both an influence upon and an individual archetype for the Age of Projects. 
It is worth noting that not every scheme proposed during this period was as grand as those 
that Petty envisaged. There were plans to find shipwrecks in the Caribbean, and Defoe invested 
in an attempt to create a diving engine, neither of which had any especially colonial or imperial 
impulses.102 Yet others followed him more directly. In an era once described as being afflicted 
by the ‘rage of party’, many schemes had political implications.103 Ambitious plans were 
conceived by Whig politicians and their allies to resettle Huguenot refugees in Ireland, New 
England, Virginia and South Carolina, as well as into parts of England. In doing so, they 
believed that they could not only provide bulwarks against French influence and supply much-
needed settlers, but also demonstrate the capacity of different nationalities and Protestant 
denominations to live together peaceably.104 Their efforts were met with fierce resistance from 
a number of Tory politicians, who now feared that these efforts were an attempt to bolster 
dissent and undermine the Church of England.105 Other plans spoke more directly to religious 
concerns. Clergy across the anglophone world claimed that vice had proliferated in recent 
years. In response, voluntary societies formed in Boston, Dublin, London and Edinburgh, 
intent on policing a population they believed to be in the throes of moral decline.106 Others saw 
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overseas commercial endeavours as the surest means to weather the hardships of the age. The 
Scottish merchant and financier William Paterson proposed an international colony at Darien 
during the mid-1690s to prove the universal benefits of free trade and draw people from across 
the world into Scotland.107 In contrast and around the same time, the EIC Director Josiah Child 
implemented a contrasting scheme to promote the wide-scale settlement of enslaved people at 
English factories across the Indian Ocean, part of an effort to demonstrate the benefits of 
commercial monopolies.108 In each example, projectors suggested and implemented ideas that 
vindicated specific ideological commitments, rather than serving any particular notion of 
public good. 
Yet, to ensure the success of their plans, projectors had to argue for the benefits of what they 
advocated in terms that spoke to the core anxieties of the era. Concern for the person of William 
III provides a significant insight into contemporary fears. Despite the fact that his invasion was 
itself a cause of much of the uncertainty that his subjects faced, after the 1688 Revolution, 
Williamites persistently styled him as the saviour of Protestantism and of lawful government, 
underscoring his ideological affinity with the majority of those he ruled.109 These efforts were 
reflected in a speech given at Boston by Richard Coote, Earl of Bellomont, in 1699. He argued 
that ‘Ever since the year 1602 England has had a succession of kings that have been aliens’ as 
they had ‘been in an unnatural manner plotting and contriving to undermine and subvert our 
religion, laws and liberties’ until ‘God was pleased by his almighty power, and infinite mercy 
and goodness to give us a true English king in the person of his present majesty’.110 These 
efforts did not, however, succeed in universally reasserting the idea that his allegiance to 
Protestantism meant that the king had his new subjects’ best interests at heart. Especially after 
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the death of Mary II at the end of 1694, William was increasingly viewed not as a Protestant 
hero but as a Dutch invader. In New York in 1698, one alleged Jacobite was said to remark 
that it was a shame that ‘such a hump back’d crook’d nos’d Dutch dog should rule the kingdom 
of England’.111 Indeed, Jacobite conspiracies and assassination plots were hatched across 
Britain, Ireland, the Americas and the European continent, and William’s supporters knew that 
if even one was successful, then it could lead to their being overwhelmed by France.112 Across 
the decade, the king’s public detractors only grew, from Irish Catholics to English country 
Whigs and, eventually, Country politicians in Scotland. In Ireland and Scotland, an image even 
took hold of William III as a successor to Cromwell, a tyrannical foreign invader set upon 
plundering rather than saving the nation.113 Disillusionment with William III, threats to his 
person and the fear of a resurgent Jacobitism as a French proxy all contributed to the 
uncertainties which characterised the age. 
Fears of national decline were particularly apparent in English printed material. One 
historian wrote during the 1690s that he lived through ‘this declining age’, a ‘middle period’ 
in the history of their nation during which they might begin to falter and fall to the influence 
of France.114 Indeed, the former hegemony that English political and ecclesiastical structures 
enjoyed over Scotland and Ireland during the Restoration had partly dissipated, as had, over 
time, the sense that the Americas were isolated from Europe.115 There were long-term 
consequences to the fact that separate constitutional settlements were reached in England and 
Scotland, seeing the latter regain a more complete independence, while Catholic Ireland 
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initially remained loyal to James II.116 Many in England came to see their immediate 
neighbours as serious rivals. English merchants, politicians and clergy worried persistently 
about the ascent of Scotland as a confident Presbyterian kingdom, fearing that they would 
come to dominate trade with Ireland and expand their reach into the Americas.117 At the same 
time they saw Ireland as a danger even after the conclusion of the Jacobite War in 1691, as 
plots traced to St Germain periodically caused panic amongst English and Irish Protestants.118 
Significant also was the ascendency of organised political interest groups in Scotland around 
the Duke of Hamilton and in Ireland around William Molyneux, in both places asserting forms 
of national rights opposed to English domination of the islands.119 Across the Atlantic, overseas 
possessions, from New York and Maryland to Jamaica and Saint Kitts, also experienced 
uprisings following immediately after 1688, some of which took years to resolve fully.120 
These events fed a perception that Stuart possessions in the Americas had become too 
autonomous and influential, so consequently needed to be made dependent upon England.121 
Fear of Louis XIV and his projected victory thus manifested itself in many forms. 
Anglophone Protestants feared a scarcity of money and people, divisions in religion and 
politics and the unpopularity of William III, as well as the competition England faced from 
other Stuart dominions. A solution for many was for these extended territories to be bound 
together more tightly. The term ‘English Empire’ first appeared in print in 1685, yet only by 
1700 had it entered common usage, joined at the same time by a concept of Scottish maritime 
empire.122 What these words meant and quite whose visions of empire should be implemented 
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became a persistent source of conflict, and it was through projects that the contest between 
these ideas unfolded.  
In this highly competitive environment, the surest means to bolster a scheme’s chance of 
success was for its architects to gain some form of state backing. If projectors were able to 
achieve this end, then their plans might contribute to processes of state formation, which 
accelerated dramatically following the 1688 Revolution. Both the new powers allocated to 
English Parliament and the enormous expense of warfare on the Continent at this time served 
to expand the administrative and fiscal capacities of the state in England.123 These 
developments only gained momentum through Anglo–Scottish Union in 1707, in which the 
emergent British state began to take institutional form.124 Yet, in the years between these 
events, the growing authority of central government bodies in England did not serve to simply 
draw the wider anglophone world into the orbit of London.125 The establishment of the Board 
of Trade in 1695, the passage of commercial legislation in England throughout 1696 and, 
finally, the failed Resumption Bill of 1701 were all intended to grant English institutions 
control over trade flows and, consequently, greater revenues.126 The view from North America, 
however, was rather different. Leisler’s Rebellion in New York and Coode’s Rebellion in 
Maryland are often considered equivalent American contexts of 1688, but they did not result 
in the wholesale ceding of governmental or legal control to English institutions, be they 
parliament, courts or bureaucratic entities.127 In fact, one former political creation aimed at 
enhancing state authority in the Americas – the Dominion of New England – actually 
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disintegrated as a result of the Revolution.128 The wider Stuart world remained a collection of 
proprietary, private and crown colonies, as well as factories, trade outposts and consulates, 
well into the eighteenth century. This tangle of different and competing state forms made it 
challenging for anyone in England to effectively control either overseas territories or 
movements of people and goods at sea. 
An absence of hegemonic state institutions only created opportunities for projectors. While 
1688 may not have heralded the emergence of a coherent ‘imperial state’, it did underscore the 
existence of a common political culture that stretched across the dominions of the Stuarts.129 
Antipopery, for instance, remained an enduring component in Protestant discourse, present in 
debates from Ireland to New England and from Barbados to St Helena.130 Similarly, the 
encouragement and regulation of overseas trade was taken to be a universal good, even though 
public debate about its organisation was fierce.131 These common discursive frameworks were 
used by projectors to dramatise the threat posed by common enemies and inflate the public 
benefits of their schemes, often in the hope that their efforts would secure the patronage of a 
state body. This dynamic was evident in a plan devised in 1695 by the ship’s captain Richard 
Long, who intended to settle a colony in Panama and secure access to Spanish gold and silver 
mines there. Realising that he could not colonise this chosen region with his resources alone, 
Long then suggested the project to a number of public bodies in the following years. First, the 
captain tried to sell his scheme to the Jamaican government as an opportunity to draw bullion 
into the island and encourage trade.132 Long then sought the backing of the English Admiralty 
                                                 
128 Douglas Bradburn, ‘The Visible Fist: The Chesapeake Tobacco Trade in War and the Purpose of Empire’, 
WMQ, vol.68, no.3 (2011), pp.361-386; Elizabeth Mancke, ‘Negotiating an Empire: Britain and its Overseas 
Peripheries’ in Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy (eds.), Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries 
in the Americas, 1500–1820 (2002), pp.242-258. Steve Pincus has argued for the importance of state building 
efforts by James II, Pincus, 1688, pp.118-220. 
129 Pincus, ‘Reconfiguring the British Empire’, pp.63-70’; Michael Braddick, ‘Civility and Authority’ in 
Armitage and Braddick, The British Atlantic World, 120-132; Brendan McConville, The King’s Three Faces: 
The Rise & Fall of Royal America, 1688-1776 (2006), pp.49-70. 
130 James Kelly, ‘Disappointing the Boundless Ambition of France’: Irish Protestants and the Fear of Invasion, 
1661-1815, Studia Hibernica, no.37 (2011), pp.37-50; Owen Stanwood, ‘The Protestant Moment: Antipopery, 
the Revolution of 1688–1689, and the Making of an Anglo‐American Empire’, Journal of British Studies, 
vol.46, no.3 (2007), pp.481-507; Beckles, ‘Irish Indentured Servants and Freemen in the English West Indies’, 
pp.517-522. 
131 Jonathan Barth, ‘Reconstructing Mercantilism: Consensus and Conflict in British Imperial Economy in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, WMQ, vol.73, no.2 (2016); Steve Pincus, ‘Rethinking Mercantilism: 
Political Economy, the British Empire, and the Atlantic World in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 
WMQ, vol.69, no.1 (2012), pp.264-266. 12-23. 




Board for settlement designed to repel a predicted French invasion of Panama, before, finally, 
suggesting his plan to the directors of the Company of Scotland, this time as a common British 
endeavour to disrupt Catholic influence in Central America.133 While Long was unsuccessful 
on all counts, his attempts reveal how projects could enhance the authority of state institutions. 
Using commonly understood but nevertheless controversial issues, he attempted to catch the 
attention of prospective patrons, many of whom had roles within state institutions. If they were 
then sponsored by their chosen public body, projectors like Long could expand state influence, 
albeit asymmetrically and for largely self-interested reasons. 
As Long’s appeal to the Company of Scotland suggests, those with projects in mind also 
sought the support of quasi-state corporations. Rather than entirely commercial, value-
maximising organisations, many early modern trade corporations were also governmental 
entities, charged with the management of their employees and a range of others within their 
allocated jurisdictions.134 Controversies about how trade corporations should be operated only 
intensified after the Revolution. Monopoly companies, such as the English East India 
Company and Royal African Company, had previously aligned themselves with James II and 
were thus weakened by his fall.135 The diminishing of monopoly companies as they had existed 
under the former monarch allowed competing visions of corporate entities to emerge and 
become the subject of public debate across the anglophone world. They were predominantly 
concerned with issues of political economy, as well as the legal jurisdiction and the population 
management of trading companies. In response, established corporations now had to justify 
their existence anew, by demonstrating the vast profits they could deliver to their investors and 
wider society, alongside the efficacy of the specific political ideologies that underpinned their 
operations. This was a crisis of corporate organisation and, in turn, an opportunity to 
projectors.136 More adventurous schemes could now be suggested to new and established 
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corporations, which they would likely have rejected in more stable times. In 1699, for instance, 
one anonymous resident of New York City proposed a colony at Madagascar to the Company 
of Scotland, an organisation established by Act of Scottish Parliament, but opposed by all of 
the major English trade corporations.137 The proposal outlined the immense profits to be 
realised from the slave trade there and that the island could also serve as a foothold for the 
Company in the Indian Ocean. This suggestion resonated with some of the corporation’s 
directors, resulting in their initial attempts to establish a trade with the island four years later.138 
As a long-established but malleable part of early modern governance, trading companies 
became as increasingly important source of patronage for projectors, as the events of 1688 saw 
corporate monopolies weakened.  
From here, it is possible to begin to consider where pirates fitted into the social anxieties, 
material circumstances and political changes of the 1690s. As an extranational other, they held 
a rhetorical value, allowing individuals to argue that their own plans brought clear public 
benefits if they were able to suppress pirates and perhaps obtain state support in the process. 
At the same time, to claim that one particular group or practice encouraged pirates became a 
potent means to discredit rivals and advance individual plans. Others might use the material 
understanding of pirates to argue that they knew how these wayward sailors could be absorbed 
back into society and made useful. The malleability of the crime of piracy also had similar 
uses. Subtle alterations in the understanding of piracy made during investigations and trials 
could ensure that prosecutions took place, which then vindicated specific ideological positions. 
As part of the anglophone world’s common political language, the term pirate was applied 
unevenly and used to describe very different groups of people.  
*** 
This thesis will work to trace these relationships between pirates and the Age of Projects, 
considering their implications for the wider anglophone world. It is divided into five chapters, 
each oriented around a particular scheme, its many contexts and how pirates were created to 
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advance it. The first considers the renewed colonisation of Ireland during the 1690s and how 
debates about its purpose, divided between English and Irish Protestants, came to be reflected 
on sea. The passage of Roman Catholic migrants and refugees between Ireland and the French 
possessions, which only grew after the Jacobite War concluded, became central here. As 
colonisation schemes were once again implemented on land, Irish Protestants argued for 
relatively open connections to the wider world, while English interests sought to see the 
island’s coasts closed. To achieve the latter aim, the advocates of the English High Court of 
Admiralty sought to establish their court as the preeminent institution governing movements 
along Ireland’s coasts, an aim that played out through the attempted prosecution of a number 
of Irish sailors for piracy. 
The second chapter deals with the Company of Scotland’s Darien Scheme. It traces why the 
project was persistently associated with pirates, by situating it within a decades-long conflict 
in the Caribbean between plantation colonies and entrepôts. While it was gold and silver stolen 
from Spanish towns and treasure shipments that made both colonial forms possible for 
Protestants, by the 1690s those with interests in plantation economies had come to follow after 
the example set previously by Spanish government officials and associate free ports with 
pirates. The scheme’s architect, William Paterson, specifically sought to build his colony in 
Panama on the example of Caribbean buccaneers, who had operated in the region from the 
1650s. Against the background of French plans to seize control of the entire Caribbean, the 
conflict between these colonial forms became central to the eventual failure of the Darien 
Scheme, bookended by the trials of Scottish sailors for piracy in Seville during 1701. 
Chapter three focuses on Richard Coote, Earl of Bellomont, and his attempt to transfer Irish 
colonisation techniques to the northeast via a naval stores project. It begins by laying out how 
longue dureé processes of settlement and oceanic exchange steered the northeast to trade goods 
stolen in the Indian Ocean. Upon his arrival in New York in 1698, Bellomont was able to claim 
that his rivals were responsible for this trade with pirates, part of his attempt to eliminate those 
who stood in the way of his naval stores scheme, which he claimed would secure the region 
from France and break its dependency upon trade with Madagascar. When it became public 
knowledge that he himself had been involved with this trade, however, it threatened to 




The fourth chapter follows the attempt to create an Anglican missionary society, which 
picked up steam through the 1690s. The initial intention of this project’s promoters was to 
secure converts from among the ranks of the Quakers, who had grown substantially in North 
America from the mid-seventeenth century. It traces three particular fronts in the push to bring 
this project to fruition, being Anglican attempts to defeat a Catholic–Quaker coalition in 
Maryland who resisted their advance, a schism in Pennsylvania and, eventually, the accusation 
that the religious principles of the Society of Friends encouraged pirates. In particular, the latter 
allowed the scheme to be transformed into an attempt to spread Anglicanism across the 
Americas via the passage of an Act of English Parliament, something that a coalition of 
dissenter lobbyists came to oppose. 
Finally, chapter five is centred upon Madagascar and three particular schemes to colonise 
the island. The first was instituted in the 1640s by the Assada Company, the second by colonists 
from North America during the 1680s and the third and final by the Company of Scotland in 
1701. This recurring colonial project intended to link the trades of the Americas and Indian 
Ocean, but it also stood to undermine the monopoly of the EIC. In the second case, the EIC 
was in a fragile position after 1688, following its support for James II, so the Company pursued 
the Madagascar colonists as pirates as a means to demonstrate the effectiveness of monopoly 
rule. The attempt by the Company of Scotland to found a colony there then produced the 
inverse, a piracy trial in Edinburgh that explicitly challenged the English Company’s grip on 
trade with the east. This prosecution fomented so much discord between England and Scotland 
that it ultimately made the case for strengthening the EIC’s monopoly, seeing the Company of 
Scotland abolished in 1701. The thesis then concludes by considering the implications of both 





I: The Colonising of Ireland, Franco–Irish Networks and Piracy, 
1689–1697 
On 26 February 1694, two Irish sailors, Darby Collins and Patrick Quidley, were found guilty of 
piracy and robbery at a session of England’s High Court of Admiralty in London. The two men 
went to the scaffold protesting their innocence after a trial in which questions of allegiance had 
proven more significant than demonstrating the intention of wrongdoing.1 Both Collins and 
Quidley were condemned for piracy on account of having seized English ships while under the 
commission of James II, the Catholic king-in-exile to whom both continued in their loyalty. The 
Admiralty Judge Charles Hedges provided the verdict: as James was no longer a monarch, any 
commission he granted was simply that of a private person, invalid under the law of nations.2 
Historians have tended to view this trial as an intriguing, but ultimately even-handed execution of 
the law, according it only a minor significance.3 Scratch below the surface, however, and unique 
circumstances appear that imply otherwise. For instance, in a rush to secure their condemnation, 
the English Privy Council dismissed and replaced two admiralty advocates who disagreed with the 
charge of piracy.4 Out of the five Irish sailors condemned for piracy in 1694, only Quidley and 
Collins were executed, while the remaining three were transported to the Caribbean as indentured 
servants. Equally, this trial did not set any kind of precedent. Nobody else tried at the Court for 
operating under commission from James was sentenced for piracy, despite the lengths to which the 
civilians had gone to secure a guilty verdict in the first place. To understand why it seemed so 
imperative that Quidley and Collins be found guilty, it is necessary look beyond the courtroom and 
consider the many local, regional and global contexts against which this piracy trial took place. 
Their conviction should not be seen as the impartial application of the law, but as part of a resurgent 
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debate amongst Protestants about how plantation schemes in Ireland should be resumed and 
secured. At issue were connections that Irish Catholics had developed with France and the 
Caribbean, long-established networks only strengthened following the defeat of the Irish Jacobites 
in 1691. How should Protestants in England and Ireland react to these movements of people? 
Should Irish networks be severed to prevent French influence in Ireland, rendering it in practice a 
colony for England? Or could these same linkages be appropriated by Protestant colonisers to 
secure a more prosperous, autonomous future for Ireland? This was not a question that could truly 
be resolved by any parliament or council chamber, but only in practice on Ireland’s coasts and at 
the sessions of admiralty courts. 
This chapter will argue that the attempted prosecution of Irish Catholics for piracy during the 
Jacobite War was conducted as part of the ongoing debate about the purpose of Protestant 
colonisation schemes and how their objectives should best be transferred onto sea. The suppressing 
of Franco–Irish networks was viewed by politicians in England as part of a plan to reduce Ireland 
to a dependent supply colony, while Protestant landowners and merchants in Ireland sought to 
repurpose those networks to grow the island’s prosperity. Attempts to prosecute these sailors for 
piracy were part of the former design, intended to sever Irish Catholic connections with French 
dominions. In doing so, the English High Court of Admiralty sought to establish itself as the 
dominant authority on Ireland’s coasts, transforming the function of their institution. 
To explore this context to the piracy trials, the following will be divided into three sections. The 
first sketches the long history of English military interventions and colonisation schemes in Ireland, 
especially how they prompted thousands of Irish Catholics to leave the island’s shores for the 
European Continent and the Americas. By the outbreak of war once again in 1689, these migrants 
had formed extensive networks, most notably between Ireland, the Caribbean and the port towns 
of Brittany, maturing over time into an international Irish community, which stood ready to receive 
a further wave of exiles. In parallel, debates began to emerge among Protestants about the 
relationship of Protestant plantation on land to movements of people and goods on sea. The second 
section then considers how, after James II’s surrender at Limerick in 1691, Irish Catholics flooded 
into these international networks, seeing the endangered Jacobite cause meld with the commercial 
activities of the island in France and the Caribbean. Through a succession of close studies, it 
reconstructs the international networks of Irish Catholics in depth, tracing the existence of their 




the French driving the English from the Caribbean. The final section then considers Protestant 
reactions to this new challenge. English politicians realised that renewed plantation schemes were 
no longer enough to secure the island from Catholic France and that, alongside territory, coastlines 
also had to be controlled in practice. The challenge for them became that no uncontroversial means 
to do so existed. Attempts to create an institutional solution revived Restoration-era debates about 
the relationship between plantation schemes and commercial exchange, but this time oriented 
around how to best neutralise Irish Catholic support for James II and Louis XIV. The final section 
moves to consider how the English Admiralty Board attempted to establish control of littoral 
Ireland, seizing “illegal” traders and privateers, who were then tried in its judicial arm, the High 
Court of Admiralty. The prosecutions of Irish Catholic sailors which followed are then tracked in 
detail, examining the controversies surrounding the attempts by the civilians to define them as 
pirates, before then weighing their implications for the “war against the pirates” later in the decade. 
*** 
Across the seventeenth century, Irish Catholics came to migrate in large numbers both to 
continental Europe and across the Atlantic, yet they often did so involuntarily, as a consequence of 
foreign military interventions and colonisation schemes. Yet, over time, these outmigrations 
became networks that were built upon commercial exchange and solidified through the growing 
status of Irish Catholics in the regions they relocated to. Emigrants moved from serving as grist for 
the Habsburg war machine and an exploited labour force in the Caribbean to being active 
participants in European colonialism, especially as traders and planters. When the Jacobites 
surrendered at Limerick in October 1691, these networks, which spanned the Atlantic, provided 
significant opportunities for Irish migrants, serving only to amplify the threat that Protestants 
perceived from Catholic Ireland. 
Direct emigration to France and Spain formed an important first step in forging more permanent 
international connections for Irish Catholics. While broader demographic pressures common across 
Europe, such as real wage stagnation, unemployment and periods of dearth, played a role in pushing 
Catholics to leave, military interventions, beginning in 1570 with the suppression of the Desmond 
Rebellion, remained a significant cause.5 Successive attempts by the English crown to “reconquer” 
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Ireland across the sixteenth century resulted in the ultimately unsuccessful attempts by Tudor 
monarchs to establish full control over the island, seeing ultimately failed colonisation projects 
attempted in Munster.6 These invasions were distinct from medieval interventions launched from 
England, as, by the second half of the sixteenth century, contemporaries such as Edmund Spenser 
viewed the contest for Ireland within the wider context of the European Wars of Religion.7 Shared 
bonds of religion became significant in determining the destinations of emigrants, many of whom 
left for Spain during the final two decades of the sixteenth century, promoting an increased flow 
of commodities and people between Ireland and the Iberian Peninsula.8 Some Catholic Irish also 
migrated to France during this period, but in much smaller numbers: around three thousand people 
prior to 1633, mostly poorer, transient populations to Paris and Brittany.9 However, mid-century 
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upheavals, in the form of both the Confederate Wars and Cromwellian Conquest, saw Irish 
Catholics venture to France in far higher numbers, especially to the port towns of Brittany, such as 
St Malo, Nantes and Morlaix. In particular, extensive land confiscations and colonisation following 
the Cromwellian Conquest forced those of a higher socioeconomic status, including gentry and 
merchants, to begin settling in Brittany and Normandy as they had previously in Spain, forming 
the basis of an enduring Franco-Irish community.10 There were at least a thousand Irish people 
settled in northwestern France by the mid-1660s.11 As most were not restored to their estates after 
the Restoration, a sizeable number chose to remain in France and Spain, producing a further rise in 
the number of merchants residing in continental Europe with familial links to Ireland.12 By 1689, 
the impact of these networks on the island were visible, as port towns, such as Waterford, Dublin 
and especially Cork, grew at a considerably faster rate than landlocked towns, part of Ireland’s 
greater reorientation towards overseas exchange.13 
The example of Cork is especially significant here, as its growing success during the seventeenth 
century owed to Irish movements westward into the Caribbean. Confession played a far less 
significant role in promoting this migration, which flowed mainly into English dominions but also 
in small numbers to Spanish and French colonies. From the 1630s, thousands of Irish indentured 
servants were traded out of Atlantic ports like Cork, Youghal and Galway into plantations in the 
Caribbean.14 During the following decade, prisoners taken during the Confederate Wars were 
shipped to the Caribbean, but their numbers were eclipsed by the outpouring of around fifty 
thousand prisoners following the Cromwellian Conquest.15 In small numbers at first, Irish 
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Catholics also became active participants in colonising ventures. In English possessions, there was 
an early Irish majority in Montserrat, who established themselves as merchants and planters there, 
while other migrants took on similar roles at St Christopher’s as early as 1627.16 Their settlement 
proceeded at such a rate that, by 1678, a third of the population of the English-owned Leeward 
Isles were Irish.17 Yet they also ventured to areas beyond those claimed by the English crown. 
From 1635, Irish immigrants were received on French islands, such as Guadeloupe and, eventually, 
Hispaniola, where some were able to establish themselves as traders.18 This emerging population 
of Irish merchants in the Caribbean retained connections to Ireland, finding opportunities in the 
transition of the region to a sugar monoculture after 1660.19 Using their connections to cattle 
farming regions in Ireland, merchants sourced enormous quantities of provisions, exporting sugar 
and tobacco in return. By 1686, almost half of Ireland’s beef exports went to the West Indies, a 
trade that far eclipsed supply from any other part of Europe. As exchange with the West Indies 
grew in significance for Ireland, the island mirrored the trend in England, seeing Atlantic trade 
come to account for a far higher percentage of overseas commerce.20 A substantial proportion of 
Irish migrants entered the Caribbean as an exploited labour force, but by the late seventeenth 
century they also came to play a role as colonisers. 
While they are often studied separately, these two migration traditions did not exist in isolation 
from one another. Instead they interacted to produce oceanic networks, a phenomenon dubbed the 
‘green Atlantic’ by some historians.21 For instance, Irish merchants who settled in France became 
involved in trading with the West Indies. Nicholas Geraldin (Fitzgerald), originally of Kilkenny, 
migrated to Nantes sometime after the 1641 uprising and remained there after unsuccessfully 
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attempting to have his property restored in 1661.22 While the Geraldins traded wherever they could 
turn a profit, Nicholas and other members of his family formed a lucrative triangular trade between 
Brittany, Ireland and the French West Indies during the 1680s.23 Successive generations of the 
Geraldins continued their trans-Atlantic commerce from Brittany, joined by other Irish merchant 
families in utilising connections to Irish Catholics permanently settled in the Caribbean.24 These 
networks had an impact beyond merchant profits, however, and saw a continuing exchange of 
population between Ireland and those of Irish descent in continental Europe and the Americas. 
The testimonies of two Irish sailors later prosecuted by the English High Court of Admiralty 
provide an illustration of this enduring movement of people. The mariner John Walsh demonstrates 
how established Franco-Irish people could make use of Atlantic networks. Born in Nantes in 1670 
to an Irish father and French mother, Walsh left for Ireland when he was thirteen years old and 
became apprenticed to a French merchant who lived in Clonmel. Throughout the following years, 
he served predominantly on ships journeying between Ireland, the French Caribbean and France. 
Walsh led a predominantly transient life, and he never truly settled in one place; he was sustained 
by, and had a role in, maintaining these networks.25 Others made their way to Ireland for the first 
time from the other side of the Atlantic. Daniel Callaghan was born in Martinique sometime in 
1671 to Irish and French parents. As a child he was apprenticed to various merchants in the 
Caribbean, all of whom were family members, migrating first to Nevis and then to Montserrat. 
Seeking to establish himself in Ireland, he bound himself to a ship’s captain intending for Galway, 
but he was shipwrecked off the coast nearby and forced into vagrancy. Eventually he found service 
in the household of a Scottish planter in County Down.26 
Before 1689, military interventions, land confiscations and colonisation projects in Ireland were 
always aided by the fact that detractors were expected to dutifully go into exile and not return. Yet 
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a significant and unexpected long-term consequence of these movements of people and goods was 
the creation of an international Irish community, who, like Dutch merchants, sailors and colonists 
had previously, thrived as “go-betweens” in spaces between other European territories.27 Above 
all, kinship, religion and unique economic opportunities ensured that emigrants retained their 
connections to Ireland and, in turn, allowed the island to begin to find its place as an Atlantic power. 
From the early seventeenth century, English and Scottish military, administrative and 
commercial interventions in Ireland were consistently underpinned by the struggle to balance the 
view that the island was seen both as a Catholic threat and an untapped economic opportunity. 
Initial English and Scottish efforts were directed towards reducing the number of Catholics in 
Ireland, with plantation schemes instituted first in Munster from 1585, then Ulster after 1609, 
seeing around a hundred thousand English and Scottish colonists migrate to Ireland before 1641.28 
The crown believed the Catholic Irish to be their foremost problem, a force that could only be truly 
broken by a policy of direct colonisation, summarised by James VI/I, when he claimed that ‘since 
we cannot now apply laws to fit the people…we will apply the people and fit them to the laws’.29 
Anglican or Presbyterian immigrants were to implement “improvement” schemes: to settle large 
tracts of land in the hope that Protestant masters would either convert Catholics or at least render 
them profitable.30 A significant impetus for these colonisation efforts proceeded from the climate 
of intense anti-popery in England from the later sixteenth century, shaped by the still-fresh memory 
of the Marian persecutions, the continuing threat of Catholic plots against Elizabeth I and finally 
the thwarting of the Gunpowder Plot in 1605.31 Hence the initial aims of “improvement” projects 
were at once commercial and confessional, meaning the increase of Protestants and their profits in 
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Ireland.32 Yet the result was not widespread conversion, but a reification of confessional difference 
through the transfer of lands and wealth into the hands of Protestant immigrants.33 
Following the gradual Cromwellian conquest of Ireland, which concluded in 1659, the recurring 
need to balance threat and economic opportunity prompted a divergence among Protestants. In 
particular, differences emerged in their understanding of how Ireland should be “improved” and 
for whose benefit. Here, it is beneficial to again briefly consider William Petty, who first received 
his lands in Ireland as part of the Cromwellian Land Confiscations.34 While initially responsible 
for overseeing the dispossession of thousands of Irish Catholics into Connacht and the Caribbean, 
his views, like those of many other Protestants in Ireland, gradually moved away from the belief 
that Catholics ought to be removed from Ireland by conversion or dispossession.35 Instead he 
claimed that the island was under-populated, while its lands and people remained under-utilised, 
arguing that solving unemployment and poverty would by themselves bring Catholics to 
Protestantism.36 Petty believed that outward emigration and workhouses would ensure that those 
opposed to any such designs were prevented from obstructing the overall objective of rendering 
Ireland profitable to Protestant landowners.37 He criticised some in England too, railing against 
their absentee landlordism and their imposing of heavy taxes, which he believed drew specie out 
of Ireland into England, arguing the island would never be improved and made Protestant if these 
practices continued.38 Thus he approved of the growing trade carried on in Ireland, as well as 
commercial links from the island with both the European Continent and the Caribbean; in fact he 
set out to encourage Irish commerce. Between 1676 and 1683 he served as Judge of the Irish High 
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Court of Admiralty, where he attempted, ultimately unsuccessfully, to transform the Court into the 
sole authority in maritime affairs in Ireland, one not subordinate to its English counterpart.39 While 
a perception of the threat posed by Irish Catholics certainly remained, by 1689, Protestant 
landowners in Ireland increasingly advocated improvement, understood as the increase of 
Protestants and profits, but through the encouragement of trade alongside plantation schemes. 
Commerce, rather than just coercion, was increasingly seen as an important means to neutralise the 
Catholic threat. 
The developing ideology of Irish Protestants, however, had only a limited resonance the other 
side of the Irish Sea. After the Restoration, Charles II did not retain a commitment to the widespread 
plantation of Ireland, nor did he turn to promoting policies of commercialisation and improvement. 
He instead favoured an ambiguous middle ground to secure peace on the island by favouring 
Protestants but not heavily penalising Catholics. For instance, the partial reversal of the 
Cromwellian Land Settlement in 1662 only restored some Catholics to their estates, a measure seen 
as both overly-generous by Protestants and miserly by Catholics.40 A period of relative peace 
between the Stuarts and Catholics powers on the European Continent, particularly after the Treaty 
of Madrid in 1670, also meant that Ireland was, for the most part, not seen to be significant as a 
potential theatre of conflict.41 This peace in the end brought prosperity after years of upheaval, and 
some Irish landowners recovered over the course of two decades, bolstered, as previously 
demonstrated, by taking advantage of dispersed Irish populations in the Caribbean and on the 
Continent.42 Yet expanding Irish trade with the Caribbean quickly caught the eye of England’s 
merchants and, eventually, English Parliament. A string of statutes – first the Staple Act (1633) 
and then the Navigation Act (1673) – expressly forbade Irish merchants from directly trading in 
plantation goods without first landing in England.43 Yet Ireland was not the primary focus of these 
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acts, nor did English commentators universally perceive a threat from Irish trade and perhaps as a 
result, enforcement remained insufficient and Irish traders continued to expand their participation 
in overseas commerce.44 
By 1660, Protestant landowners and merchants in England and Ireland disagreed about how the 
island should be colonised, but the issue was contained by the hesitancy of the monarch to pick a 
side. On the one hand, some Protestant landowners in Ireland saw engagement in overseas trade, 
in which their products were exported to France and the slave plantations of the Caribbean, as 
fundamental to the success of their plantation schemes. On the other hand, commercial and political 
interests in England simply sought to isolate Ireland from the outside world, containing both the 
threat of Catholicism and any potential competition from the island’s merchants. By the late 1680s, 
a belief began to stir within England that Ireland had risen to become a competitor which acted 
against English interests through its growing participation in Atlantic commerce.45 In contrast, Irish 
Catholics looked, as they had done for over a century, to their connections with Catholic powers 
on the European Continent and to European possessions in the Americas, links which were well-
established by the late seventeenth century. By the outbreak of the Jacobite War in 1689, at least 
three visions of Ireland’s future existed, all oriented around the relationship between colonisation 
on land and commerce on sea. 
*** 
The coming of war once again in 1689 had a disproportionate impact upon poorer Irish Catholics, 
but even after the Jacobite surrender at Limerick in 1691, they were not without opportunities. 
Renewed land confiscations and plantations schemes forced many Catholics to leave their homes, 
in the process melding their economic survival with a continuing commitment to the Jacobite cause 
internationally. A Catholic wartime economy began to form, expanded by recent migrants but 
utilising networks which had grown up as a consequence of military interventions dating back 
decades. 
The coasts of Ireland suffered more than most areas as a consequence of the war. Catholics 
inhabiting the region between Kinsale and Waterford were first plundered by Dutch and English 
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privateers, before then becoming subject to harsh military rule by Williamites.46 In October 1690, 
the taking of Cork harbour by Protestant forces was immediately followed by the raiding of the 
countryside around the port by soldiers.47 An officer at Cork around this time claimed that, by the 
time the Treaty of Limerick was signed, he had hanged around three thousand Jacobites and their 
sympathisers, while accumulating £12,000 worth of plunder.48 Within Ireland, the dispossessed 
turned to banditry, becoming what contemporaries termed ‘rapparees’, often allying themselves 
with army deserters and Jacobite soldiers who refused to surrender. Rapparees were especially 
common around Galway, the Kerry Coast and the countryside surrounding Cork, extending as far 
east as Clonmel in Tipperary.49 Although Protestant governors often characterised rapparees as a 
homogenous band of outlaws, their actions combined economic motivations with continuing 
loyalty to James II. They consistently targeted Protestants, committing highway robbery, attacks 
on their livestock and even arson.50 A proclamation issued by a band of rapparees in Tipperary 
summarised these combined motives when they claimed that they were ‘compelled to stand out 
upon our keeping in defiance of this present government & ruine & destruction of their subjects’.51 
Rapparees do not fit a strict definition of outlaw, as they retained the support of many within 
Irish Catholic society. Accounts from a local level suggest that Irish Catholics, particularly women, 
supported rapparees until at least 1697.52 The assistance they received is evidenced in the case of 
William Burke, a former officer in James II’s service who operated in the countryside south of the 
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City of Galway. Burke is first mentioned in sources in early September 1691, having been captured 
by Williamite soldiers and sentenced to be hanged for treason. Shortly after his apprehension, 
however, he was broken out of gaol by two women who were known to host rapparees in their 
houses nearby. Investigations by Protestant soldiers in the region found that local Catholics 
harboured Burke and his men, while trading in goods stolen by his rapparees. By late September, 
more soldiers were billeted on the local population to try and force the surrender of Burke and his 
men, while the two women who helped him escape were threatened with prosecution. Acting as an 
intermediary, one woman, apparently married to one of the rapparees, offered to negotiate his 
surrender, on the condition that he and his followers could take exile in France. Burke and his men 
were eventually transported to Nantes in the later part of October 1691, along with other Jacobite 
soldiers leaving after the Treaty of Limerick.53 Rapparees, therefore, formed part of an informal 
economy among Irish Catholics, sustained by local networks but also serving as an outlet for 
continuing Jacobite resistance. 
Irish Catholics not only took part in and supported rapparee activity, they also aided French 
privateers who targeted English Atlantic shipping on Ireland’s littoral. The Munster Coast formed 
a chokepoint for Atlantic trade, where ships arriving from the Americas, laden with valuable 
cargoes of plantation goods, were heavily targeted. The impact was galling for English merchants. 
One representation from some of their number in Dublin reported in July 1694 that only four of the 
thirty-two ships they had dispatched to Jamaica had returned during the previous two years.54 The 
privateers’ success would not have been possible without the assistance they received in Ireland, 
as an account given by an English sailor captured by one of these vessels indicates: 
I was carried from thence by ye said privateer to a place called black-sod in the county of Mayo, where 
the said privateer hall’d a shore … she continued there for the space of fourteen dayes, during which 
time, the countrey brought her in all sorts of provision vizt. Mutton, porke, poultrey & fish.55 
Just as Irish Catholics supplied French privateers, these vessels in turn traded goods into the 
island. Multiple reports claim that Irish fisherman met with privateering vessels at sea, and then 
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used their local connections to transport goods ashore taken from English ships.56 These vessels 
were often secured with the aid of intelligence provided from Ireland. Around Bantry Bay, French 
privateers maintained contact with rapparees, who gave information about English shipping 
movements, resulting in the capture of at least twenty English merchant ships there between 1692 
and 1694.57 Similarly, the crews of these privateering vessels appear to have been concerned with 
the success of rapparees activity inland. A justice of the peace in Wicklow described how Catholic 
priests organised collections there to support rapparees, money which French privateers then 
carried into Southwestern Munster.58 Even the very presence of French privateers on the coast 
aided rapparees, as by 1696 the privateers’ attacks on commercial traffic and the support they 
received in coastal towns forced soldiers garrisoned inland towards coastal areas, causing the 
number of rapparees to expand in the interior.59 Interactions between privateers and Irish Catholics 
provide an example of how important connections to France remained as a means to sustain Irish 
Catholic resistance after 1691. At the same time, cooperating with the French helped divert English 
Atlantic trade onto Ireland’s coasts, a potential lifeline of support for those who had been 
impoverished by the war and its aftermath. 
On closer examination, Irish Catholic support for French privateering appears as much a matter 
of aiding a continuing French war effort, as part of a growing commercial exchange with port towns 
in Brittany after the Treaty of Limerick. From 1692 onwards, Protestant officials on the coast of 
Ireland reported that recruits were transported from coastal towns into French privateering vessels 
at Kinsale, Cork and in County Kerry.60 They were, however, not the first to do so. By this date, 
the war had driven thousands from Ireland’s shores: 3000 from Munster alone during the conflict 
itself, followed by at least 21,000 men and 10,000 women after the Jacobite surrender.61 Many of 
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these exiles found their way to the port towns of Brittany and some onto merchant and privateering 
vessels there. Examinations of captured ships crews conducted by the English High Court of 
Admiralty reveal the extent to which Jacobite exiles were involved in privateering on Ireland’s 
coasts, where recent migrants served alongside French and Franco-Irish sailors. Some vessels were 
almost entirely Irish in their composition; for instance, the Mary of Teignmouth was captured 
sometime in November 1692 while returning to St Malo with captured English prizes. This small 
sloop had thirteen in its crew, all of whom claimed to be Irish. Of these sailors, ten had left Ireland 
for the first time after Limerick, while the remaining three had previously operated out of France, 
serving on merchant ships that supplied James II’s army in Ireland.62 Others had mixed French and 
Irish crews; The Sun was another sloop taken in January 1693 off the coast of Cornwall while on 
its way to Ireland from St Malo. Of the captured crew, only four were Irish and the remaining 
members, likely around ten of them, were French. The four Irish sailors had all left Ireland 
following the surrender at Limerick, though one had previously served on merchant ships trading 
to France.63 Lastly, the exiles were also recruited onto ships crewed by descendants of Irish 
migrants. The Prince of Wales was seized in April 1693 off the coast of Brittany as they were 
sailing for Ireland with a crew of fifty, of whom twenty-eight were French and five were Irish, all 
having left the island following Limerick. The remaining seventeen claimed at least one Irish parent 
but were born elsewhere: fourteen in France, two in the French Caribbean and one in Portugal.64 
These examples only offer a limited survey of Irish involvement in privateering, but begin to reveal 
how Jacobite exiles were absorbed into Franco–Irish networks created by generations of emigrants. 
Growing Irish participation in the Caribbean across the seventeenth century similarly bolstered 
the continuing French war effort. After news of William III’s invasion of England arrived there, 
many Catholics sided with the French, prompting widespread fear in English colonies that the 
whole region might be overrun.65 On St Kitts, Irish Catholics joined the French en masse, helping 
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them to first raid and then capture the island.66 Fears among English Protestants there of what they 
viewed as Irish defection caused rumours to spread that Catholics would join forces with African 
slaves and seize control of English possessions in the Caribbean for James II, effectively handing 
the region to Louis XIV.67 On Montserrat, Barbados and Antigua, the fear of an uprising was 
intense enough that any Irish Catholics deemed suspicious were arrested, disarmed and shipped to 
Jamaica, where they were detained or made to leave for French islands.68 Those who left joined 
Irish settlers in Hispaniola and Guadeloupe, as well as taking service in privateering vessels.69 The 
governor of Jamaica reported that, by 1690, large numbers of Irish inhabitants of Jamaica had left 
to serve on privateering ships, on account of both their Jacobitisim and their poverty, because they 
were ‘obliged that way to serve King James, and others through dissatisfaction, being in debt’.70 
Their attacks also had a significant impact on English Atlantic trade. A combination of attacks by 
privateers and the Port Royal Earthquake of 1692 saw six of Jamaica’s fifteen parishes totally 
destroyed and the regions depopulated by the end of the war.71 After years of conflict, by 1696, the 
island’s governor claimed that privateering had brought almost all of the trade out of Jamaica to a 
standstill.72 
The Irish sailors who served on privateering ships were also part of larger commercial networks 
operated by Irish Catholics out of Ireland and Continental Europe after 1691. The overlap between 
privateering and trading are outlined by Francis Lynch, who had settled in the French Windward 
Isles, most likely Martinique, before then migrating to Jamaica sometime before the war. After 
1689, Lynch formed a plan with an Irish planter to ship indigo out of Jamaica to Saint-Domingue, 
but, when his confederate was unexpectedly killed in a French raid, he and several others seized 
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the ship and sailed to join the French on Hispaniola.73 While there, Lynch was made captain of a 
privateering vessel, and he sought to use his commission in conjunction with connections in 
Jamaica to establish a commercial network.74 Through the wife of another Irish Catholic in Saint-
Domingue, Eleanor Stapleton, who lived in Jamaica, he sought to secure an English pass, enabling 
his crew to establish a trade between Jamaica, Hispaniola and Barbados. For unclear reasons, 
however, she reported the scheme to the Jamaican authorities, and the network never materialised.75 
While Lynch was unsuccessful, his scheme demonstrates how privateering was viewed as but one 
of the commercial opportunities available within the international Irish community, part of larger 
flows of goods and people, which connected Ireland to the Americas. 
Where Lynch failed, other Catholic merchants succeeded. The activities of John Aylward, a 
merchant born in Waterford, illustrates how, following 1688, a wartime economy was funded by 
Irish merchants who were already established abroad. Aylward first migrated sometime in or before 
1672 to Malaga, where he exported a range of goods, predominantly wine and fruit to London or 
ports in Munster, and imported draperies from London, fish from Cornwall and provisions from 
Cork and Waterford.76 On 16 April 1687, he married Helena Porter, also of a Waterford family and 
widow of a French merchant who had probably operated out of St Malo. Since her previous 
husband’s death, Helena had inherited an estate in Brittany and used her husband’s contacts to 
establish herself as a merchant, trading between Ireland and France.77 Shortly after her marriage to 
John Aylward, the couple relocated to St Malo to take advantage of Helena’s connections there, 
while they continued to trade as they had previously out of Malaga through a factor.78 John took 
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direction of the greater part of Helena’s business, and from Brittany he was able to partner with 
established Franco-Irish families, such as the Geraldins (Fitzgeralds) of Nantes, and French 
merchants, like the Desages of St Malo.79 Around the time they relocated, John Aylward also began 
trading out of Jamaica, predominantly indigo into St Malo and London, as well as tobacco to 
Ireland, in exchange for draperies and provisions.80 Like many other Irish merchants after the 
Restoration, Aylward was able to take advantage of a relatively open trade into France and Spain, 
where he appears to have worked wherever and with whoever would turn a profit. When 
considering most of Aylward’s long-term contacts, it is clear that he had a preference for trading 
with other Irish Catholics, or with those married into his extended family. By the outbreak of war 
in Ireland in 1689, many of his factors were Irish Catholics, including Walter Ryan in London, 
Dominic Lynch in Cadiz, William Furlong in Jamaica and, established that year, Edward Creagh 
in Amsterdam.81 Family connections were also significant; in Waterford he used his aunt, then his 
cousin Joseph Comerford, and in Cork he used Edward Gough, likely his cousin by marriage, as 
was another of his important London contacts, Peter Power.82 One exception was Thomas 
Brailsford, a London-based Protestant who partnered with Aylward in early 1689 in numerous 
ventures, though this relationship was established predominantly to contravene anti-Catholic 
legislation and the prohibition on trade with France.83 Between the Restoration and the outbreak of 
war, Aylward was able to use bonds of common religion, nationality and kinship to secure a small 
fortune by trading between England, Ireland, Spain, France and the Caribbean. 
The outbreak of war effectively criminalised how Aylward and his contemporaries traded. 
Nevertheless, he and others continued, even prospered, by the new opportunities it presented. The 
first problem Aylward faced was that English Parliament, as part of its legislative agenda following 
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the 1688 Revolution, declared trade from France into England and Ireland illegal.84 Initially, this 
move appeared to spell disaster for Aylward and his contacts, who despaired that their only hope 
now lay in the return of James II.85 As this sentiment would suggest, support for the king-in-exile 
quickly became entwined with economic self-interest for merchants like Aylward. With his trade 
into London initially cut, he found opportunities in Ireland assisting the Jacobite war effort. He 
took advantage of James’s offer of French passes to any vessels that supported his cause by 
shipping provisions there from St Malo – at least six vessels before 1691.86 Aylward and his 
partners quickly realised the rewards of trading in commodities deemed illegal, devising a host of 
methods to contravene legislation. For instance, to trade into London, he channeled his shipping 
through the factor Edward Creagh in Amsterdam, carried on vessels captained by Danes, carrying 
both English and French papers.87 Aylward also bought shares of privateering vessels, taking a cut 
of any profits from what they captured and using them to transport provisions he purchased in 
Ireland into France.88 At least some of this money was channeled into the Jacobite court at St 
Germain, where he acted as a creditor to cash-strapped courtiers.89 As other Irish Catholics did in 
Ireland and the Caribbean, Aylward combined allegiance to James II with the pursuit of profit. He 
did so because trade of dubious legality was profitable, because it allowed him to continue using 
the contacts he already had and, importantly, because it provided opportunities without 
compromising his allegiance to the king-in-exile. 
From rapparees in County Kerry, to sailors fitting out in the French Caribbean, to merchants in 
St Malo, international Irish networks ensured that Limerick did not end the contest for Ireland. 
Instead the conflict shifted onto the sea. Irish Catholics formally owned no overseas territory, and 
their sovereign languished in exile, but nevertheless they were able to use existing trade 
connections to wage a kind of war-by-proxy with England, and to sustain those driven from their 
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homes by the consequences of the conflict in Ireland. Indeed, the passage after 1691 of new penal 
laws in Ireland targeting Catholics, together with renewed plantation schemes, only drove people 
to make use of these technically illegal networks in greater numbers. 
*** 
As plantation schemes intended to subdue Catholic Ireland proceeded once again after 1691, 
extensive details of continuing trade and military connections between Ireland and France became 
increasingly clear to Protestant landowners. Collectively, they agreed that the coasts of the island 
should be controlled, yet these coasts were covered by numerous overlapping legal jurisdictions, 
with no one institution possessing the ability to enforce prohibitions in practice. At the same time, 
the extent to which overseas networks used by Irish Catholics should be actively suppressed was 
disputed, as was precisely how to punish those captured collaborating with France. The precise 
response to the existence of Franco–Irish cooperation was not determined by any kind of grand 
governmental strategy. Instead it was shaped by the stance of individuals and interest groups, all 
of whom advocated different solutions, depending upon whether they believed that Ireland should 
be an English colony or autonomous kingdom. In practice, these differences on how to address the 
Franco-Irish threat would be thrashed out both between and within legal institutions across the 
course of the Nine Years War. 
By 1694, governments in England, Ireland and the Caribbean had begun to realise the scale of 
aid being offered by Irish Catholics to the French war effort.90 They became aware of this fact 
because of reports provided by those who actually observed the passages of ships along Ireland’s 
coasts. James Waller, the Deputy Vice-Admiral of Munster and lieutenant governor of Kinsale, 
became an important source of information for senior Irish and English admiralty officials. In his 
many letters written after 1691, he described the arrival of French ships across Munster, recording 
an enduring traffic in brandy and wine, exchanged for provisions that ultimately supplied French 
armies in Europe.91 He perceived that this traffic threatened Protestant rule, because it encouraged 
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rapparee attacks and supplied intelligence to the French government.92 Catholics, he claimed, were 
complicit in and encouraged these exchanges, and, as the most port and customs officials across 
the coast were of the same faith, this trade continued largely unabated.93 Waller similarly described 
trade between Ireland and the French Caribbean, seizing a small number of vessels that he later 
found to have made the trans-Atlantic voyage to supply plantations.94 Here, Waller was doing more 
than simply observing this commercial traffic as it existed. For decades, the jurisdiction of the Irish 
High Court of Admiralty and especially its vice-admiralty courts had been eroded by municipal 
and customs bodies, a fact consistently resented by admiralty officials like Waller.95 He chose to 
provide reports that conveyed local customs collectors as complicit in maintaining Franco-Irish 
links, forming part of a larger attempt to use the war to bolster the jurisdiction of Irish admiralty 
courts. 
Of course, the root issue mentioned by Waller, that Catholics used connections to France to resist 
Protestant rule, was not contested. Yet interested parties apportioned blame in different ways. A 
customs official based in Dublin claimed that the prohibition of commerce with France was to 
blame, illegality having made French trade so lucrative that Catholics were drawn to it even more 
than before. As evidence, he cited the annual value of trade between Ireland and England falling 
from £130,000 to £100,000 following the conclusion of the Jacobite War.96 Other Irish Protestants 
saw Catholic merchants as the culprits. These merchants were said to retain Jacobite sympathies, 
with the Lords Justices of Ireland claiming in 1693 that they were ‘covetous and ill affected’.97 The 
concerns of commercial society in London were broader. They feared not only a potential French 
invasion of Ireland, but that trade connections out of Ireland into France and the Caribbean meant 
that Catholic merchants were now formidable competitors. Pamphlet material published across the 
early 1690s expressed these fears publically.98 All of these concerns were doubtless justified. 
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Customs officials on the coast were complicit, prohibitions had incentivised illegal trade and 
increasingly-successful Catholic merchants did retain Jacobite sympathies. Nevertheless, these 
differences of emphasis reflected uncertainty about how Protestants should respond to the situation, 
each being motivated by a particular vision of Ireland’s future. 
The position taken by most Protestant landowners and merchants in Ireland is best represented 
by Cyril Wyche, an English politician who was first appointed to the Irish Privy Council in 1692.99 
Wyche had certainly read William Petty, specifically his Political Anatomy, owning earlier 
manuscript copies of the tract.100 During his time as Lord Justice, Wyche sought to pacify the 
island, suppressing rapparees and privateers on the coasts and using the knowledge of local 
Protestants to do so.101 His concern was not to prosecute rapparees who opposed plantation 
projects, but to ensure that Irish Catholics could be made useful as a labouring class. He and the 
other Lords Justices began to implement what they believed would be the beginning of a solution 
on 2 July 1694, issuing a proclamation that offered clemency to rapparees who surrendered and 
either returned to previous forms of employment or left Ireland for France.102 In August of 1694, 
he produced a justification for this measure: Ireland, he claimed, was not ‘well peopled’, and key 
to transforming it into a productive country for England was ensuring that the land was tended and 
improved.103 At the same time, because the Lords Justices favoured the prosperity of Protestants in 
Ireland, they also believed that the kingdom should have the right to continue trading with any 
peoples that Stuart subjects were not at war with. In October 1693, when they were instructed to 
stop all corn exports out of Ireland to anywhere except England – an attempt to starve Louis XIV’s 
troops in Flanders – Wyche and the other Lords Justices protested. Such a measure, they argued, 
would further impoverish Ireland, causing merchants there to resent the low prices they received 
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from England and draining specie out of the country.104 They took issue with the English Admiralty 
Board, who they claimed did nothing to suppress French privateering on the coast and were only 
interested in seizing merchant ships for trading illegally, which could then be condemned as prizes 
in England.105 Like Petty before him, Wyche believed that only through overseas trade could 
Ireland (by which he meant Irish Protestants) prosper, so, if colonisation was to succeed on land, it 
was paramount to allow legal trade to continue on the island’s coasts. 
While Wyche and his contemporaries believed that greater prosperity would cause the Catholic 
threat to subside, the view in England was different. A broad consensus emerged among merchants 
and politicians that, alongside the danger posed by French influence, commercial competition from 
Irish Catholics and Protestants alike posed a threat. Following the surrender at Limerick, the 
English politician Edward Harley summarised what had become the dominant perspective amongst 
his peers, that ‘If the lands of Ireland do not pay for the draining of English blood and treasure, 
England must in short time become bog and wilderness’.106 The sea, he claimed, must now become 
a barrier between Irish Catholics, the European Continent and the Americas, rather than a means 
of exchange or a pathway for invasion, remarking that, ‘As for the sea, it is undeniable that, until 
the dominion be entirely recovered, England will be poor and continually exposed’.107 This position 
was supported most fervently by English merchants, particularly those from Bristol who were 
heavily involved in trade with the Caribbean.108 These traders were keen to establish that their 
interests were those of all England. In the mid-1690s, they articulated this thought most clearly in 
an address intended to be sent to England’s Parliament, complaining that Irish merchants had 
almost completely driven them from the provisioning trade to the West Indies, and proposing in 
response: 
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Confineing the exportation of their [Irish] product only hither…this will make Ireland profitable to 
England, and in some measure recompence the vast charges we have been at for its reduction and 
delivery out of the hands of foreign powers and popish cut-throats.109 
Their requests, of course, gelled with similar beliefs within the upper echelons of English 
government, as expressed by politicians like Harley. The interests of traders with links to plantation 
colonies in the Americas combined with English government ministers, together advocated that the 
island should become a provisioning colony for England, losing much of the autonomy it currently 
enjoyed. 
It was admiralty courts which became a convenient institution for the channeling of both these 
interests. A system of convoys was suggested by the Vice-Admiral of Kinsale, Robert Southwell, 
intended to protect Atlantic shipping, as well as the treasure shipments of the EIC, which often 
stopped in Cork.110 In facilitating these interests, both English and Irish admiralty officials saw an 
important opportunity. In order to establish a greater role for themselves in safeguarding Ireland’s 
coasts, they sought to begin wrestling back control from local governments and courts, which they 
felt had usurped their authority in recent years.111 Officials representing the Vice-Admiralty of 
Kinsale stressed the many uses of putting ships into Irish waters, which included preventing a 
potential French invasion into Ireland, protecting trading vessels, suppressing enemy privateers 
and seizing Irish ships that were trading illegally.112 From as early as 1691, ships began to patrol 
Irish waters, but in practice, they prioritised the latter objective. The Irish government complained 
that privateers focused upon seizing illegal traders whose cargos they could claim as a prize in 
England, while little thought was given to the protection of legal Irish trade.113 In a sense, the 
admiralty officials instituted the inverse of what Irish Catholics were attempting. In becoming the 
representatives of English interests on Ireland’s coasts, they set about diverting potential Irish 
Catholic wealth into English hands. By 1694, therefore, two plans had emerged and were being 
enacted to secure Ireland’s shores. The first served Irish landowners and emphasised clemency and 
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leniency for Catholics so that Protestants might utilise their labour in plantation and overseas trade. 
The second, by contrast, served English merchants and politicians, deploying convoys to extend 
garrison government onto sea, severing Irish Catholic links to France and with the ultimate 
intention to seal off Ireland from the wider world altogether. 
As might be expected, conflict between these two visions soon erupted. It was manifested most 
clearly in the case of the Postillion, a ketch found to be bringing pitch and salt into Ireland from 
France during 1693. On 23 August, James Waller, the Deputy Vice-Admiral of Kinsale received 
word that a vessel from France was soon to land at Crookhaven in County Cork. While his initial 
attempt to capture the ship failed, he was able to track it to Cork itself, where he had it seized on 
26 August.114 When customs collectors in Dublin heard about the seizure, they balked, believing it 
to be an encroachment upon their jurisdiction for the Kinsale Vice-Admiralty’s officials to seize a 
vessel in port. In such an unprecedented situation, both sides began to line up supporters from a 
range of public bodies. Dublin’s customs officials appealed to the Irish Lords Justices in early 
September, who ordered the Kinsale Vice-Admiralty Court to remit the ship into their hands, which 
they begin condemning the ship in the Irish Exchequer Court. Waller responded with a writ from 
the English High Court of Admiralty, claiming that he retained the authority to seize the Postillion, 
and he had the case referred to the English Privy Council.115 On a surface level, this dispute was 
about institutional authority, but ultimately it was a contest over who controlled movements of 
people and goods. 
The substance of the arguments given in this case reveal a debate present throughout the 
proceedings, centred around whether the Irish mariners who served on such vessels continued to 
be subjects in law, or if they had become enemies. These positions mapped directly onto disputes 
between wealthy Protestants in Ireland and English political and commercial interests. Dublin’s 
customs collectors, favoured by the former, made the argument that Catholics on board these ships 
were subjects and so fell under their jurisdiction, while representatives of the English and Irish 
admiralties, supported by the latter, claimed that they should be considered enemies. Robert 
Southwell provided his core argument to the English Privy Council, in which he attempted to 
interweave the interests of the admiralty courts, parliaments and the monarch in upholding his 
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jurisdiction’s right to the seizure. He claimed that, as those aboard ship had chosen to trade with 
an enemy during a time of war, they had committed a crime tantamount to treason, which broke 
their bonds of allegiance, meaning that they were no longer subjects. Only admiralty courts retained 
the right to prosecute traitors who violated the law of nations, and, therefore, they retained the right 
to the vessel. He sweetened this central argument by claiming that a verdict in favour of Southwell’s 
Court supported the royal prerogative under which the institution operated, upheld the authority of 
the English Privateering Act (1692) enacted to prevent trade with France and secured greater 
revenues for the crown through the ship’s condemnation in England. Above all, he argued, this 
case was about preventing trade between Ireland and France, something that he claimed 
representatives of the Irish government routinely ignored, despite its dangerous consequences, as 
they personally profited from it.116 
The more straightforward position taken by the Dublin customs officials was articulated by the 
Irish Lords Justices, who denied that they encouraged trade with French merchants, but also 
rejected the classification of the Jacobite privateers as enemies.117 They cited that two recent 
statutes forbidding trade with France stated that anyone Irish on these vessels remained subjects, 
as in the case of any other illegal traders, rather than enemies, and so they were liable to fines in 
Ireland, rather than prosecutions in England.118 The first verdict offered by the English Solicitor 
General on 20 September 1694 agreed with Southwell and maintained that anyone Irish who traded 
with France was indeed an enemy and possibly a traitor.119 Even after the Irish Privy Council 
appealed the decision, a revised verdict that emerged on 8 December 1694 upheld the previous 
ruling. There was compromise, however, in that Irish customs collectors could also seize vessels 
in port, with the right to the craft going to whoever captured a suspected ship first.120 In the case of 
the Postillion, admiralty officials had been successful in positioning themselves as advocates of 
the English right to punish trade with France. Yet they had not received the unequivocal verdict 
they sought. Instead, disputes over institutional rights had produced a situation in which each and 
neither side was victorious and in which ambiguity reigned, as these sailors remained subjects in 
Ireland and enemies in England. 
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The case of the Postillion allows a glimpse of a debate that would only become more complex 
in the English High Court of Admiralty. After 1692, the institution attempted to exercise its right 
to prosecute captured Irish Catholics as enemies and, in the process, establish legal precedents that 
would allow them to easily conduct prosecutions. Their targets were Irish sailors who served under 
privateering commissions from James II and Louis XIV, almost all of them the displaced poor but 
potent symbols of continuing Irish connections to France and the Jacobite cause. Like the High 
Court of Admiralty in Ireland, the English body had seen a progressive erosion of its jurisdiction 
over the course of the seventeenth century.121 For its Judge, Charles Hedges, proving that the 
institution was the correct mechanism to suppress Franco–Irish links made these important 
convictions to secure. Yet, as in the case of the Postillion, these were uncharted waters. Advocates 
were in majority agreement that these sailors should be tried, but many legal questions had to be 
tackled. How far, for instance, did Irish Catholics have the right to maintain their allegiance to the 
king-in-exile, or even Louis XIV? While they were enemies, what specific crime should these 
sailors be prosecuted for? Could the charge be upheld in practice? All of these challenges were 
made more vexing by the hybrid nature of the Court’s criminal jurisdiction, which drew upon 
elements of both civil and common law, affecting both criminal definitions and standards of 
evidence. While it was relatively easy to articulate a position that Ireland should be reduced to a 
colony and Catholics who stood in the way should face punitive legal action, institutional 
mechanisms had to be directed and refined in order to implement this policy. These trials of Irish 
sailors spanned the period 1692 to 1696, and the civilians trod a fine line in applying the law. They 
had to balance the pragmatic pursuit of convictions, with the securing of final verdicts which both 
reinforced the status of the convicted as enemies and stressed the illegality of Irish allegiance to 
Catholic monarchs overseas. 
The first privateers with Irish sailors on board were brought into London in July 1692: two 
vessels serving under commission from James II, funded by the Geraldins of St Malo.122 For almost 
a year, captured Irish sailors languished in the Marshalsea and Newgate Prisons, increasing in 
number to almost a hundred before the English Privy Council turned to a discussion of their 
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situation on 7 June 1693.123 The outcome which the Privy Council wished for was clear, that the 
sailors should be convicted of a capital crime for continuing to serve King James. Within Ireland 
this had been straightforward enough; rapparees and those who advocated directly for a Jacobite 
restoration could be charged with high treason, others for robbery or murder. On sea, however, 
criminal prosecutions were somewhat different, and Charles Hedges singled out two potential 
crimes to be applied in the cases of these Irish sailors: piracy and high treason. As the case of the 
Postillion hinted, high treason was an obvious choice, grounded on the fact that the sailors were 
aiding an enemy in a time of war, which was a felony and a capital crime in common law. Use of 
high treason asserted that Irish Catholics owed allegiance to William III and that he was, in law, 
the only sovereign they could have, irrespective of whether they left for France as part of the Treaty 
of Limerick. The second crime they opted for was piracy, which was more problematic than high 
treason, as it was a purely civil law crime and had no agreed-upon definition in common law.124 
While treason suggested service to an enemy monarch, piracy implied that the sailors’ commissions 
from James II were not issued by a legitimate sovereign and thus James was no king at all. 
Opting for the latter, the piracy trials commenced in July 1693, but an unexpected controversy 
soon unfolded. Two of the advocates, William Oldys and Thomas Pinfold, both voiced their 
objection to the charge of piracy against the sailors, the former claiming that ‘these shew a 
commission signed James Rex at the Court of St Germain’, so he could not be prosecuted as a 
pirate, which he defined as ‘a sea robber, who has thereby lost his right in the law of nations’.125 
The English Privy Council made clear that objecting was not a privilege granted to the advocates. 
Oldys was first interrogated on suspicion of holding Jacobite sympathies and then dismissed from 
his position, along with Pinfold.126 The trials proceeded in spite of this controversy, and on 26 
February 1694 a sentence of piracy was passed against five of the twelve sailors on trial, citing 
that, as James Stuart was now a private person, any privateering commission he issued was invalid. 
Even so, Oldys continued to fight the use of piracy, having the sailors petition the House of Lords 
to plead that the proceedings of the trial be investigated. As no response has been recorded and the 
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convictions stood, he was ultimately unsuccessful.127 Keen to broadcast their success, the High 
Court of Admiralty’s advocates then published a transcript of the trial.128 At first glance then, the 
civilians were successful. They had been able to secure convictions, with piracy being used to 
explicitly punish continuing Irish loyalty to James, strengthening the Court’s record on controlling 
Ireland’s coasts in the process. 
The arguments offered by both sides in this case reveal the extent to which the advocates had to 
work to justify this verdict. The debate effectively pitted a common law understanding of piracy 
against a civil law one, centred on the significance of intention.129 Oldys penned his position in a 
treatise, which was circulated in manuscript after his dismissal.130 He expressed a common law 
understanding of the crime, claiming that piracy was ultimately the crime of robbery within the 
jurisdiction of the admiralty, also drawing upon the Grotian argument that ‘pirates and brigands 
are banded together for wrong-doing’, and therefore criminal intent was what defined piracy.131 
Even if the commission from James was invalid, Oldys argued, knowledge that what they sought 
to do was illegal had to be proven to make the charge valid. He maintained that the Irish sailors 
had left Ireland before the Treaty of Limerick and therefore had no sense that what they did was a 
crime.132 If piracy was knowing, indiscriminate robbery at sea, then they were innocent. The 
advocates’ response was given in print by Matthew Tindal in 1694 and offered a civil law 
understanding of piracy as those who commit attacks on shipping at sea without a commission 
from a recognised sovereign.133 This was an interpretation that derived initially from the writings 
of Alberico Gentili and accorded more strongly with royal prerogative, as well as being the more 
established position before the 1690s, when proclamation rather than statute had tended to 
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determine what the English government considered piracy.134 In the context of Ireland, Tindal saw 
his interpretation as having a clear utility for English Protestants. He argued that only a distinct 
people with their own sovereign could be esteemed as enemies and possess the right to issue 
privateering commissions, expressed through the rhetorical question: ‘Would it not be very absurd 
in the Tories (rapparees), though they plundered Passengers and robbed Market-people by the late 
King’s Commission, to expect to be used as Enemies?’.135 The condemnation of the five sailors 
under the latter definition, therefore, was a rare victory for civil over common law, as the High 
Court of Admiralty’s criminal jurisdiction fell predominantly under the latter. In the end, Hedges 
got what he wanted: piracy was used to secure a conviction and Tindal was said to have been 
rewarded with an annual salary of £200 for his efforts.136 
Yet Oldys was still able to eventually derail proceedings. Tindal’s definition had proved 
practical, but quickly it became apparent that there were obstacles to its continuing usage. This 
Admiralty Court Session remains the only one in which Irish sailors were convicted for piracy 
when serving under James II’s commission, and there were two reasons for this. First, as an 
argument provided by Oldys suggests, if England could execute the Jacobite privateers because 
William III did not accept James’s legitimacy as a monarch, then Louis XIV – who had never 
recognised William’s claim – could do the same to any captive English sailors.137 Equally, word 
of the trial’s details made its way to St Germain. In response, any vessels that were granted 
commissions by the exiled king thereafter were also recommended to obtain one from French 
admiralty officials. The belief held at the Jacobite court was that in England they would not dare 
to prosecute prisoners with both commissions for piracy, as it would be a serious violation of the 
law of nations. The writ of the law of nations dictated that these Irish sailors could not be made 
into pirates long term, and the usage of the crime to overturn the legitimacy of James II’s 
commissions proved first controversial in England, then unworkable as a result of its diplomatic 
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implications. The problem remained for the Court’s advocates, however, that by late 1694 the 
Marshalsea still held hundreds of Irish sailors captured serving on privateering vessels.138 
Instead, the civilians relied upon the crime of high treason in their prosecutions, which, although 
lacking the precision of piracy in refuting James’s claim, still condemned Catholic allegiance to 
foreign monarchs. High treason also had its problems, however. Standards of evidence demanded 
it be proved that the accused was indeed on the captured ship and that they were born in the 
dominions of the Stuarts. For the Irish sailors, honesty was not the best policy here. In July 1694, 
three of them admitted to being born in Ireland and cited the Treaty of Limerick in defence of their 
right to take a French commission, only to be told that the treaty was not an adequate defence and 
subsequently be executed.139 Here, the greater fluidity accorded to Irish identity by their history of 
overseas migration provided a strategy. Jailors in the Marshalsea reported a sense of fraternity 
among the sailors, who coordinated numerous escape attempts.140 It is not surprising, therefore, 
that those examined after July 1694 had consistent responses to questioning, learning from the 
experience of the first three sailors condemned for high treason. When subsequently examined, the 
sailors claimed to have been born in France or the French Caribbean, or they refused to state where 
they were from. While it would have been more difficult for an English person to make such claims, 
the known existence of an international Irish community at least made what they attested plausible 
and, if true, meant that they would be considered prisoners of war and ransomed back to France.141 
For instance, on 4 September 1694, twelve prisoners were examined, all identified as Irish by the 
ship’s captain who had captured them. Upon examination, however, they all claimed to have been 
born in Brittany.142 This behaviour was mirrored by a second crew found on 20 September on a 
vessel with commissions from Louis XIV. Despite also being identified as Irish, they simply 
claimed they were French and refused to cooperate further when examined.143 Monitions issued by 
the Court aided in accumulating some evidence, but the tactic used by the sailors proved relatively 
successful. At the following session of the High Court of Admiralty, held on 6 November 1694, of 
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the twenty-eight who stood accused of high treason, only five were found guilty.144 Frustrated, 
Charles Hedges attempted to implement measures to produce a greater conviction rate. In early 
1695, he gave instructions to all English ship captains to note the nationality of any captives they 
took and listen for any instance of them speaking Irish.145 However, by December 1694, the vast 
majority of those brought in with a French commission were still being acquitted, as the sailors 
continued to obscure their origins, and the advocates struggled to amass the required evidence that 
they were born in Ireland.146 Unlike in the case of piracy, the Court did have some success in using 
high treason to consistently produce convictions. However, their failure to obtain a guilty verdict 
in the majority of cases speaks to the difficulty of applying English law to Irish subjects, who used 
their participation in an international community to successfully contest many prosecutions. 
Despite the Court’s limited success, the English Admiralty Board continued to pursue prominent 
captains they knew to be serving James II at sea. They made multiple attempts to capture Captain 
Philip Walsh of Ballynacooley, who escaped their clutches and eventually made so much from 
privateering that he was able to establish his family as merchants in St Malo.147 There were also 
some signs that the English advocates’ resolve in securing convictions was beginning to crack and 
that they sought to make the best out of a difficult situation. Dominic Masterson of Galway received 
his privateering commission from St Germain in July 1694 and was ordered to capture English 
vessels along the Irish coast.148 By October, he was waiting off the coast near Galway to escort 
ships laden with provisions back to France, but his vessel was caught in stormy weather and driven 
into the harbour.149 He and his crew were arrested, with anyone among them believed to be Irish 
shipped to England for trial.150 Masterson obviously feared the consequences of being seen to be a 
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Jacobite and had thrown his commissions overboard, then lied under examination, claiming that he 
had only been commissioned by Louis XIV.151 The captain had not been robbing ships 
indiscriminately; yet, despite his request to await confirmation from France, the civilians suspected 
his connection with the exiled king and threatened to prosecute him for piracy. When a copy of the 
commission arrived and they could not prove a treason charge, Masterson avoided execution when 
the Admiralty Court offered him a pardon on the condition that he enter the service of William III 
and swear an oath of allegiance.152 While Hedges and the other advocates still sought to enact 
exemplary punishments upon these sailors, they were no longer willing to go to such lengths for 
the sake of individual convictions. 
The last significant capture of the war made by the Admiralty Board was of Thomas Vaughan, 
an Irish captain, most likely from Galway, or perhaps, as he claimed, from Martinique.153 Vaughan 
had been captaining privateering vessels since 1692, most notoriously attacking and temporarily 
occupying the Arran Islands off the coast of Galway in 1693, while his compatriots raided and 
robbed the Protestants who had settled there.154 After an unsuccessful attempt to capture him that 
same year, the Admiralty Board was eventually able to track and seize his ship in July 1695.155 
Seeking to circumvent the need to prove high treason, the Court’s advocates first tried to connect 
Vaughan with the theft of a ship in England some years previously, before his current commission 
was issued.156 This line of questioning implies that they still wanted to convict him for piracy but 
shied away from proceeding, as they had in 1692 against someone with a commission from James 
II. The eventual decision on how to try him was postponed, however, after he was broken out of 
jail in August 1695 and fled to Hamburg.157 
By the time of Vaughan’s later recapture, circumstances for the High Court of Admiralty 
changed. By 1696, the advocates had tried and mostly failed to situate themselves as effective 
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enforcers of the prohibition on Catholic connections with France. They had done so with the 
support of English commercial and political interests who intended to enact punishment for the 
damage done to Atlantic commerce and to stymie Louis XIV’s influence on the island. Yet events 
further east meant that the Court’s focus would soon shift to the Americas, where many further, 
more fruitful opportunities to extend their jurisdiction lay. During the summer of 1695, the EIC 
were providing testimonies of similarly illegal trade in the Americas, involving “pirates” operating 
out of Madagascar.158 The Third Navigation Act (1696), which passed through English Parliament 
in April, represented the crystallisation of what Bristol merchants had sought from the admiralty 
courts, outlawing the importation of all goods from the Americas into Ireland. At the same time, it 
afforded the High Court of Admiralty no direct role in policing this renewed prohibition. They 
were, however, granted the right to establish vice-admiralty courts in the Americas, which retained 
the right to also prosecute illegal traders.159 The English body, therefore, had the potential to 
substantially expand their reach and appear to have shifted their priorities onto pursuing pirates 
from Madagascar, rather than concentrating on their authority in Ireland. 
This transition was captured very decisively in a Court Session during 1696. The hunt for the 
escaped Thomas Vaughan proceeded alongside the search for the crew of Henry Avery, as pressure 
to have captured Irish sailors prosecuted continued. In August 1695, William III had ordered the 
advocates and Irish Lords Justices to ensure the sailors were not tried in any local courts in Ireland 
and were instead quickly transported to England for trial.160 Indeed, when Vaughan’s escape was 
reported to the King on 8 September, they were ordered to ensure he was recaptured and tried 
quickly.161 In the case of Henry Avery and his crew, there was a similar urgency to their capture. 
They stood accused of robbing a ship belonging to the Mughal Empire off the coast of Madagascar, 
with the EIC claiming that relations with the Mughal Shah Aurangzeb would be damaged 
irreparably if the Company did not track down and execute them.162 The first to be captured was 
Vaughan, in April 1696, having been discovered and arrested by Paul Rycaut, the English resident 
in Hamburg.163 After a delay caused by Vaughan once again making his escape, he was shipped to 
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England on 12 June.164 Members of Avery’s crew began to arrive in the Marshalsea in July, having 
individually made their way to Ireland, England and, for a smaller number, the Americas. Those 
who fled to Ireland were captured in Kinsale in August and transported to London for trial, where 
they joined others captured around the same time in England.165 
The two separate cases served to ultimately bookend the question, first raised by Oldys, of how 
to define piracy. The issue remained the extent of behaviours and circumstances that could make 
an individual guilty of piracy. On the one hand, Avery’s crew fitted the bill under the common law 
definition of robbery at sea, having no obvious allegiances or commissions they could claim that 
motivated their actions. On the other, Vaughan could only be easily condemned as a pirate under 
civil law, and convicting him required doing so in spite of his French commission. The issue was 
specifically discussed following Vaughan’s recapture in late July 1696, when Charles Hedges, 
Judge of the High Court of Admiralty debated how to prosecute ‘that pirat Vaughan’ in a meeting 
with the Privy Council.166 The decision made against him at this stage remains unclear, but by 
October the potential consequences of prosecuting Vaughan for piracy were spelled out in a letter 
written from Hamburg by Paul Rycaut, who had been instrumental in his capture. He reported in 
October that, if Vaughan were executed for piracy, then Louis XIV had vowed to do the same in 
reparation to an English prisoner held in goal, a retaliation which Oldys had already warned of 
back in 1693.167 At this point the civilians abandoned any thought of attempting to try Vaughan as 
a pirate and focused instead on Avery’s trial, which they afforded priority. Vaughan’s trial, 
scheduled for 26 October 1695, was postponed to make way for Avery’s crew.168 In the end, both 
cases were concluded on 6 November 1696 at the same session of the High Court of Admiralty. 
Vaughan and a substantial number of the twenty-eight men serving Avery were found guilty. This 
decision upheld a confirmation of the common law definition of piracy, as Avery’s men were 
prosecuted for piracy and Vaughan for high treason.169 Shortly afterwards in December, Hedges 
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had copies of the proceedings of both trials on the same day printed, constituting both their 
permanent adoption of a common law definition and a wider shift of attention from regulating 
movements of people onto Ireland’s coasts towards the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.170 
*** 
For Irish Catholics who believed French support remained their best hope to secure a Jacobite 
restoration, the peace treaty signed at Ryswick on 20 September 1697 was the final blow to their 
hopes. If they continued to fight, they would be declared outlaws in the eyes of all European 
authorities, no longer sheltered by English acceptance of France as a legitimate enemy. In the 
Caribbean, one Irish sailor James Kelly continued the fight regardless. When told of the peace 
while he was raiding the coast of Jamaica in early 1698, Kelly reportedly replied that ‘he knew of 
none till King James was in England’.171 He was subsequently exiled from Saint Domingue by 
Jean-Baptiste du Casse, the French governor and fled to the Bahamas. There, he found a base of 
operations amongst the sailors who attacked Mughal and Safavid shipping in the Red Sea.172 As he 
continued to rob English shipping, Kelly was denounced as a pirate by both English and French 
governors across the Caribbean, and in the end he was captured and executed on Saint 
Domingue.173 His condemnation and eventual demise marks the disentangling of the most ardent 
Jacobites from the francophone world as peace concluded, seeing them move beyond the official 
protection of any European power. 
   This chapter has argued that, during the Nine Years’ War, a range of Protestant interests 
attempted to assert their exclusive right to dominion in Ireland, not just through colonisation 
projects on land but by controlling movements of people and goods at sea. The impact of war forced 
thousands of poor Irish Catholics to leave for France and the French Caribbean, where they entered 
networks formed initially by the history of British military intervention and plantation, but which 
had since matured. Their existence made the threat of a Jacobite resurgence very real, representing 
Louis XIV continuing to influence the island by proxy. Protestant landowners, merchants and 
politicians universally perceived this threat, but many legal jurisdictions crisscrossed Irelands’ 
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coasts, each of which spoke for particular interest groups. At least two visions emerged for how 
colonisation projects should best be reflected on sea. The first, advocated by English merchants 
and government figures, argued for the sealing off of Ireland to cut Franco–Irish connections and 
eliminate the island as a commercial competitor of England, rendering it a dependent colony in 
practice. The second, provided by Protestants in Ireland, advocated a lenient policy that would 
allow them to harness Catholic labour and trade networks. Granted an opportunity by anxieties 
about these movements of goods and people, the advocates of English High Court of Admiralty 
attempted to use piracy trials to play their part in implementing the former idea. Yet divisions 
among the admiralty’s advocates over the finer points of law and the legal strategies of the 
Catholics they prosecuted made them unable to secure the verdicts they sought. Above all, they 
failed in their efforts to create pirates in order to advance their own institution’s prospects, 
heralding the failure of the particular vision of empire it represented. As in the case of the Postillion, 
the drift of the Court’s attention to the Americas saw jurisdictional ambiguity endure in Ireland, a 
de facto victory for Irish Protestants. Colonisation projects on the island continued to facilitate Irish 
trade with the wider world, rather than seeing the island closed off and rendered peripheral in an 
empire controlled from London. Yet in the process, they had seen the crime of piracy converted 
from a wartime measure to suppress Roman Catholic attachment to France and James II to a means 
to control movements of people beyond far beyond Europe. As had been the case many times 
before, the crime served as a tool honed by English political and commercial interests in relation 








II: The Darien Scheme and Venture Calvinism in the Caribbean 
Sea, 1695–1701 
In a proclamation of 1699, Don José Sarmiento y Valladares, Viceroy of New Spain, denounced a 
band of colonists who had recently disembarked on an island in the Gulf of Darién, eastern Panama. 
This colonisation project, known to historians since simply as the Darien Scheme, was established 
some months earlier in October 1698 by predominantly Scottish settlers who envisaged their 
colony of Caledonia as an entrepôt, linking commercial traffic between the Atlantic and the Pacific. 
The colourful terms in which Sarmiento condemned the scheme, however, raise some important 
questions about this settlement’s place within the history of European colonialism. He claimed to 
be convinced of the need ‘to exterminate the Scottish pirates, with a number of reasons informing 
my decision’, most importantly ‘to extirpate the heresy they could introduce by their weakness 
among the ignorant pueblos, the diabolical malaise spreading among their villages, with the 
common enemy [Satan] infecting and infesting them all’. Sarmiento believed these actions to be 
justified, because the damage they would inflict was proven by similar experiences ‘from the year 
81 to 88 … where, not content with the robberies and lootings of the rivers, they [English pirates] 
took captive women, children and priests’.1 Here, Sarmiento historicised the Scots’ colony, 
likening it to the raids of Caribbean “pirates” that had plagued the Spanish Americas for well over 
a hundred years. In Sarmiento’s estimation, the heresy, financial cost and human damage these 
colonists would inevitably cause were interwoven – connections he was not exceptional in making. 
As might be expected, the Council of the Indies at Seville and Pope Innocent XII also decried these 
Scottish “pirates”, claiming that the Catholic faith, indigenous peoples and Spanish subjects would 
suffer if they were not dislodged.2 More surprisingly, a similar connection was made by English 
observers. In early January 1699, the crew of a Royal African Company vessel warned officials in 
Havana that the convoy of Scottish ships that had recently arrived in eastern Panama came crewed 
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pueblos este y el comun enemigo para infizionarlos, y infestarlos todos’, ‘desde el año de 81 hasta el de 88 … donde 
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by notorious pirates, intent on attacking the treasure fleet.3 Despite these concerns, there is no 
evidence, in any source, that Scottish mariners captured Spanish shipping while at Panama or that 
they intended to do so when they set out from Scotland. Given the unusual deployment of such a 
familiar word, it is worth asking why, exactly, contemporaries viewed the colonists at Darien as 
pirates. 
One can begin to understand this description of the Scottish colonists as pirates by accepting 
that, during its lifetime, the Darien Scheme was not viewed as unique, but as one instance of a 
familiar colonial paradigm with its roots in the European Wars of Religion. Colonists from France, 
the Netherlands, England and Denmark had all gained footholds in the Caribbean Sea through an 
essentially parasitic relationship with the Spanish overseas territories, as peripheries, rather than 
establishing their own dominions through conquest, plantation or settler colonialism.4 As early as 
1519, the lure of gold and silver, alongside the opportunity to attack Europe’s preeminent Catholic 
power pushed generations of Europeans, especially Calvinist reformers, to raid Spanish towns and 
the treasure shipments that sailed from Central America. Unified by their faith and denied access 
to political or economic privilege in Europe, these sailors and their backers practiced venture 
Calvinism: high-risk, profitable enterprises, justified by the zero-sum calculation that Rome’s 
losses were Reformed Christianity’s gains. The predominant function of these venture Calvinists 
was as a source of capital, in the form of bullion, either as specie or unminted precious metals – 
resources they diverted into trade and investment around the Atlantic. Venture Calvinism generally 
operated without explicit sovereign approval and with little regard to peace treaties, its adherents 
targeting Spanish dominions precisely because their sovereign either opposed reform or stopped 
short of military action to protect it. That said, venture Calvinists themselves never claimed to be 
aggressive, but retaliatory, enacting reprisals upon Spain in response to perceived Catholic 
aggression in Europe. This practice should, however, be differentiated sharply from Calvinist 
colonies in North America. Venture Calvinists were less concerned with permanent settlement or 
personal morality than with diverting Catholic Spanish revenue streams into the hands of reformers 
in Europe, actions that have to be understood as part of a crusading rather than a missionary 
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mentalité. The overall function of this type of venturing was to force open and redirect closed 
capital flows and forge new trading networks, practices that became an important motor in driving 
the Protestant colonisation of the Caribbean. Existing literature has at times touched on this 
connection.5 Karen Kupperman, in particular, did so when she wrote of ‘Puritan colonization from 
Providence Island to the Western Design’, but this continuity is merely a fragment, part of a larger, 
bullion-seeking model that tracks the rise and fall of international Calvinism, stretching from La 
Florida to Caledonia.6 For over a century Spain endured these attacks and condemned those who 
committed them as pirates, but by the later seventeenth century the practice had produced rival 
models of colonisation. It was this legacy that framed and ultimately undermined the Darien 
Scheme. 
How exactly the Scottish colony fitted into the history of the Caribbean, has yet to be considered 
fully by scholars. The efforts of the Company of Scotland, the joint-stock company that planned 
and funded it, loom especially large in national histories of Scotland. In a tradition stretching back 
to Defoe, this historiography continues to explore and debate the significance of the colony’s 
eventual failure for the nation’s path to Union with its southern neighbour.7 Recent Scottish 
historiography adds further texture to this still-important narrative, introducing a more detailed 
understanding of the Company itself and the Scheme’s role in the development of a Scottish public 
sphere.8 Increasingly, however, a number of historians have begun to pick up where Francis Russell 
Hart left off in 1929, by considering both Spanish and Central American perspectives on Darien.9 
Two notable accounts have recently used source materials in Seville to flesh out the place of the 
scheme within a Spanish imperial context and cite the colony’s destruction as contradicting 
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traditional accounts of Spain’s gradual imperial decline after Philip II.10 Most innovative, however, 
has been Ignacio Gallup-Díaz’s discussion of Darien within the context of indigenous geopolitics 
in Panama. He has argued that the Scottish colony constituted just one instance in a long history of 
European involvement in the region and that, like others before them, eventual fate of the Scottish 
colonists was influenced by their ability to navigate the region’s power relations. He also views the 
1690s as a particular historical moment, in which many different European peoples stood poised 
to attempt settlements in Central America. This chapter most keenly follows after this latter 
approach, stressing that observers situated Darien within the longue durée history of the Caribbean 
Sea, but did so as a means of debating its legitimacy within the particular context of the later 1690s. 
This chapter will argue that, because the Gulf of Darién was viewed as a location that historically 
drew pirates, opponents of the Scottish colony were able to position it within a much older debate 
about colonisation in the Caribbean Sea. Protestants had persistently built their presence in the 
Caribbean through plundered gold and silver, a presence that over time came to manifest in two 
colonial forms: the plantation colony and the commercial entrepôt. Those with interests in the 
former took after Spanish officials in arguing, as a means to suppress new colonisation attempts, 
that the latter encouraged pirates. Caledonia, imagined by William Paterson as a free port, was thus 
fitted into this existing context, allowing planter interests in colonies such as Jamaica to argue that 
the scheme would not just encourage pirates, but also benefit French plans to seize control of the 
Caribbean. This argument won them the support of public institutions in England, which were 
essential in undermining the efforts of the Company of Scotland. The Scottish Company eventually 
came to realise that they were part of this competition, and its backers set out to overturn the support 
that the planters had been able to secure in England. They were, however, unsuccessful, and the 
continuing opposition of Spanish and planter interests served to replicate the conditions faced by 
earlier Protestant colonisers in the region, causing the new settlers to eventually replicate venture 
Calvinism. 
Making the case for this history of the Darien Scheme, what follows will be divided into three 
sections. The first provides a macro overview of the origins and rise of venture Calvinism. It shows 
how, across the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the pursuit of bullion and religious reform 
entwined in attacks on Spanish dominions throughout the Caribbean Sea. These raids eventually 
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gave way to two rival colonial forms, the entrepôt, embodied in Curaçao, and the plantation colony, 
exemplified by Jamaica, but also led to the creation of pirate and piracy as rhetorical and legal 
mechanisms of colonial exclusion. The second section then considers the lobbying efforts that 
determined the project’s legality and the first expedition to Panama. It begins with a discussion of 
how Darien was informed by this legacy of Caribbean colonisation, a fact that was used against the 
Company of Scotland by agents representing plantation owners in England. These representatives 
were able to argue that the colony would encourage pirates and strengthen French ambitions in the 
Caribbean, winning them the support of Parliament and the Board of Trade in England as well as 
William III himself. As a consequence, the Company of Scotland entered the Caribbean under the 
same conditions as many Calvinist peoples before them, diverting them into a similar pattern of 
conflict with Spanish settlers. The third section considers the domestic response to the first 
expedition in Scotland, the events of the second colonisation attempt and the fallout of the 
Scheme’s eventual failure. It begins by reconstructing the unsuccessful attempt by the Company 
of Scotland to reposition the scheme as opposing a projected Franco–Spanish alliance, intended to 
break political support for planter interests in England. As a consequence of this failure, conditions 
in Central America remained unchanged, funnelling the colonists into even more closely 
replicating venture Calvinism. This contest between these two colonial models was finally resolved 
in Seville, where the Company of Scotland itself was placed on trial for piracy before the Casa de 
la Cotratación in 1701. The refusal of William III to intervene in the case would make the guilty 
verdict that followed into a resounding victory for the Caribbean planters. 
*** 
As was known widely at the time, the Company of Scotland did not enter an unspoiled and 
undesired region of jungle on arrival in eastern Panama during the autumn of 1698. Europeans had 
journeyed to the Gulf of Darién for over 150 years, pursuing the tremendous mineral wealth of the 
Americas and many were willing to steal or commit acts of violence to obtain it.11 Alongside these 
developing predatory behaviours came vocabularies to describe and regulate them. The centuries-
long contest for the wealth of Central and South America became formative in the development of 
both piracy as a crime and the allegorical figure of the pirate. Initially Mediterranean concepts, the 
                                                 




context of Spanish overseas expansion and the European Wars of Religion saw them rolled out 
around the world.12 Those they sought to exclude were Protestants, predominantly Calvinists, who 
came seeking the shipments of gold and silver that departed annually for Cadiz and Manilla. Over 
time, this venture Calvinism became both secularised and the basis for colonisation of the 
Caribbean by Protestants. To understand this history is to appreciate the lens through which 
contemporaries later chose to understand the Darien Scheme and the well-worn debates that were 
being articulated through its conception and application. 
The roots of venture Calvinism lay less in Geneva or Zwinglian reform than in Extremadura and 
the Reconquista.13 Initial European colonisation of the Caribbean by Iberians set the pattern for 
how all newcomers entered the region thereafter. The settlements constructed across the Greater 
Antilles by Spanish soldiers and adventurers after 1493 possessed limited military, commercial and 
political capabilities, and they were ultimately a continuation of the Iberian colonisation of the 
Azores and the Canary Islands, which had begun during the 1430s.14 By 1514, Spanish outposts of 
this kind existed at Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, Cuba and Jamaica, as well as on the coasts of 
Panama.15 Increasingly, in these small settlements, the entwined confessional and economic 
rewards of the Reconquista were transferred, most notably through the encomienda system after 
1497.16 Initially, a desire for labour by encomenderos drove widespread practices of forced labour 
and plantation, with these outposts becoming bases to secure Taíno and Caribe labourers. Hernán 
Cortés’s expedition of 1519 served to somewhat shift this focus on account of the vast quantities 
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of gold and silver he secured by plundering the Aztec Confederation.17 After many further raids 
during the following years, precious metals began flowing out of the mines of Peru and Central 
America towards Spain via these Caribbean islands. Yet, for the conquistadors, this pursuit of 
wealth did not conflict with their Catholic faith. Figures like Cortés may not have believed that 
what they did was divinely sanctioned, but they did believe themselves to be the recipients of divine 
favour as the inheritors of both El Cid and the Reconquista.18 Successive generations of Spanish 
writers had no issues lionising the conquistadors as the vanguard in the expansion of God’s 
Kingdom.19 The first colonisation of the Caribbean after the 1490s, therefore, drew upon Iberian 
precedents to fuse the pursuit of precious metals, slave trading and other forms of commerce. They 
did so with the underlying justification that, in doing so, they embarked upon a form of crusade, 
blazing a trail for the expansion of Latin Christendom.20 At the same time, islands like Cuba came 
to be covered with plantations built on unfree labour but also functioned as commercial entrepôts 
that allowed the Spanish crown to harness the vast wealth of the Americas. 
While widespread belief in, or at least enthusiastic dissemination of, la leyenda negra among 
Protestant peoples suggests that they abhorred Spanish colonialism, in practice, all aspiring 
imperial powers in the Atlantic emulated them.21 Cortés’s riches attracted widespread attention in 
Europe, and it was French sailors who were next drawn across the ocean in pursuit of American 
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bullion. The lucrative potential of raids on Spanish shipping were realised in 1523, when the 
commander Jean Fleury captured two vessels stocked with treasure amassed by Cortés.22 The onset 
of the French Reformation, however, markedly changed the significance accorded to these raids.23 
By the 1550s, Calvin’s doctrine had secured converts amongst urban merchants and landless 
artisans in greater proportions than in rural areas, causing French Protestant – popularly called 
Huguenot – populations to expand disproportionately in the port towns of Normandy, as well as 
Montpellier and La Rochelle.24 This blend of militarised reform, merchant capital and often 
displaced artisan populations facilitated the outfitting of vessels, intent on precious metals and 
crewed increasingly by reformers.25 The emergence of a form of resistance theory in Calvinist 
communities aided this development, as jurists produced coherent political philosophies arguing 
for the importance of opposing Rome through means up to outright revolt and military action.26 
Thus attacks continued out of towns like Dieppe even during peacetime, while in times of war they 
inflicted significant injuries in the Spanish Caribbean, temporarily capturing Cartagena in 1543, 
Santiago de Cuba in 1553 and Havana in 1555.27 
Growing religious tensions in France, alongside the eruption of the first episode in the French 
War of Religion in 1562, saw these raids come to facilitate colonisation schemes. As the reform 
movement began organising in France, some nobles converted to Calvinism, seizing control from 
clergy, most notably through Gaspard de Coligny’s open conversion in 1558.28 Coligny himself 
was among the sponsors of two predominantly Huguenot colonial projects in Brazil (1557) and 
Florida (1562), both publically envisioned on the part of moderate reformers as fortified trade posts. 
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The militant wing of French reform openly envisioned these colonies as bases from which they 
could secure gold and silver to support further reform in France.29 Despite the efforts of initial 
moderates like Coligny to control both colonies, La Florida was eventually used as a staging post 
to attack Havana – the point where Spanish treasure shipments converged – provoking the colony’s 
destruction.30 Yet the collapse of these schemes and the intensification of violence during the Wars 
of Religion after 1567 did little to deter French reformers from travelling to the Americas. In fact, 
they stepped up their attacks there, vowing to enact reprisals for the loss of both colonies, destroyed, 
as they claimed, by the rage of savage antichristian forces.31 They emulated Spanish colonists even 
while they condemned their beliefs, forcefully pursuing bullion and casting their actions as the 
necessary and forcible advancement of true Christianity, the first instances of venture Calvinism. 
To protect these flows of gold and silver, it was clear that a now-extended Spain required laws 
and rhetorical strategies to combat interlopers. Following on from attacks by French corsairs during 
the 1520s, Iberian commerce was progressively centralised for protection into ports around the 
Isthmus of Panama, practices ultimately formalised in 1566 by Pedro Menéndez de Avilés into the 
two annual departures of the flota and the galeones.32 However, while this system provided a 
clearer means for officials to determine which subjects traded legitimately, they still lacked a 
language to identify, deter and punish foreign intruders.33 Initially, Huguenot attackers were 
dubbed corsarios luteranos, ‘Lutheran corsairs’ where ‘Lutheran’ stood as a catch-all term for 
reformer.34 The use of corsair suggests less that they considered Huguenot raids a form of 
“privateer” (for which there was no direct translation in Spanish), than the adaptation of a 
vocabulary used predominantly in the context of the Mediterranean to describe Moorish and, 
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latterly, Ottoman sailors attacking Christian vessels at sea.35 Yet corsario luterano was largely 
descriptive and denoted heretical status rather than a more precise form of criminality that could 
be challenged in any secular court with a maritime jurisdiction. 
Any new criminal charge, however, had to be located within emergent legal theories that justified 
Iberian claims to the Americas. Emperor Charles V had initially asserted his Atlantic dominium, 
through secular Roman law precepts, which were soon tempered and sacralised in response to 
criticism from Thomist scholars, seeing Spain and Portugal positioned as the sole defenders of the 
res publica christiana beyond Cape Verde.36 As a result, dominion over the Americas was 
conferred not just through the papal bulls of 1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas, but also through 
the Habsburgs’ defence of Latin Christendom via consecutive processes of reconquista in the 
Mediterranean and conquista in the Americas.37 The nebulous Iberian concept of piratería (piracy) 
connected with these claims for several reasons.38 Roman law drew its conception of the crime 
from a reading of Cicero’s description of pirates as hostis humani generis (enemies of mankind), 
generis not understood to mean mankind in the most literal sense, but that, as subsumption into the 
res publica was the ultimate destiny of mankind, to oppose Rome was to attack civilisation itself. 
Pirata signified that, in lieu of this fact, those who attacked the Republic in the Mediterranean Sea 
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were not legitimate enemies, but literally beyond all recognised law.39 From here, it is possible to 
see how the Spanish crown, styled as a global defender of the res publica christiana, benefitted 
from this conception of piracy. Under the Ciceronian paradigm, any encroachment by foreigners 
into the Atlantic Ocean became an attack on Christendom itself, making the perpetrators pirates 
rather than legitimate enemies.40 In Europe and the Mediterranean, Spain did recognise the 
sovereignty of other Catholic princes and their right to wage maritime warfare, but it did not afford 
a similar right to Ottoman vassal states in North Africa, or to anyone serving a “heretical” 
sovereign. Anyone in the latter two categories were beyond and against the res publica christiana; 
so by definition pirates, being beyond and against Christendom if they attacked Spanish subjects 
or encroached into spaces their sovereign claimed at sea.41 The universalist claims of Spain, 
Portugal and the Papacy became folded into the secular crime of piracy, criminalising the attacks 
of reformers while underscoring the divine basis of Iberian dominium in the Atlantic. It was this 
conception of piracy that would later prove central in the contest between planters and the Company 
of Scotland over the Darien Scheme’s legality. 
By the late 1560s, the European Wars of Religion had spilled over into the Caribbean, seeing 
French Calvinists challenge the Habsburg grip on American bullion, predominantly silver. The 
crime of piracy and the epithet pirate came to be applied to reformers as a means to enforce the 
Iberian monopoly on the wealth of the new world, becoming part of an emergent secular legal 
framework. While these first instances of venture Calvinism did lead to some colonisation projects, 
they remained insurgents without a sovereign who would ever support their actions in the 
Caribbean. As a result, no lasting projects or coherent defence of colonisation, either in law or 
political philosophy, emerged in this initial period. 
It was reformers from the Low Countries who were the first to coherently challenge Iberian legal 
theories in both writing and practice. As part of their struggle against Philip II’s rule, the attacks of 
the Sea Beggars spread from Europe to the Caribbean after 1568, seeing Spain’s now-extended 
legal system endure its first major test. The Watergeuzen, or Sea Beggars, were sailors in the 
employ of Protestant nobles forced out of the Low Countries and into exile following the eruption 
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of the Dutch Revolt in 1568. At least 192 of these sailors were tried and executed for piracy before 
1572, their convictions standing on the supposition that they were commissioned and given 
commissions of reprisal by the “heretic” William of Orange, rather than a legitimate Christian 
sovereign.42 The Dutch encountered similar legal proceedings when they began moving eastwards 
into the Indian Ocean, where the Estado Da Índia executed a number of Dutch sailors for piracy 
during the earliest years of the seventeenth century.43 If the Protestant Low Countries ever wanted 
to carve a permanent place for itself in the Americas, this war would have to be fought in law as 
well as in practice. 
A direct challenge to the legality of these prosecutions came from the jurist Hugo Grotius in his 
tract De iure praedae, penned in 1603. In the text he worked both to refute the charge of piracy 
and argue for the Dutch right to wage war at sea, preoccupations that led him to challenge Iberian 
claims to overseas dominium in general.44 His arguments rested upon a secularised understanding 
of ius gentium (the law of nations) drawn from classical authors but also leaned heavily on la 
leyenda negra, which he used to attack arguments that Spanish or Portuguese claims could be 
justified on the grounds that they expanded Christendom.45 After the truce of 1609, Grotius aired 
his views in print, along with a revision of some of his arguments, in the pamphlet Mare liberum.46 
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The latter tract, which grew to become the theoretical underpinning for Dutch overseas expansion, 
saw Grotius build his case by arguing that the ocean was not a form of territory to be owned and 
alienated as private property, but instead common to all who adhered to his conception of ius 
gentium.47 Although Grotius appears avowedly secular, it is worth noting that his writings were 
intended to undermine Rome’s universalist claims. His refutation of Phillip II’s charge of piracy 
illustrates this point, as he drew upon Cicero, arguing that it was by ‘a common maritime right, 
possessed by other free nations also, that the Roman People were authorised to distribute fleets for 
the protection of sailors and to punish pirates’.48 He defined piracy by intention of wrongdoing, 
rather than by sovereign legitimacy or confessional allegiance, as had previously been applied in 
Spanish law.49 Above all, while Grotius built his arguments in favour of Dutch rights upon a secular 
understanding of ius gentium, its very articulation was intended to undermine the entwined 
dominium of Spain, Portugal and Rome beyond Europe. Thus venture Calvinism developed an 
attendant framework in secular law, one that would aid Protestants in settling permanent colonies. 
This concept of mare liberum became fundamental to Dutch expansion into the Caribbean.50 The 
Dutch West India Company (WIC) initially focused on raiding Spanish commercial traffic, 
continuing even during the period of truce after 1609, and later also established slave plantations 
in Brazil and Guyana.51 In particular, the WIC were animated by the pursuit of gold and silver, 
culminating in Piet Heyn famously capturing the Spanish flota in 1628.52 These raids saw Dutch 
outposts established across the Caribbean, first at Tortuga and Tobago during the late 1620s, 
followed by their first permanent colony of this type at Curaçao, established amid a combination 
of Calvinist piety, free trade and plunder.53 The Dutch began to occupy the island as early as 1625, 
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before formally capturing it in 1634, when it became a base from which they laid siege to ports 
such as Maracaibo, Santa Maria and Cartagena.54 At the same time, early Dutch Curaçao possessed 
a millenarian character, which, in turn, aided its eventual expansion into an entrepôt. Sephardic 
Jews, who arrived in the colony in the 1650s, held important commercial and eschatological 
purposes for the colony. Many of the Dutch colonists believed in the importance of reunifying the 
Jews with Native Americans as the lost tribes of Israel, while at the same time, the Sephardim’s 
enduring connections in Spain made it possible to form extensive trade links into the mainland.55 
As in the case of emergent applications of international law in the Caribbean, during the ensuing 
years, any explicitly confessional aspect of Curaçao faded as it transitioned to a free port seeking 
to draw the trade of all nations.56 Thus the Dutch transformed their initial practices of trading and 
looting Spanish shipping into a means to further national reformation, break open new markets 
and, eventually, generate their own legal theories to defend their presence in the Americas. Venture 
Calvinism underpinned their initial overseas expansion, before giving way to the Grotian 
conception of mare liberum, embodied most clearly in the Caribbean entrepôt. 
Like reformers from the Low Countries, English sailors also embraced venture Calvinism as a 
practice. Mariners such as Francis Drake and Walter Raleigh were amongst the first English people 
to practice maritime predation in the Caribbean, although they were moderate reformers rather than 
followers of Calvin.57 Their efforts led to the initial creation of several small, temporary outposts 
in the Caribbean.58 This situation changed under James VI/I and his son Charles I, both of whom 
went to great pains to ensure that attacks against shipping in the Caribbean Sea were curbed.59 The 
crown’s support for Spain, combined with the promise of precious metals, prompted some 
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Calvinists, still then within the Church of England, to claim their right to continue waging a just 
war of reprisal. Most prominent of these figures was Robert Rich, Earl of Warwick, who, like many 
other Puritans, found himself disillusioned with Stuart alliances with Catholic powers and 
suspicious of growing Arminianism within the English Church.60 He funded numerous attacks on 
Spanish possessions in the Caribbean, most notably out of Bermuda between 1616 and 1620, while 
the precious metals they took became important investment for the development of plantation 
farming in the colony.61 Rich subsequently backed the Providence Island Colony, which in 1631 
set out to establish a Puritan settlement off the coast of Nicaragua, a vantage point from where they 
intended a combination of plantation farming as well as a secure source of bullion from Spanish 
commercial traffic.62 After nearly ten years, the colony was destroyed by a fleet dispatched out of 
Havana, which justified the attack as action against a ‘den of thieves and pirates’.63 Despite this 
setback, the onset of Britain and Ireland’s own wars of religion in 1639 ultimately led to state 
backing for these English Puritans’ private war in the Caribbean.64 Rich and the colony’s other 
investors secured substantial political preferment as a result of Parliament’s victory in the English 
Civil Wars and subsequently gained favour with Oliver Cromwell, who sought to build upon their 
experiences with his Western Design of 1655. Though the Design failed and saw the 
Commonwealth capture Jamaica rather than Hispaniola, few sought to transform it into a plantation 
colony like Guyana or an entrepôt like Curaçao.65 By the 1655, the English state appropriated 
aspects of venture Calvinism to secure territory in the Caribbean, although Jamaica’s future 
remained as yet unclear. 
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Following the island’s initial capture, the Calvinist mores that had led to the Western Design 
quickly faded. After 1655, many on the island continued to attack Spanish towns and shipping, yet, 
as the Wars of Religion receded in Europe and the restored House of Stuart itself continued the war 
with Spain, the impetus pushing English reformers to the Caribbean dissipated.66 Equally, as a 
result of generations of these sailors operating in the Caribbean, they began to create a distinct, 
localised culture, different from those who had preceded them. Sailors who made their living 
through plunder and free trade in the Caribbean Sea became known as buccaneers. One of the first 
printed accounts of the buccaneers translated from Spanish into English claimed that ‘since that 
Curasao, Tortuga, and Jamaica have been inhabited by English, French and Dutch, and bred up that 
Race of Hunts-men, than which, no other ever was more desperate, nor more mortal Enemies to 
the Spaniards, called Bucaniers’.67 Just as the legal theories generated around the colonisation of 
the Caribbean appropriated and secularised confessional conflict, venture Calvinism gave way 
across the later seventeenth century to the more individualistic, secular practice of buccaneering. 
At the same time, English plantation farming practices, initially established in the Chesapeake 
and Barbados, were introduced into Jamaica, initially funded by large amounts of stolen Spanish 
silver.68 In doing so, planters, who still prized the accumulation of bullion above all other 
commodities, began to emphasise that a positive balance of trade, labour and cash-crop production 
were now the best means to acquire it.69 Following the Treaty of Madrid in 1670 and the realisation 
of the vast profits brought by sugar production, buccaneers were increasingly viewed by planters 
less as a form of investment and more as a drain on Jamaica’s labour force. Here, two competing 
visions for Jamaica’s future emerged, one as an entrepôt that trafficked the trade of all nations and 
the other of a plantation colony built upon unfree labour.70 This emergent desire to assert control 
over the movement of people and goods played out through political battles in the colony between 
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supporters of the planters and buccaneers, eventually resolved in dramatic fashion by the Port 
Royal earthquake of 1692, which destroyed the colony’s centre of buccaneering. In Jamaica, stolen 
bullion funded the formation of a plantation society rather than a free port comparable with Curaçao 
to the south. Those who continued to seek precious metals as the buccaneers had done now found 
themselves outlaws, condemned thereafter by English authorities as pirates. 
From the mid-sixteenth century, venture Calvinism emerged as an important motor driving the 
colonisation of the Caribbean by Protestants. Iberian monopolisation of new world bullion, the 
papal dispensation that underpinned it and the ultimate benefit both realities bestowed upon 
Catholic peoples all meant that religious war and the pursuit of an American source of capital 
became initially entangled.71 Emulating the smash-and-grab tactics that defined the early Spanish 
Caribbean, French reformers were the first to contest this monopoly, sacralising maritime predation 
into an expression of religious war in the process. These practices were then adopted by Dutch and 
the English mariners, both using the bullion they obtained to become advocates of separate colonial 
models: one built upon mare liberum that sought to draw flows of people and goods through 
entrepôts, the other relying on plantation farming that sought to confine labour, increasingly unfree, 
to islands. Yet equally significant was how Spain responded to the damage inflicted by reformers. 
Spanish governments consistently searched for commercial regulations, as well as legal concepts, 
to punish interlopers and assert the divine origins of their dominium, all of which found their 
eventual expression through a criminal conception of piracy. By the 1690s, English colonisers in 
particular shared more with Spain than they would ever wish to admit; having built their presence 
in the Caribbean on plundered Central American wealth, planters now turned on the excesses of 
their earliest tactics, disowning those who continued to practice them as pirates. 
*** 
The way in which Scottish commentators spoke of Catholic Spain in relation to the Darien Scheme 
underwent a marked tonal shift over the course of the colony’s existence. In 1698 the Company of 
Scotland claimed to extend a hand of friendship, seeking to engage in an enriching free trade with 
Central America. Yet by 1700, one Kirk minister was able to attest that, in eastern Panama, they 
acted where their fellow Protestants would not, promoting a colony to bring about ‘the ruin of the 
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Antichrist, their Golden Mines shall no more uphold their accursed dignity’.72 A later English 
observer lampooned the Company for how they eventually acted, claiming they ‘pretend an honest 
and fair trade to East-India and mean invasion and piracy on Spain’, that they departed intent on 
‘filling Scotland with gold’ and the scheme ‘startled all honest men and made them ask: is this the 
first fruits of the new reformation of the church in Scotland?’.73 
These quotations could easily be drawn from similar disputes ranging back over a hundred years, 
and this element of pentimento – older imperial languages and forms resurfacing – proved 
persistent around Darien.74 Irrespective of what the Company of Scotland intended, they did not 
operate independently of the region’s history or the immediate circumstances of the 1690s. They 
came up against the fact that, like all similar projects before them in the Caribbean, their proposals 
angered Spanish interests, but they did so at a time when fears grew amongst English colonists that 
France intended to seize control of the entire region. Political leaders in Europe were unsure about 
how to prevent this eventuality, presenting an opportunity for individuals to propose solutions. In 
this context, the Darien Scheme, first imagined by the trader and financier William Paterson, 
reignited the conflict over the future of colonisation in the Caribbean, which was held to have been 
resolved with the Port Royal Earthquake. These models presented fundamentally different ideas 
about how to utilise flows of goods and people. The entrepôt required a substantial throughput of 
both, while plantation societies required a constantly replenished but static labour force alongside 
regimented exchanges of goods. Darien quickly became the most recent project to advance the 
former scheme. Situating this older debate within the context of the 1690s was the initial challenge 
which planter agents in England faced, as they sought influential allies to oppose the Company of 
Scotland’s project. 
The idea for a new European settlement in Panama came from the experience of William 
Paterson, a Lowland Scot who one source claims was witness to the changes taking place in 
Jamaica during previous decades.75 He was said to have immigrated to Port Royal sometime after 
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1673 and was likely on the island when Bartholomew Sharp discovered that an overland route to 
the Pacific was possible after sailing up the Gulf of Darién.76 This discovery precipitated the raiding 
of gold and silver mines in Panama by Dutch and English buccaneers, who were then able to 
proceed to the poorly defended Spanish towns in the Pacific. The idea that Paterson developed 
during his early lifetime was, possibly as a result, largely a variant on existing Spanish trade routes, 
specifically the flows of silver that ran from Potosí into Central America, before being shipped 
west from Acapulco to Manila and east to Cadiz via Havana.77 The difference in the Scottish project 
was that they imagined that the American specie would become concentrated into a port founded 
in or close to Panama, drawing sailors and merchants trading commodities from both the east and 
the west. It was something of an unusual proposal, akin to transposing a free port like Curaçao as 
close to a ready supply of bullion as possible, and in this respect it drew predominantly upon a 
Dutch precedent. This ambition is encapsulated in Paterson’s turn of phrase: ‘it will be manifest 
that trade is capable of increasing trade, and money of begetting money to the end of the world’.78 
Yet it was also influenced by the context of Jamaica and the aspirations of buccaneers during the 
1670s. 
By 1685, Paterson was promoting some form of the idea in Amsterdam, while in 1690 it may 
have almost taken form with the founding of the abortive Americaense Compagnie in 
Brandenburg.79 It is worth noting that the project at this point differed substantially from the 
eventual form taken by the Darien Scheme, as Paterson imagined it as an internationally funded 
venture, rather than a purely Scottish one. He found another potential home for his idea when he 
invested in, and became a Director of, the Company of Scotland, established by Act of Scottish 
Parliament on 26 June 1695. This Scottish association has to be understood as initially having some 
similarity to the Dutch WIC, in that they enjoyed state backing, were envisaged as a company 
acting as a secular authority and held a broad remit in terms of the kinds of trade they were expected 
to encourage.80 As a result, Paterson had to persuade the Company of Scotland to adopt his scheme, 
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rather than turning their interests eastwards along established trade routes, as others within the 
Company advocated.81 His initial proposals, delivered in 1696, were supported by the testimony of 
the buccaneer Lionel Wafer, who pitched the venture in Panama to the Company’s directors as a 
rich and fertile region beyond the control of Spain, populated by amicable natives and filled with 
precious metals.82 By July, Paterson had convinced the Company to fund this project, and they had 
selected the Gulf of Darién as their eventual location. It is easy to see how such proposals stood to 
upset myriad commercial and political interests. 
This was an especially bad time to be disturbing the balance of power in the Caribbean. For 
English governments there, the Nine Years’ War had served to underscore the precarity with which 
Stuart dominions were held. The temporary loss of St Kitts and near-loss of Jamaica in 1694 both 
helped inform this perspective, with governors warning that a lack of population made the islands 
vulnerable to French conquest.83 After the Peace of Ryswick in 1697, this was not a fear that 
subsided. A succession crisis in Europe loomed on account of Charles II’s ill-health and lack of an 
heir, raising the spectre of a Bourbon inheritance of the Habsburg dominions. By 1699, the prospect 
that Louis XIV would come to control all of the Spanish Empire by proxy was made more likely 
by the death of the heir to the undivided Spanish crown, Joseph Ferdinand.84 In parallel, both 
Spanish and English politicians began to notice numerous French projects underway in the 
Caribbean Sea, as well as in the Gulf of Florida. New fortified settlements were established on the 
Mississippi, Puerto Rico and Espiritu Santo Bay, alongside rumoured interest in the Gulf of Darién, 
all of which were accompanied by a general build-up of French military capacity. The purpose of 
this increased activity was to be ready to launch attacks upon Spanish Americas should the 
Habsburg’s dominions be partitioned, or the English and Dutch should the Bourbons inherited them 
undivided.85 Officials throughout the Caribbean relayed this information to their compatriots in 
Europe, watching French activity nervously across the later 1690s. English politicians in particular 
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believed that they should be matching these colonisation efforts or strengthening their hold over 
colonies that already existed, but they were unsure of how to do so without also provoking the 
Spanish crown.86 This was a threat that only grew in political significance as the Darien Scheme 
proceeded. 
Across the later-seventeenth century a gradual transfer was underway in the anglophone world. 
It was increasingly France, rather than Spain, that was perceived as the greater threat in the 
Caribbean. Yet this political context alone does not explain why the Darien Scheme drew such 
opprobrium; indeed, it is feasible that the directors could have successfully positioned the colony 
as a bulwark against France, rather than making an enemy of Spain. Nor was it simply that William 
III or English government ministers exhibiting a kneejerk reaction to a Scottish venture. It was, 
after all, not the first colonisation project launched by Scots.87 Instead, shortly following the 
formation of the Company of Scotland, commercial interest groups set out to secure public support 
wherever they could for a strong response to the scheme. After it emerged that the Company 
intended to settle in the Caribbean Sea, Jamaican planters became the staunchest opponent of the 
project, seeking to quash any proposed entrepôt close to their island. 
Both greater interest in the Panama region and the opposition of Jamaica’s planters to new 
colonies there are illustrated in the ill-fated colonial project of English ship’s captain and Quaker, 
Richard Long. During the summer of 1697 he attempted to persuade the English Privy Council to 
sponsor an expedition to secure plate wrecks and gold mines in Central America.88 While the Privy 
Council did not initially fund his scheme, Long was referred to the Admiralty Board, who allowed 
him a commission to conduct his search.89 By 9 August 1698, he had arrived at Port Morant in 
Jamaica, and there he was informed that buccaneers were no longer present in the Gulf of Darién, 
making the region “vacant”.90 His ensuing travels around eastern Panama convey his growing 
excitement at the prospect of harnessing the trade previously held by these sailors. Long formed 
links with the Tule (known today as the Guna), a Native American people in Panama who had an 
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established history of resisting Spanish attempts at missionisation and political control. He 
brokered alliances with a number of capitanes, individuals within Tule society who drew power 
from alliances they were able to secure with Europeans.91 Realising that the region was not in fact 
vacant, he then focused on securing alliances amongst the Tule.92 His goal became to form the 
early stages of a colony, fuelled by a source of gold or silver from poorly guarded mines further up 
the Gulf and supplied with provisions from trade with his allies locally. He also encountered French 
buccaneers nearby, who had intermarried with the indigenous people to form a maroon community, 
and who he was told occasionally made attempts on Spanish mines some distance away.93 He struck 
a deal with a capitane called Captain Diego who believed that Long would similarly bring English 
settlers, likely over whom the Tule believed he would have authority.94 Leaving four men with 
Diego as hostages, Long then departed for Jamaica on the 3 December, seeking recruits to bring 
his project to fruition. 
When he returned to Jamaica, however, he immediately encountered opposition from the planters 
there. They claimed that his scheme would drain labour out of the island; as Long put it: ‘The great 
men at Jamaica are much against such a settlement in the Gulph, either by English or Scotch … 
fearing a great part of their common people would run away from them to live there’.95 In late 
December, unable to secure the people and supplies he needed, the Quaker then sailed for England, 
where he hoped to find support for his scheme. There he reshaped his project and pitched it the 
Duke of Leeds.96 He stated the advantage of the region for trade into China and the Indian Ocean, 
enabled by a readily accessible supply of bullion – an almost identical proposal to what Paterson 
had provided in 1696. He also emphasised that what he pitched was a means to secure the region 
from growing French ambition, claiming that the maroon community he encountered was merely 
the first step in their colonising the region. Long also proposed a variant of the scheme to David 
Leslie, Earl of Leven, in which English and Scottish colonists would settle on the tract he had 
agreed with Diego, similarly as a means to obstruct French designs.97 However, Long found no 
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favour in England or Scotland, and, like many such proposals during the Age of Projects, his 
colonisation scheme never materialised. 
Shortly after the establishment of the Company of Scotland in 1695, Paterson and the other 
directors were initially successful in drawing investment from the London merchant community. 
Yet, in doing so, they provoked a backlash from those who imagined the damage the Company 
might do. It was the EIC who first expressed alarm about the Company of Scotland, believing that 
they sought a direct trade into the east, and at a time when they were weakened by the recent 
weakening of their monopoly.98 The EIC’s agents drew up reasons for opposing their new opponent 
on 4 December 1695 to deliver to English Parliament, claiming that their Company contravened 
the Navigation Acts and would draw English investors and sailors to Scotland, allowing them to 
then seize North American markets for manufactured goods.99 These arguments held an especial 
significance for those invested in the slave trade. Another monopoly company struggling at the 
time was the Royal African Company (RAC), which also submitted its arguments to Parliament, 
asserting that the correct response was to enhance its monopoly privileges to match the Company 
of Scotland.100 This argument caught the attention of Jamaican agents in London, as Gilbert 
Heathcote, a merchant who was involved with the New EIC but also held substantial commercial 
and familial ties with the island, insisted they break the RAC’s monopoly entirely. This move, he 
claimed, would increase the availability of cheap slave labour, which could then be redirected 
covertly towards the Spanish Main, in turn drawing bullion to the island.101 In the end, the Jamaican 
agents had their way. Parliament refused to reinstate the monopolies of either the EIC or RAC, yet 
rumours circulated in London that the Scottish Company were bound for Panama. 
This new information prompted planter interests to push for further action.102 Debates 
reminiscent of those about Jamaica in the 1670s resurfaced as the planter agents likened the 
projected Scottish settlement to Curaçao, maintaining that colonists would be drawn by the promise 
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of riches and become pirates there, leading common people from the island and weakening their 
ability to defend against French invasion.103 The proposals submitted by the agents were digested 
by the House of Lords, and some of them were included in the Bill for Regulating Abuses in the 
Plantation Trade (1696), intended as a restatement and strengthening of the Navigation Acts.104 
Even at this early stage, planter interests stated what was to be their entrenched position about 
Darien. As had been the case with Long, they argued that the project would draw the population of 
their island away to become pirates. Yet, to drive home the strategic implications of this movement 
of people, they also argued that it would worsen their relations with Spain, weakening Stuart 
dominions against France. 
This dispute followed Paterson to the European Continent, where, in the final months of 1696, 
he led expeditions to both Amsterdam and Hamburg to secure further investment.105 Opposition 
was fierce, first from the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in Amsterdam and then from Paul 
Rycaut, English resident in Hamburg. Although ordered to obstruct the Company of Scotland by 
the English Board of Trade, the latter’s resistance was borne of more than his professional 
obligations. Rycaut had a long history of connections with English trading interests, dating back to 
his appointment as resident at Smyrna in 1667, where he had begun to develop links with the 
Hamburg and Levant Companies, both of which relied upon supplies of tobacco and sugar for their 
trade, and both of which also lobbied the English Parliament back in December 1695 opposing the 
Company of Scotland.106 He employed numerous measures to hinder Paterson and his followers, 
including lobbying the Hamburg Senate to prevent them from establishing a factory in the city and 
publishing an anonymous tract casting doubt on the legitimacy of the trade proposed by the 
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scheme.107 When Paterson discovered what Rycaut had done, he claimed that they had been 
‘villified & defamed as a company of Beggars’.108 Here, he likened the Scots’ position to that of 
the Sea Beggars during the Dutch Revolt, whom Elizabeth I had similarly refused to aid, as she 
feared repercussions from Phillip II.109 At the same, Rycaut’s agent, Richard Orth, reported 
rumours swirling around the Scottish venture in Hamburg to the Board of Trade. He spoke of the 
Scottish colonists’ intention to capture Spanish mines in Central America, how known pirates had 
been recruited to join the project and how French commercial interests were now considering a 
similar project in Panama as a result.110 By the end of April 1697, Paterson and the other 
commissioners were forced to leave Hamburg without the investment they sought, while a cloud 
of suspicion hung over what they truly intended. 
Both the lobbying of the planter agents and the reports supplied by Orth made their way to the 
recently established English Board of Trade, whose members had already heard that the Company 
of Scotland intended to set out for the Gulf of Darién by October 1696. On 16 of the month, 
Jamaican agents bluntly reminded the board that ‘more bullion is yearly imported from Jamaica 
than from all the other Colonies’, yet this was endangered through depopulation, as in recent years 
‘many have turned pirates’, an eventuality they claimed Darien would encourage, and, should the 
island wither, France would ‘become masters of the mines of Mexico and Peru’.111 This message 
was then supplemented by the news delivered by Orth and Rycaut during early 1697.112 While 
already suspicious about what the Scottish Company intended, the Board then heard that they had 
been in contact with the now retired buccaneer Lionel Wafer, who were summoned along with 
William Dampier to appear before them on 30 June.113 Together, these men gave a similar account 
to that which had been provided to the Scottish directors the previous year, emphasising the 
opportunities that they would have for trade into the Pacific, the mines nearby and the fictitious 
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Native American ‘Emperor of Darien’ who could help them obtain both.114 One member of the 
Board wrote in October that their concern had moved from the danger the scheme posed to the 
plantation trade, to fears that it would result in ‘hostilitys and depredations upon the Spaniards’.115 
They then submitted this evidence to the solicitor general and requested that a proclamation be 
issued forbidding all subjects from contact with the project. Under their recommendation, William 
III agreed to the measure.116 
By 1698, therefore, as tensions over an ensuing conflict in the Caribbean grew, commercial 
interests succeeded in using this climate to rearticulate a much older debate. Difficult economic 
conditions as a consequence of war and famine in Scotland had allowed Paterson to secure support 
for his free trade project, both from the Company of Scotland and Scottish Parliament. In reply, 
planter agents succeeded in positioning themselves as the truest representatives of English 
government interest in the Caribbean, although they had used particular arguments to persuade 
English authorities that this was the case. They had woven together the growing fear of French 
designs in the Caribbean with the older argument that an entrepôt in Panama would mean pirates 
raiding Spanish towns and shipping. With no allies to speak of and without the support of their 
sovereign, the Company of Scotland’s colonists entered the Caribbean under the conditions that 
many Calvinist peoples had faced before them. As the Company’s colonisation efforts proceeded, 
established power relations in the Caribbean ensured that a free port could not be established by 
peaceful means, causing the project to gradually ease closer to replicating the practices of earlier 
venture Calvinists. 
On 2 December 1699, the colonists finally arrived at what they called Golden Island in the Gulf 
of Darién. The first people they encountered were Tule capitanes, who had previously used 
alliances with transient English, French and Dutch sailors to navigate complex regional 
geopolitics.117 When the Company’s colonists arrived, they met a number of capitanes, who 
presumed that they resembled English-speakers they had encountered previously and therefore 
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were predominantly interested in Spanish gold and silver. This association was illustrated shortly 
after the Scots’ arrival, when they were visited by one Tule, who, in an attempt to foster good 
relations, gave ‘praise of Captain Swan and Captain Davies two English privateers who he said 
were his particular friends, and whom he knew in the South Sea (Pacific)’.118 During the early 
months of 1699, the colonists formed what came to be a long-lasting alliance with a Tule who 
introduced himself as Captain Pedro. Accounts provided prior to Scottish settlement mark out 
Pedro as being in charge of a small band vying for position with other capitanes in the region; one 
passage describes a dispute between Pedro and a rival over who was the ‘better man’ and that he 
had recently aided French sailors in their attempt to access gold mines further up the Gulf.119 
Pedro’s ambitions led him into contact with both the Scottish settlers and Spanish soldiers during 
January 1699. Initially, seeking easier access to trade with the colonists, he urged them to settle a 
fortified position on the mainland near his village, telling them that Spanish forces were already 
massing to attack the colony.120 Pedro and his band then made their way to Toubacanti, an outpost 
used by the government of New Spain to conduct diplomacy amongst the nearby indigenous and 
maroon communities. When there, the Tule encountered a Spanish scouting party intent on 
discovering what the Scottish colonists planned, so he attempted to broker a better arrangement, 
claiming that through ‘art and deceit’ he could lead them to these newcomers.121 He asked for gold 
in return for the information, but when the soldiers revealed they had none Pedro departed in search 
of a better deal. He returned to the Scottish settlement and informed them that ‘a Spanish party 26 
in number besides Indians and negroes’ was nearby.122 Believing that this party meant invasion 
was imminent, the Council of Caledonia resolved to strike first, prompting a skirmish in which the 
scouts were routed by the combined forces of Pedro’s band and the settlers. Both groups returned 
to the island colony shortly thereafter. 
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Immediately following the conflict at Toubacanti, Caledonia’s government sought to calm the 
situation through diplomacy.123 An opportunity to do so came when one of their ships was captured 
and brought into Cartagena during February 1699; its crewmen were interrogated about their 
intentions to trade at Portobello, before then being committed to prison on suspicion of piracy.124 
The Council of Caledonia dispatched one of the colony’s officers, Alexander McGhie, to negotiate 
the prisoners’ release on 11 March. McGhie was instructed to offer the Spanish authorities a truce 
and the opportunity to trade with their colony, but also asserted that, if they continued to deny the 
Scottish right to settle, then they would enact reprisals for the seizure.125 When he arrived in 
Cartagena, he was granted an audience with the governor, Pedro de Olivera Ordoñez, who was far 
from obliging, tearing up the peace offering and denouncing the Scottish colonists as ‘rogues and 
pirats’.126 True to their word, the Scottish Council responded by issuing all of its ships with letters 
of marque, instructing them to take any Spanish vessels then encountered.127 In Mexico City it was 
similarly interpreted that the colonists’ actions were in violation of the initial papal grant and 
Tordesillas, signalling that they did not intend peaceful settlement. The Viceroy of New Spain 
made the charge more explicit when he ordered Caledonia’s destruction in late March, justified 
because, he claimed, the colonists were pirates and would encourage the spread of heresy.128 
Spanish officials responded to the settlement on the mouth of the Gulf of Darién just as they had 
other European newcomers for hundreds of years, dubbing them pirates and vowing to destroy their 
settlement. In doing so, however, the Caledonia’s Council felt provoked to seek reprisals. 
The inhabitants of the colony nevertheless persisted and attempted to break into Central 
American markets. By April 1699, their situation had become desperate. The English proclamation 
had been sent to Jamaica and was distributed across Stuart dominions in the Americas, blocking 
provisions while famine and disease ravaged the colony.129 For assistance they turned to Domingo 
De Rada, a merchant from nearby Santa Maria who they had captured during the skirmish at 
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Toubacanti.130 During his months of imprisonment at Caledonia, De Rada secured good relations 
with the colony’s Council, providing them with intelligence about Spanish towns and military 
capacity in the region.131 Believing him to be their connection to markets in the Spanish Main, De 
Rada was offered his freedom as a further peace offering, but on the condition that he worked to 
establish trade between Santa Maria and their colony.132 When he was released and returned to the 
town in early May, however, officials there presumed that following the battle he had conspired 
with the Scots at Caledonia to establish illegal trade links. De Rada was immediately imprisoned 
on arrival, and in August he was transported to Havana for interrogation. There, he informed his 
interrogators from the Spanish Inquisition that the colonists endeavoured to trade commodities into 
Santa Maria, while also using his knowledge of the region to lead them to vulnerable Spanish gold 
and silver mines. Once they knew their location, he claimed, they would issue privateering 
commissions to anybody who sought one, precipitating a wave of raids against Spanish towns and 
shipping.133 De Rada was then released, the evidence he provided further vindicating the belief of 
his captors that their ultimate intention was to seize control of the flow of bullion. For the 
Caledonians, the merchant’s capture further hindered their attempts to peacefully establish trade 
networks on which their entrepôt would depend, increasingly important as their situation 
deteriorated. Yet, as these networks never materialised, starved of supplies by their European 
neighbours, the colonists were soon forced to begin abandoning the colony, eventually departing 
in June 1699. 
Consideration of the planning and execution of the first expedition to Panama reveals a hasty 
attempt to follow Paterson’s plan and establish a fully-fledged free port. While they came with 
goods, the colonists found no buyers, as they pursued established trade networks that had been 
deliberately closed to them. While they lacked supplies, denial of access to any source of capital 
also contributed to the project’s failure, as their Tule allies did not produce the gold and silver for 
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which they had initially hoped.134 Especially significant was the fact that other regional interests 
chose to imagine that the Scottish colonists had altogether more violent intentions. Jamaican 
planters, striving to undermine the creation of any further entrepôts in the Caribbean, had convinced 
government figures in England that Darien would facilitate an increase in pirates, weakening their 
islands against France’s ambitions in the process. In doing so, they had shored up support within a 
range of public institutions for their vision of the Caribbean’s future. Spanish officials, though 
aware of the war to come, reacted to the Scottish project as they always had done in the past, by 
condemning the colonists as pirates. Something would have to change if the project was to ever 
succeed. 
*** 
As events unfolded in the Caribbean during early 1699, the Company of Scotland’s directors and 
the Spanish Ambassador in England, Manuel de Coloma y Escolano, fell into a significant dispute 
over the colony’s legality. Coloma drew directly upon the history of Spanish colonisation in 
Panama to refute the Scottish Company’s claim. He argued that, as early as 1500, conquistadors 
had settled the land, subjugated the region’s native inhabitants and installed missionaries among 
them. Only recently, he asserted, with the encouragement of buccaneers, had the Tule rebelled. 
Furthermore, even if Spain had not actively colonised the region, it was still theirs by both papal 
bull and Tordesillas, a position essentially unchanged since the reign of Charles V. Importantly, he 
added that the English proclamation issued by the Board of Trade established Darien’s illegality, 
and it would allow them to treat the interlopers as ‘disturbers of mankind’, an allusion to Cicero’s 
description of pirates.135 The reply compiled by the directors of the Company of Scotland argued 
that the “Dariens” had always been a sovereign people, Panama had never truly been colonised 
and, even if it had, the Spanish crown had relinquished its title by deserting the region – a forfeiture 
that, they added, included the mines there.136 Finally, citing Grotius and his tract Mare liberum, 
they argued that the Pope had no right to alienate the territory itself, making their settlement legal 
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under the law of nations.137 These positions were, of course, as irreconcilable as they had been 
when the Dutch entered the Caribbean in earnest eighty years earlier. Yet it was the proclamation 
issued by William III that provided the lynchpin in Coloma’s argument, coming to underpin all 
later objections to the project in law. 
The Spanish crown would have not always taken a hard-line stance on a settlement at Panama. 
In fact, initial military action against Darien had been prevented by the speculation and 
misinformation that swirled around it. Francesco de Berroteran, a Spanish admiral stationed in the 
Caribbean, had claimed as early as November 1698 that 12,000 Scots had settled in the Gulf of 
Darién, intending to recruit sailors from other free ports, such as Curaçao and St Thomas, while 
others contended that there were 6,000.138 Diego Córdoba Lasso de la Vega, Governor of Cuba, 
seeking reprisal and understanding the English and Scots to be one people, then began seizing any 
English vessels encountered in the Caribbean.139 Following the first arrival of the Scottish 
colonists, the passage of treasure ships from Cartagena and Portobelo were halted, while the Casa 
de Contratación appealed to Rome for funds to counter Scottish missionaries.140 All of these 
measures demonstrate the extent to which the response to project followed long established 
precedents. Yet, in the early months of 1699, the Council of the Indies’ understanding of the 
situation placed Charles II in a difficult position. If William III had indeed consented to the colony, 
it violated the 1670 Treaty of Madrid, which conceded the King’s right to all of their current 
possessions in the Caribbean, but no new settlements. English governments were also obliged to 
restrain any plunder or illegal trade into Spanish dominions, both activities they had heard that the 
Scottish newcomers intended.141 However, with the potential war with France looming and 
persistent French expansion in the Caribbean, Spain could ill afford hostilities with Protestant 
Europe as well. Clarity came in May 1699, when the Spanish ambassador reported that Darien was 
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a private enterprise and one that William III had actively disowned by proclamation.142 In light of 
these facts, the Council of the Indies rendered its verdict, that the Company of Scotland’s ‘actions 
are without any order from the court of England, as is evidenced by the proclamation sent to the 
governor of Jamaica’, and so it was certain that ‘they are pirates who have executed this 
operation’.143 Freed of diplomatic complications, the Council at Seville was able to order more 
concerted action against the colony. 
Finding a means to overturn this proclamation thus became crucial to the Company of Scotland’s 
efforts to reverse the fortunes of its struggling project. Opposition from the Spanish crown in 
particular stimulated a wave of popular anti-Spanish sentiment in Scotland, imbuing the second 
expedition with an overtly Calvinist sense of mission. Yet, with the Spanish succession crisis 
escalating, these emotions would do little to aid the Company, and its directors were not blind to 
this fact. The task for them and particularly William Paterson was to balance and direct this 
outpouring of animosity. By repositioning the project as a means to oppose the projected Franco–
Spanish alliance, they endeavoured to win support in England to overturn the proclamation. In 
doing so, they were debating on the same terms as the planters had previously, seeking to 
demonstrate how their projected entrepôt could also serve to frustrate French ambitions. 
Deteriorating diplomatic relations with Spain afforded a greater place in the scheme for the Kirk, 
Scotland’s established Presbyterian church. As early as 1 July 1698, the Edinburgh Presbytery had 
appointed prayers across the city for the Company’s success, followed by regular services and 
thanksgivings thereafter.144 Initial forays into print by its ministers used the Calvinist doctrine of 
providence as a lens to understand the colony’s significance, arguing that the recent famine and 
economic downturn that had afflicted Scotland was the result of provoking evils – the collective 
sins of the nation.145 Striking at the heart of the antichrist’s dominion in the Americas, asserted the 
Cameronian Alexander Shields, would make Darien an ‘Azylum, Sanctuary, and Shelter, for 
whatever Storms and National Calamitys may threaten and blow upon Sinful and Provoking old 
Scotland’.146 The initial voyage had taken two ministers (both of whom died on the initial voyage), 
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but the Company of Scotland had initially refrained from conveying Darien in explicitly religious 
terms. This growing conception of the project as part of an ongoing conflict between Rome and 
Reformed Christianity emerged only months following the initial departure and had at least some 
level of influence over the Company’s directors. While preparing to send their second set of 
colonists to Central America, they recruited three further Kirk ministers, set down a collection of 
Mosaic laws to govern behaviour there and instructed the colony’s councillors to ensure missionary 
work as well as moral reform were carried out there.147 Doubtless, some of them genuinely came 
to understand the scheme in more confessional terms, while others saw the value in terms of public 
support in Scotland, the Kirk affording it as a symbol of the nation. When the second expedition 
departed on the 24 September 1699, therefore, free trade alone was no longer the raison d'être for 
the colony, as contesting papal dominion, as well as enacting reprisals upon Spanish towns and 
shipping, became equally important motivations. 
Despite the Calvinist providentialism that began to infuse the Company of Scotland’s efforts 
during the early months of 1699, the project’s supporters attempted to channel this sentiment into 
a practical means to overcome the opposition of planter interests. Across 1699, Bourbon 
inheritance of the Spanish crown looked increasingly likely, which would precipitate an alliance 
between France and Spain.148 The prospect of a grand Catholic alliance provided a means for the 
Company of Scotland to begin framing the scheme as a means to prevent a Franco-Spanish seizure 
of the entire Caribbean. Their target was the proclamation issued by the English Board of Trade in 
1697, which many in the Company blamed for the project’s difficulties. The case of its directors 
was laid out succinctly by William Seton, a prominent Country Party MP. In a speech to Scottish 
Parliament, he claimed that the English proclamation represented sovereign disapproval, allowing 
the Spanish ambassador and other officials to treat the Company of Scotland as pirates. If the 
proclamation was overturned, he claimed, then the scheme would be able to succeed and see them 
mount an opposition to the ‘Catholick League for the Extirpation of the Protestant Religion’.149 
Many printed accounts at the time replicated this exact argument.150 Thus the public rhetoric which 
                                                 
147 Ramsay, The Darien Scheme, pp.48–68; ‘Ordinances of the Council of Caledonia, 24 April 1699’, Darien Papers, 
vol.1, Adv.MS 83/7/4, fos.172–174, NLS; ‘Directors to Council, 10 February 1700’, Darien Papers, vol.2, Adv.MS 
83/7/5, fos.83–84, NLS. 
148 James Falkner, The War of Spanish Succession, 1701–1714 (2015), pp.2–6. 
149 William Seton, A Short Speech Prepared to be Spoken by a Worthy Member in Parliament: Concerning the 
Present State of the Nation (1700), p.8. 
150 Examples are numerous, see Hodges, A Defence, pp.44–46; Foyer, Scotland's present duty, pp.3–27; Anon., 




emerged around the Darien Scheme had a purpose, intended as a response to the arguments 
Caribbean planters had presented in previous years, shifting from the purely free-trade benefits of 
the colony to instead play upon contemporary fears of France. 
Following his return from Panama in October 1699, Paterson joined in this repositioning of the 
project. He and the rest of Caledonia’s council claimed to have become aware of French plans 
while in Central America.151 In a report submitted to the Company of Scotland’s directors, he 
described how he had found letters among the wreckage following a shipwreck, describing ‘the 
great inclination there is in the Spanish Indies to declare for the Dauphin upon the first news they 
will have of the Spanish King’s death … and so by consequence not only to get a part but the whole 
Indies’.152 Publicly, he wrote in similar terms to Seton, contending that repealing the proclamations 
was the only means to wash away the charge that the colonists were pirates and to secure the 
Caribbean from a Catholic takeover.153 A succession of petitions from the Company of Scotland to 
William III culminated in a plea to repeal the proclamation sent to the king in January 1701 by 
Paterson. In it, he rebalanced his initial proposals, restating the benefits of an entrepôt in the Gulf 
of Darien, but annexing a large section detailing how it would combat a Franco-Spanish plot.154 
These attempts failed, however, as William III held firm in refusing to rescind the proclamation. 
As a consequence of this failure, in practice little had changed in material terms at Panama. The 
proclamation remained in effect, and as a consequence trade was formally forbidden into the 
colony, allowing Spanish governments to continue deeming them pirates. The second expedition 
saw an escalation of conflict with their Spanish opponents, shaped by the fact that, on their arrival 
in the Gulf of Darién on 30 November 1700, the new settlers discovered not a thriving colony, but 
the abandoned ruins of Caledonia. This discovery caused the project to take on a pronounced 
Calvinist and anti-Spanish dimension, shifting to become more about enacting reparations upon 
Spain than founding a free trading colony. 
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Kirk ministers had their role in providing a stricter Calvinist direction to the colony. Shortly after 
arrival, they were quick to present the previous expedition’s failure as providential. They claimed 
that such misfortune could only be divine judgement and that rebuilding had to now proceed on a 
foundation of exemplary piety.155 To emphasise this point, Alexander Shields and the other 
ministers visited the mainland several times to proselytise amongst the Tule, enforced adherence 
to the Sabbath and worked hard to reform the morality of the colonists. For Shields in particular, 
much of the project of Darien was creating a colony godlier than Scotland itself, but his limited 
success in these endeavours irked him. In particular he despaired over the presence of ‘so many 
wild Highlanders’, many of whom would have been Catholic.156 Indeed, the general appetite for 
moral reform seems to have been relatively limited at Darien. This was not to be a settlement colony 
after Congregationalist New England. Instead, the beliefs of Shields and the other ministers found 
their expression by encouraging the colony’s leadership to mount attacks on the Spanish Main.157 
With his encouragement, counsellors drew up plans to besiege Portobello with aid from their Tule 
allies in late 1699.158 Yet this plan foundered because one of the colony’s councillors – a Quaker – 
refused to agree to the raid.159 Thus, despite pressure that something be done to avenge the loss of 
the first expectation, the new colonists initially failed to showcase either exemplary Calvinist piety 
or militancy. 
There was still some glimmer of hope for the commercial development of the project. During 
1699, the Boston merchant Daniel Mackay had set about coordinating trade links to support the 
colony, speaking to the Company’s directors of a network of Scottish merchants, including Robert 
Livingston in New York and Robert Mascive at Nevis, who believed they could supply the colony 
with provisions and settlers but not ‘acknowledge publically’, that they had done so.160 Atlantic 
trade, they stressed, was about networks, and total adherence to all regulations established in 
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Europe would only impede their efforts. This belief was articulated most directly by a Scottish 
merchant at New York, who remarked that establishing factors at New York and Jamaica would 
allow them to be supplied indefinitely.161 This advice underscored two core lessons from the 
experiences of the first expedition. First, that however effective commercial legislation may appear 
in Europe, it was deployed with limited success on the other side of the Atlantic. Second, that to 
achieve the eventual design advocated by Paterson they would have gain access to trade routes 
through force or subterfuge, as no other European government would allow success to be simply 
gifted to them. 
As a result, the colonists placed more importance upon Darien as a generator of bullion in order 
to draw North American trade south. Shields remarked that they endeavoured to seize the 
‘abundance of Gold mines, Nicaragua, and other precious woods etc’, and that, if they had enough 
men, ‘to subdue the Spaniards or oblige them to be quiet, in a little time the place would provide 
for itself, and prove the most considerable settlement in the West Indies’.162 Access to gold and 
silver was seen as essential. As part of the project, the Company of Scotland had dispatched a 
goldsmith with the second group of colonists, the intention being to establish a mint once the colony 
secured access to a reliable stream of precious metals.163 Shortly after the settlers’ arrival, they also 
sent vessels to Boston and New York, endeavouring to begin taking advantage of the networks 
they had established, while provisions were successfully imported from Jamaica, Barbados, Rhode 
Island and New York, all despite the English proclamation continuing to be in effect.164 Yet by 
February 1700 their plans had run into difficulties. The nearby areas they had surveyed for precious 
metals proved barren, and their Tule allies assured the colony’s Council that the only means to 
obtain access to gold and silver was by trading through them, or by capturing mines much further 
up the Gulf of Darién for themselves.165 Similarly, despite the contacts Scots had made, any 
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extensive commercial traffic from North America failed to materialise, and they had little to sell to 
the vessels which did arrive.166 It became increasingly obvious that they could only get a foothold 
by forcibly capturing a source of bullion from Spain, but again they were blocked from doing so 
by James Byres, the Quaker Counsellor.167 
A shift came on 7 February 1700, when, under the pretence of seeking to prove that they could 
broker a trade agreement with Jamaica, Byers left the colony, breaking the deadlock in its 
Council.168 Shortly thereafter, the colonists were warned by one of their Tule allies that a Spanish 
force was gathering for an assault among the Native American and Maroon communities near 
Toubacanti. The Council resolved to attack the outpost to pre-empt any imminent invasion and on 
13 February sent out a force onto the mainland; almost half of them Tule, they came up against a 
force ‘of the Spaniards 100…and of malattoes, criollios, negroes and indians about 300 more’. This 
admittedly small victory did not seem so at Caledonia and later in Edinburgh, both of which saw 
scenes of celebration in response to the news.169 Buoyed by their victory, the Council then issued 
privateering commission to their vessels for capturing Spanish shipping, while beginning initial 
planning into how they might secure control of mines nearby.170 Their triumph was short lived, 
however, when on 23 February a Spanish fleet commanded by Don Martin de Zavala arrived and 
blockaded the Scottish colony’s harbour, eventually forcing its surrender at the end of March.171 
The project culminated in an attempt launched from a fortified settlement by a Calvinist 
leadership to seize control of a supply of bullion, justified by the argument that it would strike a 
blow against Catholic Spain. Caledonia became one further instance of venture Calvinism, rather 
succeeding in establishing Paterson’s design from the outset. Yet the debate that had raged through 
this project between advocates of plantation colonies and of entrepôts would not be resolved with 
this failure in Scotland or England. It was, rather, decided in Seville during the early months of 
1700, when several Scottish colonists stood trial in the city for piracy. The incident once again 
raised the vexed issue of the proclamation, which forced William III to choose very publicly 
between these two visions of the Caribbean’s future. 
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In the first months of 1700, with the Scots once again settled in Central America, a symbolically 
important chance for the Council of the Indies to condemn the colony presented itself. In April 
Robert Pincarton, a Company of Scotland ship captain, and some of his crew arrived in Cadiz as 
prisoners to stand trial by the Casa de la Contratación, which also served as the highest court with 
an American criminal jurisdiction.172 The questioning of the Scottish prisoners by the fiscal (crown 
prosecutor) showed the extent of concern with the military nature of the colony and the crew’s 
intentions to establish a trade with Portobelo and Cartagena.173 However, when the case eventually 
went to trial, the central pieces of evidence used against the accused was the proclamation issued 
by the English Board of Trade and the fact that William III was purported to have also described 
the colonists as pirates, both of which, the prosecutor claimed, signified that they lacked sovereign 
approval for the scheme. Under Spain’s long-established claims to the Americas and their 
understanding of the crime in Roman law, these facts that made them guilty of piracy.174 A 
judgement was given out by the Court on 29 May, finding the accused guilty, but it was a conviction 
that extended beyond Pincarton and his men. The piracy conviction also covered ‘The Duke of 
Hamilton, the Marquess of Tweedale and the rest of the persons in Scotland who formed the 
company’.175 The individual sailors were not condemned so much for their actions, as in reprisal 
for the actions of their Company.176 
Pincarton’s only option was to appeal the verdict to the high tribunal at Madrid, and the trial 
itself presented William III with a stark decision.177 Supporters of the Company of Scotland had 
previously implored him to overturn the proclamation, but they now intensified their efforts, as it 
would undermine the central piece of evidence convicting the sailors.178 Yet this request placed the 
King in a dilemma. Should he overturn the proclamation disowning Darien, he would make the 
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sentence invalid, effectively declaring that the Darien Scheme and, as a consequence, the Company 
of Scotland’s right to establish a free port to be lawful.179 If he did so, then he would jeopordise 
relations with Spain, as well as the English planter interests who had lobbied so persistently for the 
proclamation in the first place. First, William attempted to find a third way, initially by pressuring 
Martin Westcombe, the Consul at Cadiz, to construct a case for the defence ahead of the case’s 
appeal and then personally implored Charles II to grant a pardon, but neither measures were 
successful. In the end Pincarton and his crew were saved by the Governor of Cartagena, Juan Díaz 
Pimienta y Zaldivar, whose letter detailing Caledonia’s surrender arrived in Madrid in late July 
1700. With little to gain from their execution now, the case was not heard until September, when 
Pincarton and his crew were again declared guilty by the High Tribunal, but were immediately 
pardoned by Charles II, a month before his death, and released for trial in England.180 This result 
gave William III what he wanted. It upheld the illegality of the Scottish project but also saved the 
lives of the sailors, preventing a more substantial escalation of anger among his subjects in 
Scotland. Yet most of all, it was a victory for the Caribbean planters and their agents in London. 
*** 
This chapter has sought to account for the association of the Darien Scheme with pirates by both 
Spanish and English contemporaries. It has argued that this connection can be understood by 
considering Paterson’s project against the long history of colonisation in the Caribbean Sea 
juxtaposed against the particular circumstances of the 1690s. The tradition of venture Calvinism 
that developed across the sixteenth century as a means to forcibly acquire bullion fuelled the 
eventual creation of two separate colonial models. There was the entrepôt, which relied upon a 
constant throughput of people, and the plantation colony, which relied upon a static labour force 
replenished by immigration. Across this same period, Spanish jurists also adopted the concepts of 
piracy and pirate as part of an imperial vocabulary to deter and punish largely Protestant interlopers, 
concepts later co-opted by English planters as part of their efforts to exclude buccaneers from 
Jamaica. When the Company of Scotland proposed its colony at Darien, it effectively reignited this 
dispute between these two visions of the Caribbean’s future. Planter interests rearticulated their 
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argument that entrepôts drained plantation colonies of people and created pirates, yet against the 
background of a looming war with France they added an additional dimension. To gain the support 
of public institutions, they claimed that the pirates they created would jeopardise relations with 
Spain and render Stuart colonies indefensible, just as war with France loomed once again. Their 
success at securing a royal proclamation disowning the project ensured that the Scottish colonists 
were received in Panama as buccaneers had been before them, drawing them into a familiar conflict 
with local Spanish governors and military officials. The Company of Scotland then tried and failed 
to secure the overturn of the proclamation as a means to render its colony legal and did so by 
positioning it as a bulwark against Franco-Spanish influence. This lack of success witnessed little 
change and caused the second expedition to then take on a markedly more anti-Spanish caste and 
follow after the venture Calvinists who had preceded them. The final trial of Scottish colonists for 
piracy in Seville, in which the proclamation itself was the evidence for a guilty verdict, forced 
William III to choose very publicly between the enduring hegemony of English plantation colonies 
and legitimising a free port. Ultimately, he prevaricated but remained aligned with the former, 
securing an English Caribbean covered by slave plantations. 
At times, there were glimpses of a successful project that might have been, but from La Florida 
to the Western Design and eventually Darien, few meticulously planned colonial schemes 
succeeded in the Caribbean. Instead, colonialism there was shaped in the first instance by regional 
and global factors pushing and pulling people to migrate. Venture Calvinists, like others who 
entered the region, had been relatively free to experiment, and, in the end, it was the interplay 
between free movements of people and a growing range of interests who sought to control them 
that produced the Caribbean as it existed by the later seventeenth century. Paterson and his fellow 
directors would have been as well to take the advice of Matthew Tindal in his tract condemning 
Irish Catholics serving on French privateers. In it, Tindal reminded his readers that ‘Argiers, 
Tripoly, Tunis, though at first but Nests of Pirates, and associated for the sake of Spoil and Plunder, 
yet as soon as each of them had the face of a Republick, they were esteemed as just Enemies.181
                                                 




III: The Earl of Bellomont, the Madagascar Trade and John Locke’s 
Atlantis, 1695–1701 
During the summer of 1699, the remaining colonists from Caledonia sluggishly made their way 
northwards following their colony’s initial failure. In late June, the two remaining ships and their 
starving crews first pitched onto the coast of Nicaragua, their presence causing such alarm that the 
local militia was assembled to repel them. The two remaining ships then beat a retreat northeast to 
New Providence in the Bahamas and from there, followed the American coast all the way to the 
mouth of the Hudson Bay, arriving there on 3 August. Yet there they stayed because on arrival, 
their vessels were refused entry to New York City by the colony’s governor, Richard Coote, Earl 
of Bellomont. He did so on the grounds that the proclamation previously issued by the English 
Board of Trade in 1696 forbidding any subject for assisting the Company of Scotland, was still in 
effect.1 While sympathetic to the colonists, this was a poor time for them to arrive.2 The journey 
they had taken tracked the final leg followed by many vessels from Madagascar, most of whom 
pitched into Caribbean entrepôts like New Providence, Curaçao and St Thomas before proceeding 
north. 
It was only in the preceding three years that these connections to the Caribbean had become 
conspicuous. Observers in Britain and Ireland believed that they facilitated a trade in goods stolen 
by pirates in the Indian Ocean, and Bellomont, as governor of New York, Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire was expected to use his position to prevent this traffic. So the earl made some show of 
refusing the Scottish colonists entry – he could not be seen to engage in activities which the English 
Board of Trade viewed as illegal. Despite this public display, however, he surreptitiously supplied 
them with provisions.3 The governor was willing to bend the rules for his allies, but, of course, did 
not extend the same latitude to his opponents. For instance, the earl sought out every scrap of 
evidence that linked one of his critics, the wealthy merchant Frederick Philipse, to stolen goods 
received from Madagascar. The bundle of documents he eventually delivered up to authorities in 
England made the merchant’s involvement plain, through with ultimately no criminal 
                                                 
1 ‘From a Scotchman Master of a Ship Bound for Newfoundland, 12 August 1699’, Collections of A. Hill Relating to 
Trade, 17th-18th Centuries, Sloane MS 2902, fos.231–232, BL. 
2 ‘Daniel Mackay to Directors, 3 July 1699’, Darien Papers, vol.1, Adv.MS 83/7/4, fo.188, NLS. 




consequences.4 This element of performance in service of personal and partisan interest ran through 
all North American pirate hunts during the later 1690s. As in the case of Ireland or the Darien 
Scheme, larger colonial and imperial ambitions fueled the creation, arrest and conviction of pirates 
in North America. Bellomont is especially interesting in this regard. He had a remit to investigate 
the presence of pirates from the Hudson all the way to the northernmost woodlands of Maine. The 
question is, what, if anything, did he imagine he could achieve as a consequence of these 
investigations? 
The existing literature in which Bellomont features does not provide a satisfactory answer to this 
question. Some classic political histories of colonial New York have made space for the earl, 
including him in the detailed narratives of faction in American colonies that were once the norm.5 
These scholars hermetically sealed Bellomont into a New York context and locked him into a back-
and-forth between the supporters of Jacob Leisler, a German merchant who staged an uprising in 
the colony during 1691, and anti-Leislerans who were largely former supporters of the Dominion 
of New England (1686-1689). The fact that he committed so much of his time to hunting pirates 
barely features in this scholarship. At the same time his long life before he came to America is 
absent – he was in his early sixties by the time he arrived – as is the fact that he spent a considerable 
amount of time outside New York. Histories of pirates, in contrast, have chosen not to delve into 
the partisanship which these histories were at such pains to outline. Instead they have tended to 
flatten Bellomont into the role of a generic royal official, or, “administrator”, bent on centralisation 
at the expense of provincial autonomy.6 The beginnings of an alternative perspective on the peer 
are suggested by two recent studies. Owen Stanwood has demonstrated how Bellomont used anti-
popery to rally supporters and discredit his opponents, fomenting a belief that Jacobites conspired 
with native Americans to deliver the northeast to Louis XIV.7 Equally, Simon Middleton’s 
excellent study of labour politics in New York City considers Bellomont. He has sketched the naval 
stores project which Bellomont promoted during his time in America, viewing it as evidence of a 
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labour shortage in the colony.8 Both of these considerations provide glimpses, but not the entire 
picture of what the peer believed he could achieve. 
This chapter will argue that Bellomont saw northeastern connections to Madagascar pirates as a 
structural economic problem and one he attempted to resolve through the implementation of Irish 
colonisation strategies. His appointment came at a particular moment in the mid-1690s. War had 
exposed the vulnerability of New England and New York to French invasion and members of the 
newly established Board of Trade sought a means to strengthen the region. The influence of John 
Locke saw to the earl’s many appointments who, as an Anglo-Irish Protestant, shared much with 
the philosopher’s particular vision for North America, which he termed Atlantis in his private 
writings. Through a naval stores project, Bellomont intended to plant Protestant soldiers on lands 
from the Upper Hudson Valley into New Hampshire and eventually eastwards into southern Maine. 
The scheme he intended to serve two purposes. The first was to produce commodities that would 
draw Atlantic flows of people and goods northwards, severing dependency on goods stolen by 
pirates out of Madagascar in the process. At the same time, he believed his plan would also 
safeguard colonial borderlands from French influence. In the process, Bellomont imagined creating 
a society of stout Protestant freeholders, industrious, religiously tolerant and resistant to Catholic 
influence - a direct transfer of colonisation techniques from Ireland. Those who stood in his way 
he characterised as part of the problem, secret Jacobites and abettors of pirates, whom he held were 
responsible for the region’s vulnerability and economic difficulties. Thus Madagascar pirates 
became the pretext for remaking the American northeast in the image of Protestant Ireland, a plan 
set in motion by John Locke but one over which the philosopher eventually had little control. 
The argument in this chapter is advanced in four sections. The first lays out the long-term 
structural economic causes of connections between Madagascar and the northeast before the 1690s. 
It begins by outlining how regional competition facilitated port towns and their rural surrounding 
a role in provisioning the Caribbean rather than any kind of cash-crop production, networks then 
deepened by subsequent migration. Commercial privileging of the Caribbean owed much to the 
pursuit of a stable supply of specie for the northeast. This desire saw merchants enter the 
Madagascar slave trade, which, by the late 1680s had become a means for colonists to funnel gold 
and silver stolen in the Indian Ocean into North America. These networks were then flushed with 
people after the outbreak of war in 1689. The second section considers the factors which converged 
                                                 




in Bellomont’s appointment. It begins with his Irish background before considering the political 
philosophy he shared with John Locke, who was, at that time, seeking to implement his ideas 
through American political appointments. He ensured the earl was appointed to strengthen the 
region against France and was then successful at turning the unfolding scandal of the Madagascar 
trade to his and the earl’s advantage. The third section covers initial efforts by Bellomont to use 
these investigations against his opponents. It tracks his initial success at discrediting his opponents 
in New York by tying them to Madagascar pirates, but was then undermined by the revelations that 
he himself had sponsored William Kidd, an accused pirate. However, he was eventually successful 
in weathering the scandal. The final section then considers Bellomont’s attempts to implement his 
naval stores project. It begins by considering how the scheme originated from the Huguenot refugee 
Gabriel Bernon, as well as its resonance with both the earl and Locke. It then follows the earl 
developing it into a plan to transfer Irish colonisation techniques to the Americas, before then 
detailing the programs of land redistribution and missionary work he set in motion to lay the 
groundwork. The section then concludes by describing the eventual collapse of the scheme and 
how it failed on account of his earlier attempt to pin the Madagascar trade on his political 
opponents. 
*** 
One of the first characteristics of New York City which the earl noticed following his arrival was 
how fantastically rich many merchants there were. Fresh off the boat in May 1698, he wrote to the 
Board of Trade claiming that their riches came from their sponsoring of Madagascar pirates and 
that the support they had enjoyed in doing so were an inevitable consequence of his predecessor’s 
corruption.9 These were aspersions intended to discredit his rivals, but Bellomont had struck on a 
particular characteristic of the northeastern colonies which did facilitate links with Madagascar: 
macroeconomic structural inequality. Rather than the consequence of a few covetous merchants 
and their abettors, trade with Madagascar resulted from the subordinate place the northeast had 
come to play in the Atlantic economy, caused by specific circumstances of English colonisation. 
The interplay of processes of migration, economic competition and religious conversion all had a 
role in ensuring the northeast came to depend upon provisioning plantation colonies rather than 
                                                 




developing commodity-production. This reality left the regional economy starved of specie, and 
by the later 1680s, people from North America had begun to follow the global trail of money into 
the Indian Ocean. Bellomont consistently engaged with this problem while in the northeast, so to 
understand what the earl attempted the structural issues that first motivated North American 
colonists to venture east have to be considered. 
If there were particular regions most associated with the Madagascar trade during the 1690s, it 
was the coast of southern New England and Long Island, as well as those coastal areas stretching 
southwards to the Delaware Bay. In the first instance, these networks were the product of long-
established regional competition between aspiring commercial centres across this littoral space, a 
dynamic which fostered the dependency which eventually drew colonists to the Indian Ocean. This 
commercial competition first developed through trade and conflict with Native American peoples, 
but it was not long before the processes of initial colonisation transferred it onto the ocean. 
While Boston and New York City are often considered to be the most significant northeastern 
ports, during the early seventeenth century, they had many competitors. Initially, the south coasts 
of modern-day Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts and Long Island were also seen to have 
enormous potential. Filled with chains of islands and narrow seas and sheltered from Atlantic 
currents, these coasts appeared ideal for seafaring communities.10 This fact was emphasised by the 
Ninnimissinuok, a union of Algonquian peoples who by 1600 had inhabited these coastlines for 
over two thousand years, and whose trade networks stretched as far as Florida and the Caribbean.11 
The Algonquian were also hunters and the pelts and furs they traded were coveted as a commodity 
by Europeans. By the 1620s, this trade had begun to draw Dutch colonists eastwards from 
Manhattan Island and the English Congregationalists south from Plymouth Plantation.12 Initial 
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competition for control of this trade erupted into conflict with the Pequod War in 1636, the 
experience of which made English Puritans aware of the commercial potential of these coasts for 
the first time.13 For instance, the militia captain John Underhill took to promoting colonisation of 
the “vacant” territories they had seen to the south during the war, emphasising the possibility of 
fertile land for cultivation and expansive harbours for – ports to compete with Boston and New 
Amsterdam.14 These promoters enjoyed some success. By 1651, the migration of English 
Congregationalists southwards saw fifteen towns established in Southern New England’s coasts, 
bringing the region’s population rise to around five thousand, rivalling the fourteen thousand in 
Massachusetts and four in New Netherland.15 By midcentury, therefore, potential commercial 
centres had arisen, scattered across the northeast’s coastlines. 
It was in the emergent trade with the Caribbean and Chesapeake Bay which these towns initially 
sought to establish themselves. As early as 1632, New Amsterdam’s merchants began to capitalise 
on Dutch gains from the Portuguese, trading slaves out of factories on the Gold Coast into Brazil 
and the Leeward Islands, where they purchased sugar and logwood before proceeding north. In 
New Netherland they would then buy provisions to supply the rapidly expanding plantation 
economies to the south but also furs to sell in Europe.16 Slower on the uptake were the merchants 
of Boston. By 1634, traders there began also shifting their attentions southwards, prompting a 
modest migration from New England to islands such as Barbados and St Kitts and, as a 
consequence, a modest trade in provisions.17 In the 1640s Newport, perched on the mouth of the 
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Narragansett Bay, also stood poised to enter into this trade. The Bay’s first European settlers were 
New England dissenters, relocating southwards on account of the Antinomian Controversy which 
erupted during 1636 and which saw half of Boston’s merchants relocate there with the spiritual 
leader Anne Hutchinson.18 This initial migration was then supplemented by the arrival of the 
young, landless populations of Massachusetts and Plymouth moving south in search of 
opportunities.19 In 1638, two vessels were dispatched out of the Narragansett Bay intent on trading 
into both Virginia and Barbados, yet no long-term commercial links developed.20 The first 
European settlers at New Haven equally faced problems trying to enter this long-distance trade.21 
Instead, by 1660 the region of Southern New England transitioned to an agricultural hinterland, 
supplying both Boston and New Amsterdam with provisions to then be exported southwards.22 The 
merchant Samuel Maverick summarised this transition when he wrote that while ‘Boston is full of 
good shopps well furnished with all kind of Merchandize and many Artificers, and Trad's men of 
all sorts’, in New Haven ‘ye Harbour proveing not Comodious, the land very barren, the Merchants 
either dead or come away, the rest gotten to their Farmes’.23 
The colonisation of Shelter Island provides a case study in this transformation, but also the 
aspirations of northeastern merchants as the century progressed. The small island, situated between 
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Long Island’s two eastern forks, gained the attention of Nathaniel Sylvester in 1651, an Anglo-
Dutch merchant and early convert to Quakerism.24 That year and with three other traders, he bought 
the right to settle there from the Montaukett Sachem Wyandanch.25 Sylvester made his home on 
the island but his partners respectively were based between Barbados and London, with the other 
residing at Southold on Long Island.26 These connections provided them with shipping out of 
England, a factor in the Caribbean and, they intended, a supply of provisions from New England. 
In 1652, Sylvester migrated permanently to Shelter Island, purchasing livestock, indentured 
servants and further land, alongside attempts to cement good relations with the Montaukett.27 Their 
partnership did not end with provisioning the Caribbean, however, with initial forays into shipping 
slaves from West Africa both to Barbados and to Shelter Island itself to work on his plantation.28 
He sourced provisions from a combination of the tenants on land he purchased, his plantation itself 
and trade with the Montaukett. However, this venture was not to last. Like other merchants in 
Southern New England, Sylvester gradually shifted from attempting a direct, long-distance trade, 
to supplying Boston and New Amsterdam. Undoubtedly, the rapid drop in sugar prices during the 
1660s made it difficult for him to compete with more established merchants, but also in 1673, 
though a negotiation with the government in New Netherland, he was forced to buy out his partners’ 
shares in Shelter Island, severing his connections to Barbados.29 By the time of Sylvester’s death 
in 1680, his experimental provisioning plantation had instead become absorbed into New York’s 
emergent manorial system and became a satellite of New York City itself. Sylvester’s attempt to 
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move from provisioning into conducting the emerging slave trade can be considered typical of the 
shift which these port towns underwent after the 1650s. 
For Boston and New York City, an increasing number of migrants arrived during the 1660s, 
many of whom were merchants. For the former, new non-Puritan groups included hundreds of 
Presbyterians from Scotland and Ireland, as well as a growing number of Huguenot refugees and 
English Anglicans.30 Connections to the Caribbean and Chesapeake were essential in drawing these 
people. Scottish merchants John Borland and Thomas Dewer migrated sometime before 1680 and 
came with established connections to Barbados, as did the Huguenot André Faneuil.31 Anglican 
merchants were similar, with traders including John Brown and George Corwin arriving with trade 
networks to the sugar colony, but also to Virginia and Maryland.32 Aided by this influx, Boston 
grew in prominence, coming to dominate the inter-plantation provisioning trade by 1677.33 At the 
same time, New York City expanded in its size and demographic diversity.34 Established Dutch 
families such as the Van Cortlandts remained important, while the Rotterdam based trader Andrew 
Russell ensured a number of Scottish traders settled in the colony.35 In particular, Huguenot 
merchants who arrived there enjoyed considerable success, with many, but not all of them 
following the example of the trader and later politician Nicholas Bayard in converting to 
Anglicanism.36 Again, the Caribbean and Chesapeake accounted for much of this migration, while 
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the low startup costs of the coastal trade itself allowed them to expand their initial enterprises with 
minimal risk.37 Connections with plantation colonies, therefore, were further deepened through this 
exchange of people. 
By the later 1660s, Newport’s status as a haven of radical religious dissent also fostered a nascent 
plantation trade.38 Its emergence owed to the success of Quaker missionaries in Newport, who were 
able to convince former Hutchinsonians to join the sect.39 Parallel conversions in Barbados, but 
also to a lesser extent in Jamaica provided small-time Quaker merchants in Newport, such as Peleg 
Sanford and Walter Newbury, with factors, allowing networks to form which transported both 
goods and missionaries between the two regions.40 This conversion ultimately allowed Newport to 
benefit from the greater interconnectedness which characterised Atlantic Quakerism following 
George Fox’s missionary tour during the early 1670s.41 The missionary William Edmundson, for 
instance, records how in 1675, he took passage from Cork to Barbados with a Quaker captain and 
after some months, from there to Newport in a vessel captained by one of his coreligionists.42 
Quaker conversion and migration remained the most significant to Newport in this period, but were 
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accompanied by a small, but significant number of Huguenots and Jews.43 By 1690, Newport came 
to rival New York City and Boston, supported by often endogenous Quaker economic and religious 
networks. 
Part of the appeal of trade with the Caribbean stemmed from the persistent and chronic shortage 
of coinage in North America. In particular, the need to import large amounts of manufactured goods 
from Europe made it difficult to retain specie, making wampum beads as well as barter the means 
by which most everyday transactions were conducted.44 Before the 1650s, some Spanish coins 
made their way to the northeast, either through trade into Bilbao and Cadiz but also from the 
Caribbean, where it was either stolen or the product of trade with the Spanish Main.45 From 1655 
in particular this southwards trade began to assume a greater importance. The Navigation Act of 
1655 prevented Boston and New York City from trading with Spain legally and with the recent 
capture of Jamaica, the profits of buccaneering began to serve as a replacement.46 Not only could 
plantation goods be re-exported, but now increasing amounts of stolen gold and silver could be 
layered into the shipments from plantation colonies.47 For instance, in 1666, one merchant reported 
he was awaiting a shipment of ‘150 negroes, and 7000 peeces of eight’ into New York from 
Jamaica.48 Boston’s merchants and government also coveted this supply of bullion. A mint was 
established there in 1661 to manufacture their own specie from unminted precious metals and 
Spanish coins.49 Newport also began to taste the benefits of this trade. By the final decade of the 
seventeenth century, the town was estimated to be importing at least £20,000 worth of specie from 
the Caribbean annually.50 
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With the fur trade in perpetual decline by the later seventeenth century, these three towns and 
their hinterlands had been drawn, like the majority of the Atlantic’s shipping, into the orbit of the 
‘hub of empire’ in the Caribbean.51 This trade caused wealth to largely concentrate amongst the 
select few in these port towns, leaving the majority beyond them relatively poor, a fact which did 
little to encourage migration. Nevertheless, as Sylvester had, traders in these towns were not 
satisfied simply being partners of wealthier merchants in Cork or London. They sought to use their 
capital to gain a role in growing trade in slaves out of West Africa. Yet, as the English slave trade 
grew in scale from the 1660s barriers began to grow up preventing merchants from the northeast 
entering it. In 1672, the Royal African Company (RAC) was granted a monopoly on the 
transatlantic slave trade, which, unlike their predecessors, they actually worked to enforce.52 
Nevertheless, merchants in North America began to seek an alternative and found one beyond the 
Cape of Good Hope. As early as 1663, English merchants had purchased slaves from Madagascar, 
trading them to Barbados. By 1677, the island became a regular destination for traders from Boston 
and New York City, activities condemned by the RAC and the EIC, but there was little either 
company could do, these activities being in a grey area between their charters.53 Effectively, 
Madagascar provided an equivalent trade to the Guinea Coast or Angola, allowing European traders 
to buy the gold, ivory and slaves which had been traded out of the Swahili Coast for centuries.54 
They used Malagasy elites on the eastern coast of Madagascar as a proxy to access networks into 
ports such as Mombasa and Mozambique.55 While initially few in number and challenging to track 
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through the historical record, Madagascar allowed American traders to circumvent legal 
restrictions, expanding their participation in the plantation trade and providing a modest source of 
specie in the process. 
The potential of trade with Madagascar only grew across the 1680s. As early as 1685, Caribbean 
buccaneers began to follow merchant ships beyond the Cape of Good Hope to the island.56 From 
there, they began launching raids upon Indian Ocean shipping, stealing gold and silver, but also 
fabrics and spices, the purview of the EIC but carried to an island over which they held no 
authority.57 This trade grew enormously with the eruption of war between the English and French 
colonies in 1689. Privateering commissions issued in New York City, but also in Newport and 
Boston served as cover for crews to sail eastwards without fear of prosecution by the RAC or the 
EIC.58 These vessels then made their way to Madagascar, before continuing to the Arabian and 
Red Seas. There they could pillage treasure shipments before returning to Madagascar where the 
goods were supplemented with slaves and ivory before being funneled westwards to the Caribbean 
or directly to port towns in the northeast.59 As in the case of the Caribbean previously, stolen goods 
were layered into a legal trade, providing merchants not just with an unprecedented source of 
coinage, but a supply of cheap east India goods normally reserved for the EIC. In effect, they part-
redirected the global trade imbalance which drained bullion from the Americas. 
The immense profits to be made in trade with Madagascar are illustrated by the New York based 
merchant Stephen DeLancey. Born in Caen to a Protestant family during 1663, DeLancey left 
France in 1681 before travelling to Amsterdam and briefly to London. He had arrived in New York 
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by 1686, allegedly with £300 he had amassed by selling family heirlooms.60 Endenizened in June 
of that same year, granting him the right to trade, he partnered with the wealthy Philipse family, 
initially trading provisions for tobacco in Virginia as well as sugar and slaves at Barbados.61 
Although it is unclear exactly when he entered the slave trade with Madagascar, his factor Giles 
Shelly was installed there as early as 1689, the same year his partner Frederick Philipse began 
dispatching ships to the island.62 DeLancey began importing not just slaves, but also calico fabrics, 
manufactured goods and specie.63 By 1695, he had made enough in this line of work to afford a 
house valued at £350 in New York City, putting him in the top 1% of the city for property wealth, 
along with large tracts of land in Orange, Ulster and Westchester Counties, and further properties 
in New York City itself.64 These profits brought more than mere material benefits. Signaling his 
transition into the city’s merchant elite of this period, at some point DeLancey converted to 
Anglicanism, eventually becoming a vestryman at Trinity Church.65 These connections were soon 
strengthened by marriage, when he wedded Anna Van Cortlandt in 1700, daughter of an established 
patroon.66 This position he gradually attained for himself undoubtedly influenced his politics, 
leading him to oppose Jacob Leisler’s uprising in 1689 and to call for the rebel leader’s arrest.67 
Through his efforts, he founded one of New York’s most enduring and successful dynasties that 
secured substantial preferment in the following decades.68 DeLancey well captures merchant 
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beneficiaries of the Madagascar trade. Initially traders of middling means who migrated to the 
northeast during the 1670s and 1680s, they found themselves able to use an initial investment in 
the Caribbean and Chesapeake to move into the costlier, long-distance trade into the Indian Ocean. 
While of dubious legality, it secured for him a supply of ready money which was denied to many 
others in the region. From these initial profits, marriage, conformity to the Anglican Church and 
political preferment cemented DeLancey’s ascendancy into the growing merchant elite, his gains 
ploughed into land and investments, in part to conceal their origins. 
There was, however, a separate stratum of society in the northeast who benefitted from the 
Madagascar trade, as the landless and those without the capital to fund a voyage themselves found 
work on ships. One pioneer in this line of work was Josiah Rayner from Southampton, Long Island. 
Raised a Congregationalist, Josiah was the fourth son of the farmer Joseph Rayner, who had 
migrated to the town stepwise via both Boston and Watertown, Connecticut in the later 1640s.69 
Across his lifetime, Joseph became a landowner of some status, accumulating assets worth £938 
both in, and around Southampton, predominantly through land purchased from the Montaukett, 
and trading his produce into New York City and Boston.70 By 1688, both Joseph and his wife Mary 
had died, leaving their landholdings to their three eldest sons.71 Josiah, like many younger sons 
across New England, found himself without prospects and made his way to the Caribbean 
sometime after the outbreak of war. By 1691, he was in Jamaica, where he became captain of the 
Bachelor’s Delight, a vessel owned by merchants in Charlestown, South Carolina but formerly by 
the buccaneers Edward Davis and Lionel Wafer.72 Sometime during the summer they sailed for 
Madagascar and from there into the Indian Ocean. In October, Rayner and his crew returned with 
a haul of stolen coins and east India goods to the provisioning plantation established by the New 
York’s merchants on the Island of St Maries, situated in Saint Augustine Bay.73 There, they traded 
rum, weapons and wampum beads for provisions and Rayner chose to leave the crew with his share 
of the loot.74 In the following years he moved between the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean, 
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supplying and serving on the vessels which arrived at Madagascar with stolen goods.75 When he 
finally arrived back on Long Island in April 1696, he brought with him spoils of at least £1000 – 
more than has father had been able accumulate in assets during his lifetime.76 This money he used 
to buy a house and land in Lyme, Connecticut, followed by landholdings in Westchester County 
and eventually, across the eastern end of Long Island too.77 In 1698, he was pursued by Bellomont 
on suspicion of being a pirate and fencing stolen goods, informed upon by an ally of DeLancey.78 
Yet he avoided legal action and appears to have continued in his landholdings until his death in 
1743. Rayner exemplifies the particular role which rural areas came to play in the Madagascar 
trade. With limited opportunities compared to Boston or New York City the northeast's young and 
landless became a ready source of labour. While many never returned from these voyages or gained 
little, the Madagascar trade offered to some a level of social mobility unachievable otherwise. 
Rayner also emphasises the broader point that, by the 1690s, not just plutocratic merchants but also 
those from rural areas had also become involved in trade with Madagascar and used the profits 
from it to join the middling section of colonial society. 
Madagascar pirates, therefore, were the result of economic relationships many years in the 
making. They were the product of local commercial competition, the northeast’s dependency on 
trade with the Caribbean as a region and, above all, were a response to an unfavourable balance of 
global flows of gold and silver. Initial links to growing plantation economies stimulated the parallel 
expansion of agriculture in the northeast rather than any kind of stable commodity-production. 
Trade then promoted further migration, which served to deepen the region’s role in provisioning, 
providing a small influx of Spanish bullion. Ambitious merchants were then able to overcome 
commercial restrictions imposed during the 1670s to move into the transatlantic slave trade with 
Madagascar, contravening the monopoly of the RAC. The integrating of stolen goods from the 
Indian Ocean into this trade from the mid-1680s drew an increasing number of traders to participate 
and, after the outbreak of war in 1689, others of lesser means as a labour force. By the time of 
Bellomont’s arrival the Madagascar trade had played its part in enriching merchants who now also 
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wielded political power in these expanding port towns, yet some from humbler backgrounds had 
also come to harness the benefits of this trade. Those sailors who became known as pirates by the 
middle part of this decade were an integral part of the northeast’s economy. 
*** 
A number of different factors combined in Bellomont’s appointment as governor of New York, 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire, but suppressing trade with Madagascar was a responsibility 
he received as an afterthought. The official reason he was considered for these positions was that 
his military background in Ireland made him well qualified to secure the northeast from advancing 
French influence. Yet he was no impartial crown agent. An Anglo-Irish Protestant with immaculate 
Williamite credentials, his appointment resulted from John Locke’s influence during the earliest 
years of the Board of Trade’s existence. During this period, Locke sought to put his particular 
vision of empire into practice, and to do so through the candidates he was able to have appointed 
to positions in North America. His preference for Bellomont owed to considerable ideological 
synergy between the two and the naval stores project the earl later proposed accorded closely with 
the philosopher’s plans. The demand which surfaced during 1696 that governors investigate the 
presence of pirates in the northeast had to then be integrated into these existing schemes. 
Bellomont’s background provides some initial clues as to why he was appointed, as well as the 
particular ideology which motivated his actions in America. He was born Richard Coote in County 
Roscommon in 1636 into a family which had first enjoyed preferment as clients in the early 1620s 
of the royal favourite George Villiers. The Cootes benefited through both lands and titles during 
the midcentury upheavals, as they were invariably soldiers, virulently anti-Catholic and 
consistently bent to align themselves with those who most ardently defended the interests of Irish 
Protestants.79 These characteristics were captured by the Presbyterian minister Francis Makemie 
when he described Bellomont’s father as ‘a zealous supporter of parliament and terror to the 
Irish’.80 During the Cromwellian Confiscations, it was the Cootes who were part-responsible for 
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the resettlement of thousands of uprooted Irish Catholics in County Roscommon and for 
maintaining Protestant military garrisons amongst them.81 The title of Earl of Bellomont itself is a 
demonstration of Coote’s unerring commitment to this same cause. He was appointed to the 
peerage by William III in recognition of his service during and after the Revolution, having 
supported the Prince of Orange’s claims as early as 1687.82 During the Jacobite War, Bellomont 
served in the Williamite army, before being tasked with suppressing rapparee networks in central 
Ireland after the Treaty of Limerick – a record which led to further lands being awarded to him 
during the Williamite Confiscations.83 Around this time, he also began to develop a profile on the 
other side of the Irish Sea. His marriage to the English heiress Catherine Nanfan allowed him to 
secure a seat in English Parliament as well as an initial alliance with the Whig Junto through the 
Earl of Shrewsbury. Equally, he came to hold the position of Lord Justice of Ireland and a position 
as treasurer for Mary II; all positions he nevertheless sacrificed in 1694 as a result of his unrelenting 
criticism of corruption in the Irish Privy Council.84 Effectively an upwardly mobile Protestant 
landowner, Bellomont was in perpetual financial difficulty and it was the salary of a North 
American governorship that initially appealed to him. As early as 1692, he was made aware of the 
£1,000 salary which Benjamin Fletcher was awarded as governor of New York.85 It is safe to say, 
therefore, that Bellomont initially had no particular interests in the Americas, but initially saw a 
position there as a means of both political redemption and financial stability. 
His political convictions were those common to Anglo-Irish Protestants, many of which were 
common to English country Whigs.86 He emphasised the importance of government which adhered 
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to the common law and the importance of secure private property rights 87 The earl was an 
Anglican, but committed to international Protestantism and sympathetic to the plight of the 
Huguenot (arranging for his son to be educated by a French refugee), yet had a more limited 
tolerance for radical dissenters.88 From his time spent pacifying Catholic uprisings in Ireland, he 
acquired a strong antipapal streak and a resolute opposition to Jacobitism which he believed 
continued to exert a sinister influence across the anglophone world. 89 Bellomont always deemed 
himself English, rather than Irish, believing that devotion to the Williamite regime marked him out 
as more English than any Jacobite aristocrat of ancient lineage. His political convictions are most 
clearly set out most clearly in a speech he gave to the Boston assembly in June 1699, in which he 
proclaimed: 
There is something God-like in what the king (William III) has done for us. The work of redemption 
and preservation comes next to that of creation … ever since the year 1602 England has had a 
succession of kings that have been aliens; in this respect I mean, that they have not fought our battles, 
nor been in our interests, but have been in an unnatural manner plotting and contriving to undermine 
and subvert our religion, laws and liberties, till God was pleased by his almighty power, and infinite 
mercy and goodness to give us a true English king in the person of his present majesty.90 
Economically, Bellomont followed after Petty, advocating the efficient application of labour to 
land and manufacturing, to encourage overseas commerce. Before he eventually left for North 
America, he put these ideas into practice through a number of projects which employed poor or 
migrant workers.91 Indeed, his opponents in New York would later lampoon the earl’s 
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preoccupation with such schemes.92 The cornerstones of Bellomont’s ideology, therefore, should 
be regarded as an emphasis on balanced government, adherence to a tolerant and international 
Protestantism, virulent antipopery, Englishness defined by loyalty to the Revolution and an 
emphasis on economic improvement centred upon the importance of labour. 
All of these broad principles he shared with Locke, who had already attempted to apply them in 
a North American setting in previous decades. The philosopher’s involvement had begun during 
his role in the drafting of the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina in 1672, when he developed 
some interest in attempting to create an ideal society in the Americas. This aspiration was manifest 
in his frequent writing about a hypothetical utopian colony he named Atlantis, possibly an 
invocation of the similarly named New Atlantis, by Francis Bacon, published in 1627 and James 
Harrington’s Oceana of 1655.93 Locke’s brand of colonialism accorded especially strongly with 
Harrington but their overlap with Bellomont’s own ideas are most decisively shown in the 
philosopher’s involvement with colonial projects after 1688.94 Persistently, he fused support for 
international Protestant interest with settlement projects focused on the importance of labour. 
During the early 1690s Locke showed a revived interest in the Carolinas, where he lent his 
assistance in efforts to recruit Huguenot refugees for the colony.95 Similarly, his hand can be 
detected in early efforts by the Board of Trade to support the establishment of workhouses in 
Ireland in parallel with the planting of Huguenot settlements there, being a scheme intended to 
reform the poor and repopulate the island.96 The two, therefore, had common ideological 
preoccupations, but also a commitment to putting them into practice through colonial schemes and 
projects. 
The first instance of Locke using the Board as a foil for his ideas came in 1696 with the 
governorship of Virginia. The colony was then governed by Edmund Andros, the former president 
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of the Dominion of New England and a staunch Tory.97 In an attempt to secure the dismissal of 
Andros, Locke drafted his ‘Essay on Virginia’ during mid-1696, possibly with the assistance of the 
Anglican clergyman James Blair.98 In the paper, Locke criticised Andros’s wielding of excessive 
executive power but also went further to include a programme of reform intended to remedy the 
colony’s ills. First of all, he advocated the breaking up of exorbitant land grants to ensure that 
property could redistributed to the landless poor and foreign Protestants, lured through the promise 
of easy naturalisation and religious toleration. Second, he suggested concentrating the population 
into towns resembling New England, claiming that such a proposal would facilitate manufacturing 
and encourage tradesmen. Finally, he proposed limiting executive powers in order to preserve the 
independence of the judiciary and the legislature, along with a purge of corrupt officeholders.99 All 
of these proposals were included, in some form, in the instructions for Andros’s successor Francis 
Nicholson, who only partially worked to secure their implementation while in Virginia.100 These 
suggestions read like a rough blueprint for what Bellomont would later attempt at different points 
in the northeast. His naval stores project would focus upon land confiscation and redistribution as 
well as the commercialisation of the economy for English benefit. Bellomont’s appointment, 
therefore, has to be understood in the context of this larger attempt by Locke to refashion England’s 
North American colonies in accordance with his political ideas. 
These plans, of course, went largely unspoken in the political maneuvering behind Bellomont’s 
appointment. Instead, Locke and sympathetic interests from North America presented his 
candidacy as an opportunity to reinforce the northeast against the influence of France. Since the 
outbreak of war in North America in 1689, many people had complained that provisions for the 
region’s defence were inadequate and the influence of the French ran deep. In New York, the 
supporters of Jacob Leisler persistently justified their actions as driving Catholics and crypto-
papists from government to secure the colony from invasion.101 The sacks of the frontier towns of 
Schenectady on the Hudson and Pemaquid in Maine during the initial years of the war only served 
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to underscore this point.102 In the ensuing years, governors of New England and New York 
persistently complained that they lacked the means to defend their charges effectively and that 
Jesuit priests worked to turn their Native American allies against them.103 There was a desire for 
an individual or a plan capable of securing these colonies. 
Locke had known Bellomont since 1690, when he was seeking supporters for campaign to secure 
appointment as one of the lords justices of Ireland.104 Bellomont was first suggested for governor 
of Massachusetts by the Earl of Shrewsbury, primarily to block the appointment of the former 
Dominion of New England councilor Joseph Dudley to the post.105 The influence of the Mathers 
of Massachusetts were important here, who had stressed the need for someone who could bolster 
their defences seeing his appointment was confirmed in June 1695.106 At the same time, financial 
trouble continued to shape his ambitions, as he sought further commissions in North America to 
ease the debts his Irish estates were beginning to accrue.107 By August, he and his allies had in their 
sights the governorship of New York, held by Benjamin Fletcher. Using information supplied by 
Jacob Leisler Jr. and the New York-based merchant Robert Livingston, they argued that Fletcher’s 
corruption had caused the decay of the frontiers, which had threatened to hand the region to 
France.108 Yet the accusations had a delayed effect, falling in the period of limbo before the 
dissolution of the Lords of Trade and the formation of the new Board of Trade. As a result, 
                                                 
102 Rossiter Johnson, A History of the French War Ending in the Conquest of Canada with a Preliminary Account of 
the Early Attempts at Colonization and Struggles for the Possession of the Continent (1882), pp.116–118; Thomas E. 
Burke Jr., ‘Leisler’s Rebellion at Schenectady, New York, 1689–1710’, New York History, vol.70, no.4 (1989), 
pp.405–430.  
103 ‘Benjamin Fletcher to Connecticut Council, 16 March 1692’, ‘Declaration of Connecticut Council, 3 March 
1693’, Documents Relating to the New York Connecticut Border, unpaginated, NYHS. 
104 ‘Bellomont to Clark, 23 August 1690’, ‘Bellomont to Clark, 30 August 1690’, ‘Bellomont to Clark, 7 September 
1690’, Bellomont Papers, NYHS. 
105 ‘Sylvester Brounower to Locke, 26 November 1696’ in De Beer, Locke Correspondence, vol.5, p.721; Robert C. 
Winthrop (ed.), Letters of John, Lord Cutts to Colonel Joseph Dudley: then Lieutenant-Governor of the Isle of Wight, 
Afterwards Governor of Massachusetts (1886), p.11; Richard L. Bushman, King and People in Provincial 
Massachusetts (1985), pp.63–67. 
106 John C. Rainbolt, ‘The Creation of a Governor and Captain General for the Northern Colonies: The Process of 
Colonial Policy Formation at the End of the Seventeenth Century’, New York Historical Society Quarterly, vol.57, 
no.2 (1973), pp.101–108; CSP Col, vol.14, no.893; ‘Memorial of Sir Henry Ashurst, undated’, Collections of the 
Massachusetts Historical Society, Ser.6, vol.5 (1892), p.92. 
107 Ritchie, Captain Kidd, pp.50–52; ‘Coote to Locke, 12 May 1699’, De Beer, Letters of John Locke, vol.6 (1981), 
pp.622–623.  
108 ‘Blathwayt to Irish Lords Justices, 8 August 1695’, Blathwayt Letterbook, Add. MS 37992, BL; ‘Pierre du 




considerations for New York were postponed until July 1696 when the latter came into being.109 
The timing proved auspicious for Bellomont, however, as Locke, the most prominent Whig on the 
Board, was given a relatively free reign during the earliest meetings, owing to the fact that the Tory 
politician William Blathwayt was frequently away in Flanders. By the time Locke and his allies 
were done, their arguments in favour of stronger defence had seen Bellomont appointed not just to 
New York and Massachusetts, but New Hampshire as well, and augmented by his being granted 
the position of Captain General of all colonies north of Maryland.110 On his return, Blathwayt 
attempted to stem the growing number of accolades awarded to Bellomont, but to no avail.111 By 
February 1697, therefore, the peer’s appointments had grown from a means to supplement his 
income into a broader scheme, intent on ‘uniting of New York, Massachusetts and the adjacent 
Colonies under one head’.112 
Unfortunately for Locke, his initial efforts to steer the direction of the Board of Trade became 
eclipsed by the reports of Henry Avery’s activities in the Red Sea. This fact was of no particular 
relevance for the earl until July 1696, when Avery’s crew and other like them were openly living 
in Ireland and North America.113 The initial manhunt for Avery and his crew grew into a broader 
effort to trace the origins of the Madagascar trade to North America, coming to dominate the 
Board’s earliest operations.114 Locke did not allow his agenda to be completely buried, however, 
instead repositioning to reconcile pirates to his established colonial designs. To explain the 
existence of piracy he attempted to draw upon his discussions of the crime in his Two Treatise of 
Government, conveying pirates as unlawful oppressors who impoverished societies and themselves 
a consequence of the lawlessness tyrants promoted through their actions.115 Here, Locke configured 
the crime of piracy as tyranny, an understanding of the crime with historical precedent, but initially 
intended to illustrate the right of subjects to resist arbitrary rule. This earlier writing had some 
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influence over a document he presented to the Board in late July 1697. In it, Locke argued that the 
problem of piracy as one of corrupt government in the Americas, that governors were compromised 
and ruled arbitrarily, so could not be trusted to enforce laws against pirates.116 Given that it was the 
Tory Benjamin Fletcher in New York who stood most strongly indicted for encouraging pirates by 
this point and Locke had just seen to the appointment two new governors, this solution benefited, 
rather than hindered his colonial ambitions.117 The end result was that the title of Vice-Admiral of 
all colonies north of the Jersies was also awarded to Bellomont before his departure for New York 
in early 1698.118 
Over the course of two years, an increasing number of titles were heaped upon the earl. What 
began as a living for a disgraced and financially precarious Protestant landowner grew into a plan 
to install an ally sympathetic to Locke’s particular political philosophy. This initial growth in titles 
was achieved by inflating the danger posed by Catholic France, arguing that all northeastern 
colonies had to be united on the grounds of common defence. The growing awareness of 
northeastern links to Madagascar and the flow of stolen goods across the Atlantic only came to 
present one further opportunity to discredit former Tory governors and saw the earl’s jurisdiction 
extended from land onto the sea. From the English government’s perspective, he departed with a 
mandate as considerable as was once held by Edmund Andros as Governor of the Dominion of 
New England. As will be addressed below, the earl had conceived his naval stores project before 
his departure, though it was not yet clear how effective a conduit he would be in putting Locke’s 
ideas into practice. 
*** 
Calls for scrutiny of the Madagascar trade presented a clear path for the earl upon his arrival in 
New York City during April 1698. In New York, implicating the supporters of his predecessor 
supported Locke’s initial analysis of Madagascar pirates and their origins, as well as allowing him 
to dispense with any who might oppose him. He had less to worry about in Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire, where he could count on the approval of Congregationalists, so he initially dedicated 
a great deal of his attention to New York. Yet his own involvement in trade with Madagascar 
                                                 
116 Sarah Pemberton, Locke's Political Thought and the Oceans: Pirates, Slaves, and Sailors (2017), pp.52–56. 
117 ‘BOT to Lords Justices of England, 19 October 1698’, Photostat Collection, JLI. 




through William Kidd quickly came to derail his initial plan, leaving him scrambling to keep his 
position. In the end, however, he weathered the unfolding scandal, but not without severely 
damaging the prospects of his naval stores scheme, which he attempted to put into practice after 
the Kidd issue subsided. 
Bellomont’s earliest position was that cooperation with pirates was a necessary problem of 
arbitrary government, specifically in New York. Even though his predecessor, Benjamin Fletcher, 
had been recalled on corruption charges, supporters remained on the colony’s Council. They 
included Nicholas Bayard, William Pinhorn and Frederick Philipse, notable as the wealthiest 
landowners and merchants in New York and all substantial beneficiaries of trade with Madagascar. 
He now had to provide evidence of this involvement to get the government in England to agree to 
their dismissal. His efforts began in April, when Bellomont was notified of a vessel named the 
Fortune recently arrived on the northern coast of Long Island carrying an unnamed quantity of 
contraband.119 Owned by at least three members of New York’s Council, the ship had left the 
colony in November 1696 for Madagascar under the cover of purchasing slaves there, yet once at 
St Maries, they bought a fortune in stolen east India goods.120 First, Bellomont followed the 
unloaded goods to the warehouse of Ouzeel Van Swieten, a merchant and ally of Fletcher’s 
councilors, but his officials found only a fraction of the goods there.121 Nevertheless, he had them 
seized and flooded the Board of Trade with firsthand testimonies of the event.122 Throughout the 
summer he made several similar seizures, all of which he connected to Fletcher’s councilors.123 
His persistent argument became that ‘unlawful trade and Arabian gold brought in by pyrat ships 
from the red sea are the things they thirst after … a demonstration of the wickednesse of our English 
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merchants here’.124 At the same time, a separate body of evidence was gathering in Hamburg. 
Testimonies supplied by Bellomont had suggested one of the councilors intended to sell stolen 
goods there and, during June, the English resident Paul Rycaut was notified that the ship was in 
port.125 Ordering the vessel seized, Rycaut collected detailed accounts of both the stolen goods 
aboard the ship and its connections to New York City’s merchants.126 A firm Williamite, it is 
unlikely to be a coincidence that Rycaut chose to pursue this seizure with such vigour and regard 
for detail.127 With both men drip-feeding information to the Board, they effectively seized control 
of the Madagascar issue, laying the blame squarely at the feet of an allegedly arbitrary government 
in New York. 
The earl was able to secure further evidence through his alliance with New York City’s Dutch 
population. His solidarity with them was most clearly expressed in late September 1698, when he 
allowed a crowd of hundreds to exhume to bodies of Jacob Leisler and Jacob Milburne, march 
them through the streets of the city and rebury them in the Dutch Reformed Church.128 Both were 
martyrs to the Dutch in New York and a the exhumation symbolic slight to Fletcher’s remaining 
councilors, most of whom had sat on the jury which condemned and executed the two rebels.129 As 
part of their alliance, they provided Bellomont with ample evidence of the counsellors receiving 
stolen goods, but also rumours of the merchants’ containing loyalty to James II.130 In gathering this 
evidence, the earl spoke to several important factors that had been raised in his appointment. He 
connected participation in the Madagascar trade with the Jacobitism which he claimed left the 
region vulnerable to French influence, giving credence to Locke’s notion that pirates were a 
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consequence of arbitrary government. This was point stressed powerfully in a petition signed by 
over a thousand of the city’s Dutch residents.131 
Evidence arriving throughout 1698 in London from Hamburg and New York had the desired 
effect. In late October, the Whig members of the Board of Trade compiled a summary of extant 
evidence from both Hamburg and New York that Fletcher’s councilors had fostered trade with 
Madagascar, itself said to be evidence of their corruption.132 They recommended the immediate 
dismissal of the accused from New York’s Council and, in the face of seemingly overwhelming 
evidence, there was little Tories on the Board could do to oppose the measure.133 On 25 October, 
the Privy Council assented to the dismissals and instructed Bellomont to delve further into pirates 
and illegal trade in the northeast, as well as government malfeasance.134 In a transatlantic effort, 
therefore, Locke, Bellomont, Rycaut and the Dutch in New York City had been able to engineer 
the scandal of the Madagascar trade to bring down Fletcher’s supporters. Already enjoying the 
support of Congregationalists across the northeast, by the end of 1698, Bellomont had removed 
any who might oppose him from positions of political influence. 
Yet despite this initial success, the issue of the Madagascar trade would backfire spectacularly 
for the earl in the following months. As was to be expected, the deposed councilors rallied around 
the former governor, emphasising that he was the victim of a smear campaign by his substantially 
more arbitrary replacement.135 Part of their response was to argue that the Madagascar trade went 
far beyond Fletcher, accusing Jacob Leisler himself of complicity and naming New York City’s 
less established Dutch merchants.136 Bellomont’s credibility was soon spectacularly shredded. 
During later 1698, details of the attacks on Mughal shipping by the captain William Kidd began to 
emerge, a venture he and a number of prominent Whigs had sponsored.137 The response of 
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Bellomont’s allies was outlined by George Somers in December 1698. He advocated that the 
investors should own up to their involvement, but emphasise that Kidd had acted in violation of 
their instructions, whilst at the same time, redoubling their efforts against the Madagascar trade in 
both England and the Americas.138 Throughout this unfolding controversy, an ailing Locke 
successfully fought to keep Bellomont in position, but the argument that support for the 
Madagascar trade was emanated from the political culture Fletcher and his circle introduced, had 
unraveled.139 It was evident, therefore, that the scope of Bellomont’s investigations would have to 
be substantially widened if he was to keep his position. 
The governor’s only option now was to now double down and continue to take a firm stance 
against trade with Madagascar. His Dutch contacts in New York City supported this conclusion, 
claiming that to do otherwise would confirm his earlier efforts as venal and self-serving.140 
Throughout 1699 ships from Madagascar continued to recruit and unload their stolen cargoes 
across southern New England, where a now established network of brokers laundered the 
contraband for investors in New York City and Boston.141 Yet having to confront the reality of the 
Madagascar trade and how embedded it was in the northeast’s economy, was problematic for 
Bellomont. He had, of course, known for some time that goods made their way from the Indian 
Ocean into southern New England, he had just chosen to downplay and ignore its significance to 
keep attention focused on Fletcher’s councilors.142 But when two of Kidd’s men, James Kelly and 
Joseph Bradish, disappeared into the port towns of Connecticut, he was compelled to ask the 
governor, Fitz-John Winthrop, to act.143 The Winthrops viewed the earl as a valuable ally, one who 
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could help them defend their charter rights, as well as wrestle control of a tract of land known as 
Narragansett County from Rhode Island’s Quakers.144 As a result, when Bellomont sought 
permission to capture members of Kidd’s crew in the colony along with other reputed pirates, they 
allowed him to do so.145 At the same time, they were keen to pass on accountability for the 
Madagascar trade, directing attention towards the fact that many of the pirates they set out to catch 
fled to Newport, where the majority had been given privateering commissions.146 Neither 
Bellomont nor the Winthrops had any love for the colony’s Quaker leaders, so, during June 1699, 
the focus of investigations shifted, with the earl coming to emphasise that Rhode Island was 
responsible for harbouring and encouraging pirates.147 This change in strategy possibly explains 
why Bellomont decided in June to lure Kidd to the colony for capture the following month.148 All 
that remained was to once again, appear to get the heart of the Madagascar issue, but this time in 
Newport rather than New York City. 
Compared with the lengths to which the earl went in implicating New York’s councilors in 
sponsoring pirates, Bellomont placed Rhode Island’s Quakers under very little scrutiny. Before his 
arrival, they begged him to be lenient so that they would not lose their charter, but his earliest line 
of investigation during mid-September was dictated by the Board.149 He was to question the 
colony’s former governors, their deputies and admiralty judges about their providing of 
privateering commissions to vessels which then proceeded to Madagascar.150 Quaker merchants 
had been as keen as anybody to profit from this trade, while at the same time, the commissioning 
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privateers for defence in a time of war had been especially important for a colony occupied in 
majority by pacifists.151 They had reconciled their aversion to violence by appointing the Gortonian 
John Green as deputy governor in 1690 and tasked him with overseeing the colony’s military 
operations. Despite this dubious arrangement, Rhode Island’s Quaker leaders emerged from the 
investigations relatively unscathed. Bellomont was able to quite correctly trace most of the issued 
commissions to Green, and from there, the issue of directly commissioning pirates was kept at 
arm's length from the Quakers, which instead became an issue of Green’s antinomianism.152 At the 
same time, he presented the broader failure to capture and convict known pirates as a problem of 
the colony’s laws, rather than evidence of Quaker complicity.153 Assured that they would see their 
charter overturned otherwise, the governor grudgingly allowed the earl to amend their laws to align 
more closely with England’s.154 In effect, Bellomont successfully absolved the colony’s Quakers 
of responsibility but followed his commission to the letter. With Kidd on a ship bound for England 
by this point and the earl having clung on to his positions, it appeared that he had survived the 
scandal. 
These investigations into the Madagascar trade had begun at the same time as Bellomont was 
attempting to follow Locke in presenting pirates as a product of arbitrary government. Yet while 
his initial efforts had shown promise, the Kidd scandal undermined the narrative he had worked 
with his Dutch allies and Rycaut to create. In turn, it forced him to concede the more widespread 
participation in the Madagascar trade across the northeast. While it jeopardised his position, 
Bellomont eventually managed to limit the damage of these revelations to himself and his allies. 
Congregationalist New England was largely kept out of the spotlight, something which changed 
when a Tory later succeeded Bellomont to the governorship of Massachusetts.155 Being forced to 
present the reality of widespread connections to Madagascar, however, was not necessarily a 
problem for Bellomont. Admitting that it was embedded within the northeast’s economy actually 
placed him in a stronger position to argue for the naval stores project he had been refining since 
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before he came to North America. Even if trade with pirates could not be presented as a 
consequence of Tory corruption, it could become an economic problem for his scheme to resolve. 
*** 
During the evening of 16 August 1699, a ship named the Fortune was sold by inch of candle in 
New York City’s dock to Abraham De Peyster, a Dutch merchant of middling means and status.156 
The vessel was the first ship which Bellomont had seized after his arrival more than a year 
previously, its crew having returned from Madagascar with east India goods and specie. In the days 
which followed, the Fortune was loaded with masts and naval stores intended for London, yet 
neither De Peyster’s purchase of the Fortune or this cargo were a coincidence.157 The merchant, 
whom Bellomont had appointed to New York’s Council in 1698, was playing a small but 
significant role in the ambitious scheme devised by his patron. In parallel to and especially after 
Bellomont’s trek across the northeast in pursuit of pirates, the earl’s greatest preoccupation 
remained promoting naval stores production, specifically the manufacturing of tar, pitch, turpentine 
and masts. He coveted the profits such a venture might realise, especially after his own financial 
situation deteriorated following the confiscation of his Irish estates during 1699.158 Yet this was far 
more than a simple commercial venture. The Fortune’s sale speaks of the belief the earl had in his 
scheme’s transformative character: it being repurposed from trading stolen goods out of the Indian 
Ocean to manufactured products intended, he claimed, for England’s benefit. This project also has 
substantial implications on land, becoming a means to transfer Irish colonisation strategies across 
the Atlantic, creating a society of redoubtable Protestant freeholders whose labour would draw 
Atlantic flows of people and goods northwards into Boston and New York City, while at the same 
time securing the colonial borderlands from French influence. 
Behind his initial attempt to pin the Madagascar trade on his rivals, the earl understood it was in 
fact a problem of the northeast’s economy, traceable to a lack of specie and people. Over the years, 
he wrote to many correspondents that these shortages made the region vulnerable to French 
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influence and could only be resolved through the manufacture and sale of valuable commodities.159 
He noted in particular that none of the northeast’s trades went in majority to England: provisions 
went south to the Caribbean without discrimination as to where they were sold, the Newfoundland 
fishing industry continued to depart in large part for Spain, remaining furs from New York went to 
Curaçao and Amsterdam, while the masts and lumber of New Hampshire supplied Porto and 
Lisbon.160 Each of these activities, he observed, drained people and specie from North America, 
all the while enriching foreign powers. The Madagascar trade he placed alongside all of these other 
forms of commerce, that although it injected coin in the regional economy it encouraged landless 
colonists to emigrate.161 As he viewed it, his challenge was to attract and effectively employ enough 
labour in some kind of commodity-production to facilitate a viable commercial alternative to all of 
the above trades. At the same time, any solution had to shore up his position in North America, 
first and foremost by protecting the frontiers with France, but without upsetting any of the 
American interest groups who favoured him. By the time of his arrival, he already had a solution 
in mind. 
The initial idea for a naval stores project did not come from Bellomont but the Huguenot 
merchant and refugee, Gabriel Bernon. Of a long-established La Rochelle merchant family, Bernon 
made his fortune in the 1670s trading to Guadeloupe and Martinique as well as to New France.162 
In 1682 he left France for Quebec, before fleeing after 1685 to Amsterdam and then London, where 
he became naturalised.163 He secured his return to North America with many other refugees as part 
of two separate ventures to transplant several hundred of his coreligionists to Massachusetts and to 
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Rhode Island.164 In 1688, Bernon migrated to Boston and oversaw the settlement of around fifty of 
his fellow émigrés onto a tract of land he had purchased in southern Massachusetts – they named 
it Oxford.165 In the following years he remained in Boston, where he recruited further refugees and 
experimented with numerous commercial projects for the settlement, which included the planting 
of vineyards for wine making, as well as the production of raw silk and naval stores.166 The latter 
quickly came to appear the most promising as he understood that the English Admiralty Board 
bought their stores from Scandinavia at considerable cost and the French capture of Pemaquid in 
1689 had cut off much of the meagre North American production that existed.167 In the years which 
followed, he gradually established Oxford as a centre for the manufacture of turpentine and pitch, 
selling both to the Admiralty Board amid the protests of the Eastland merchants (those who traded 
with Scandinavia and the Baltic).168 Disaster struck in 1696, however, when tensions between the 
Huguenots at Oxford and their Narragansett neighbours boiled over and the town was raided, 
causing its inhabitants to fleeing to Boston and south to Narragansett County in Rhode Island.169 
Discouraged but determined, Bernon sailed for England again, arriving there in February 1696, 
seeking support to re-establish his scheme. 
While there, he was able to make an impact on Bellomont and his supporters. The two met at 
some point in early 1696, being put in touch through Henri de Massue de Ruvigny, Earl of Galway, 
a Huguenot noble who, like Bellomont, had been rewarded with a title in Ireland for his efforts 
during the Jacobite War.170 A basic document outlining the potential of a naval stores scheme in 
the northeast was submitted to the Board in July by Edward Randolph, rather than Bernon, which 
stressed the potential of New Hampshire and New York to produce them.171 The merchant’s 
proposals for making wine, silk and naval stores made their way into Locke’s writings during 1696 
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and the philosopher suggested the production of all three in his proposals for Virginia.172 While 
Bernon left London without the formal support of the Board, he evidently had been able to exert 
an influence. On his return to North America in late 1696, he relocated to Newport, redirecting his 
efforts towards the Huguenot settlement of North Kingston in Narragansett County and to the 
rebuilding of Oxford, re-establishing his small-scale naval stores production in both towns.173 It 
was Bellomont, however, who was most taken by Bernon’s proposals. On a number of occasions 
he praised the merchant’s various commercial projects to the Board, understanding how each could 
provide commodities currently bought by England from foreign ports.174 The earl similarly found 
the naval stores scheme to show the most promise, but agreed that their problem was a labour 
shortage.175 It was in November 1698, at the height of his investigations into the Madagascar trade 
in New York City, that he first wrote to the Board of Trade asserting that Bernon’s ideas, if properly 
executed, would be a long-term solution to the problem. He claimed that naval stores production 
would make the region’s connection to Madagascar unnecessary, as they provided a commercial 
alternative which would render the northeast as profitable to England as was Ireland.176 
The earl’s invocation of Ireland here is telling and suggests the particular approach to the project 
he would come to propose. He presided over a deteriorating geopolitical position in which New 
France continued to make substantial gains. Nine years of war had put pressure upon English 
relations with their native American neighbours: the Haudenosaunee were concerned with the 
resurgence of the Huron out of the Great Lakes region, while the Abenaki had not been privy to, 
nor had they signed, the Treaty of Ryswick. These confederacies together spanned most of the 
territory between New England and New France and both had factions within them during the later 
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1690s advocating closer ties with the French.177 Bellomont credited their growing dissatisfaction 
to the presence of Jesuit priests within each confederacy and persistently reminded the Board of 
Trade that he believed alliances were forming between English Jacobites, Native American leaders 
and New France. By 1699, he believed that an invasion was imminent.178 It was against this context, 
as well as his understanding of the Madagascar trade, that he conceived the details of his project. 
Drawing upon his experiences in Ireland, he transposed Native Americans in place of Irish 
Catholics and suggested the transferring of Protestant English soldiers currently stationed in 
Ireland. He sought to settle them on land surrounding Albany in New York (closest to the 
Haudennosaunee) and across New Hampshire (near the Abenaki). These soldiers, he offered, 
would manufacture naval stores and receive basic pay, but after seven years receive a tract of land 
and the basic means to establish themselves as farmers.179 It was by these very techniques of 
plantation that the Cootes themselves had first gained lands in Ireland and where the tried and 
tested methods by which successive governments had worked to expand English rule following 
land confiscations.180 
To achieve such a large settlement programme, however, the groundwork had to be prepared. 
Most controversial would be the need to break up the enormous land grants which had been 
allocated to particular magnates in both New York and New Hampshire, almost all of which sat 
uncultivated as a result of failure to attract tenants.181 The earl later made it clear what he thought 
of these grants and their implications for the attraction of migrants: ‘what man will be such a fool 
as to become a base tenant (in New York)…when for crossing the Hudson’s River that man can 
for a song purchase a freehold in the Jersies?’.182 The scheme he proposed and that fact that it 
overlapped with what Locke had proposed for Virginia some years earlier throws up continuity 
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with earlier political thinkers. He advocated breaking up any land grant over a thousand acres, 
pulling apart New York’s emergent manorial system to create a society of autonomous 
freeholders.183 The genealogy of such an idea can be traced back to the Fundamental Constitutions 
of Carolina and, ultimately, James Harrington’s writings during the Interregnum.184 What 
Bellomont suggested was not just to settle soldiers as a guard against Catholic France but to create 
a society of industrious, landholding Protestant yeomen, collectively a barrier against the popery 
which threatened to consume English dominions in North America.185 
Laid out in full, his scheme began with the commercial experiments of Huguenot refugees but 
was then modified. The earl proposed using organised landholding as well as commodity 
production as a means draw Atlantic trade flows north, securing the northeast from the French 
threat and providing an alternative to the Madagascar trade in the process. In doing so he transferred 
his own experiences from Ireland but at the same time created the society of autonomous Protestant 
freeholders of the kind which Whig political philosophy valued. The earl’s task was to persuade 
the Board of Trade to assent to his scheme while he made these territories ready for settlement 
through land redistributions and countermeasures against French influence. 
As early as May 1698, Bellomont began to set in motion his land confiscations in New York. At 
this stage, pursuing the project was mutually supportive with his efforts to pin the Madagascar 
trade on Fletcher’s councilors, most of whom had been allocated enormous tracts of land by the 
former governor.186 With Locke’s continuing influence over the Board of Trade during 1698, his 
idea had a favourable audience and reception in England. In October, the very same letter which 
urged Bellomont to dismiss Fletcher’s councilors for their funding of pirates also instructed him to 
proceed in the process of breaking up their land grants.187 Such a measure had to be pushed through 
New York's Assembly, however, and elections scheduled for April 1699 provided the best 
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opportunity to introduce his supporters into the legislature. He specifically sought the land 
surrounding Albany, but in recent years, patroons like the Van Rensselaers and Van Cortlandts had 
deliberately obstructed colonists from settling there to preserve Albany’s monopoly on the fur 
trade.188 While Albany’s Dutch residents in large part came out against Bellomont he secured a 
majority of supporters and obtained the passage of his act on 13 May.189 The Act still had to be 
sent for confirmation by the Board of Trade in London, however, so it would be some time before 
he could begin to set his plan in motion. Yet, nevertheless, in the summer of 1699 he appealed to 
England for a thousand soldiers to settle on these lands. 
While confident of his ability to eventually secure the territory he needed, the earl feared placing 
settlers on land which was still subject to Jesuit influence. He kept up an adversarial 
correspondence with Jesuits who operated in the region, who taunted him with stories of their 
successes near to Albany, which were often corroborated by reports from the town.190 Securing 
Protestant missionaries, he believed, was essential in maintaining their alliance with the 
Haudennosaunee but also to safeguard any settlers he introduced from being converted to 
Catholicism.191 Of course, combatting the influence of Catholic priests was also a preoccupation 
of Irish Protestants, particularly during the 1690s. In his attempts to recruit missionaries he was 
essentially non-dogmatic, as he was an Anglican but also a latitudinarian. He had no qualms about 
being a member of the Congregationalist Company for the Propagation of the Gospel in New 
England, from whom he requested missionaries to preach around Albany, clergy he was only 
permitted on the condition that they were Harvard graduates.192 In January 1699 and several times 
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thereafter, Locke and the other Whigs on the Board encouraged Bellomont to make sure that these 
missionaries were recruited, instructions which he followed up while in Boston during May 
1699.193 There, he negotiated a deal with Harvard’s fellows for the missionaries, which he was 
promised in exchange for his help securing a new charter for the College.194 At the same time, he 
also appealed to Henry Compton, the Bishop of London for five Anglican missionaries to be sent 
permanently amongst the Mohawk, to be provided by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel 
(SPG) shortly after its projected formation.195 Although his settlement of soldiers was in itself 
intended as a barrier to French influence, Bellomont’s fear of creeping Catholic influence meant 
that he believed holding the region depended upon more than just soldiers. Protestant missionaries 
drawn from any source available thus became an integral part of his project. 
The last piece in Bellomont’s plan lay in New Hampshire, where he imagined he would extend 
his naval stores project and, while in regular correspondence with colonists there, he did not arrive 
in New Hampshire until July 1699. His intentions were to vastly expand the production of lumber 
and masts there to be exported to England via New York City. A substantial amount of the existing 
production went to Lisbon and was limited by the fact that almost all of the land was owned by the 
London-based merchant Samuel Allen, who used only a fraction of it.196 Yet by the time of his 
arrival, the colony was in the throes of an unusual constitutional crisis. The entire grant was 
disputed by Robert Mason, a relative of the former proprietor and both claimants had appointed 
their own governments in the colony.197 The first was run by William Partridge a Congregationalist 
appointed by Mason and favoured by Massachusetts, while the other by Samuel Usher, an Anglican 
who acted as an advocate for Allen.198 During his brief stay in there, the earl disentangled the legal 
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problems the colony and mediated an amalgamation of the two governments. Yet after his 
departure, he accumulated evidence intended to undermine the two claims as well as information 
about their trade with Portugal, which he claimed was illegal.199 He instructed the Board of Trade 
to do all that they could to see that both claims were annulled, so that the lands could go to the 
crown. He believed that this measure would enable production to be expanded, while soldiers could 
be sent to the region to assist in producing the naval stores, all the while securing the colony from 
the French.200 
With his plans proceeding and having overcome his implication in the Madagascar trade, the earl 
outlined his naval stores project in full to the Board on 22 June 1700.201 The formal proposal looked 
like a document Petty could have produced, filled with precise calculations of numbers of sailors 
it would employ, colonists to be settled and quantities of specie drawn into Stuart dominions. The 
net effect, he reiterated, would be to reorient Atlantic commerce into Boston and New York City 
and ensured the northeast’s frontiers were well guarded.202 In August he met with William Penn, 
then Governor of Pennsylvania, and Francis Nicholson, Governor of Virginia and together they 
drew up supplementary measures to encourage this transformation of North America. They 
suggested establishing a mint in New York City for a reliable source of specie, alongside the 
passage of an act of naturalisation to encourage aliens in migrating to the Americas as well as 
bounties to any who turned in Madagascar pirates.203 At the end of this summer, the earl evidently 
believed the time was right to bring his labours to fruition. Yet despite his high expectations, these 
hopes were dashed when, on 23 October, a vessel arrived into New York City’s harbour with his 
soldiers from Ireland. Out stepped around a hundred men, ten percent of what he had requested for 
the lands surrounding Albany.204 To make matters worse, he complained of being sent ‘the vilest 
fellows ever to wear the king’s livery, the very scum of the army in Ireland and several Irish 
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papists’. He was told he had to pay them out of any profits he made from the naval stores scheme.205 
When he attempted to force them to work for no initial pay, they mutinied and the earl had several 
of them hanged before dispatching them to Albany where they became part of the Garrison, rather 
than settlers.206 It was evident that he would not be receiving the labour force he had anticipated. 
Bellomont believed that the blame for this outcome lay with William Blathwayt, the Tory who 
had come to dominate the Board of Trade since Locke’s decline in influence and eventual 
retirement in 1700.207 It was certainly true that Blathwayt did not value the scheme, he had 
effectively seen to it that all of the risk for the scheme be placed onto the earl by allocating no 
money, when he knew full well that the earl was in perpetual financial difficulty.208 He had also 
been in no rush to push the New York land confiscations through and as an ally of Usher from New 
Hampshire, he did was not exactly taken with Bellomont’s suggestion of annulling his land 
grants.209 Yet it was not just Blathwayt who had worked to undermine the earl’s proposals. 
Compton, the Bishop of London had been angered by the earl’s lack of support for his own church 
and had actively sought his dismissal, as had the Classis of Amsterdam, the governing body which 
oversaw the Dutch Reformed Church in New York. This latter enemy he developed as part of a 
dispute with one of their ministers who had substantial landholdings around Albany.210 Fletcher’s 
allies in New York City had been equally unrelenting in their criticism of Bellomont and had 
continued to blanket the Board with their complaints.211 In an ill-tempered letter aimed at 
Blathwayt of 28 November 1700, Bellomont complained of the hypocrisy in the Tories pressing 
for the confiscation of his own estates in Ireland, what at the same time blocking the vacation of 
similar grants in North America.212 Restating the innumerable benefits of his own scheme he made 
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one last attempt to insist upon more soldiers, citing the economic credentials of his scheme, 
claiming it was endorsed by writers ranging from Francis Bacon to Charles Davenant, as well as 
his allies Penn and Nicholson.213 His bluster achieved little: the Board responded coolly and offered 
no further encouragement.214 This point proved the high water mark of Bellomont’s plan – he died 
some months later on 5 March 1701, having suffered from severe gout throughout his time in North 
America. He was briefly succeeded by his son-in-law John Nanfan, who attempted to continue the 
project before being told to abandon it entirely in April 1702.215 
*** 
For all the effort it had entailed, this was a project which was not realised within his lifetime. As a 
plan to settle soldiers on a frontier, Bellomont had perhaps over-inflated ambitions for what it could 
achieve. He sold the scheme as at once an answer to the northeast’s subordinate place in the Atlantic 
economy, itself the cause of the Madagascar trade, and as a means to halt the advance of French 
influence. In many ways, the project was how one might expect an Anglo-Irish Protestant to react 
to the particular challenges of being governor of most of the northeastern colonies; that he would 
seek to create a society of productive Protestant freeholders pushing forwards the frontier against 
a Catholic adversary. In developing his naval stores scheme, the earl had doubtless advanced far 
beyond what Locke had in mind when he had secured Bellomont’s appointment or initially drafted 
Nicholson’s instructions. Yet it endured as an idea in Whig thought, being implemented by the 
later Governor of New York, Robert Hunter. In 1709 he settled thousands of German refugees on 
the frontier, having them produce naval stores while he settled SPG missionaries amongst them.216 
In the end, his initial attempt to turn the Madagascar trade against his rivals, his subsequent 
implication in it and the enemies he made attempting to lay the groundwork for his project 
undermined him. Yet so did changing circumstances in England, as whatever Locke had intended 
four years earlier was no longer feasible when circumstances changed. 
The case of the Earl of Bellomont demonstrates one further attempt to use the existence of pirates 
to further a particular vision of empire. Fear of Catholic France had outlined a problem but not 
necessarily a solution, creating a vacuum into which Locke and Bellomont were happy to step. 
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Pirates, understood as the enemy of empire, were first turned against those who opposed Locke’s 
Atlantis before then becoming a source of labour and specie for the earl’s colonisation project. This 
scheme itself constituted an attempt to bridge land and sea, to vanquish the enemies in both domains 
and to do so in a manner that transferred an Irish model of colonisation across the Atlantic. Yet 
rather than unifying the northeast as had initially been the plan with Bellomont’s appointments, 
following his death the earl left it more divided than ever and with war on the horizon once again. 
Antipopery had not proved enough by itself to draw the northeast together and the guise of 
suppressing trade with Madagascar had presented a means to drive through a particular vision of 
how the northeast should come to do so. He had to implement a plan of some kind, but with so 
many private interests to consider and unintended consequences returning to haunt him, it is 




IV: Missionary Anglicanism, Quaker Outcasts and Pirates in 
Pennsylvania, 1691–1702 
On the evening of 20 February 1702, the Anglican priest Richard Willis, Dean of Lincoln, delivered 
a sermon at the Church of St Mary-le-Bow in London. He spoke exclusively about the Americas, 
the shortcomings of his church there and the imperatives that he believed commanded his fellow 
clergy to pay them greater attention. Willis believed that the trade and riches that colonisation had 
brought to England were a sure sign of divine favour, but that these gains were precarious, as all 
American colonies were beset by enemies: religious dissenters and the agents of hostile Catholic 
powers.1 He warned that, if the assembled clergy failed to instil due reverence to Anglican worship, 
then these enemies, as one, would overwhelm them, destroying trade and prosperity. This 
eventuality could only be understood as righteous divine retribution, he continued, for which they 
would have themselves to blame.2 This was the first annual sermon delivered for SPG, a missionary 
organisation formally incorporated the previous year. Beneath the detail was a subtext that other 
clergymen delivering this sermon also wrestled with: how to embed Anglicanism within processes 
of overseas expansion. These annual addresses were thus an exercise in positioning, seeing 
preachers identify the enemies their missionary work would overcome and, persistently, the means 
by which their faith could be made to accord with profit.3 While these debates ran through the 
sermons, they were not addressing new questions. The need for Protestant missionary societies to 
operate alongside overseas expansion had been stressed in England since the 1660s.4 For 
                                                 
1 Richard Willis, A sermon preach’d before the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (1702), 
pp.17–18. 
2 Ibid., pp.20–24. 
3 Consideration of enemies: John Hough, A sermon preach’d before the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in 
Foreign Parts (1705), pp.18–19; William Beveridge, Of the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts: A Sermon 
Preach’d at St Mary-le-Bow (1707), p.18; William Dawes, A sermon preach'd before the Society for the Propagation 
of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (1709), p.14; White Kennett, The lets and impediments in planting and propagating 
the gospel of Christ. A sermon Preach'd before the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts 
(1712), p.31; George Stanhope, The early conversion of islanders, a wise Expedient for propagating Christianity. A 
sermon Preached before the Incorporated Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (1714), pp.2, 14–15, 18; Phillip 
Bisse, A sermon preach’d before the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (1718), p.11; and 
how to accord with commerce: Gilbert Burnet, Of the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts. A sermon 
preach’d at St Mary-le-Bow (1704) p.27; Dawes, A Sermon Preach’d, p.14; Charles Trimnell, A Sermon Preach’d 
Before the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in in Foreign Parts (1710), p.23; William Fleetwood, A Sermon 
Preach’d Before the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (1711), p.14, 18; White Kennett, The 
lets and impediments, p.16; Bisse, A Sermon Preach’d, p.17. 
4 Gabriel Glickman, ‘Protestantism, Colonisation, and the New England Company in Restoration Politics’, The 




Anglicans, this question became especially pressing after 1680, exemplified by the writings of 
Morgan Godwyn, who had spent many years in Virginia. While, on paper, a staunchly Anglican 
colony, he complained that people there ‘know no other God but Money, nor Religion but Profit’ 
and, foreshadowing Willis, he retorted that ‘if they do not promote the Christian religion, then it 
[wealth] will be taken from them just as quickly’.5 In the years between these publications, 
Anglicans in both England and the Americas began to collaborate in constructing arguments as 
well as institutional forms to answer this problem. In doing so they sought not simply to combat 
“irreligion” but to render their faith an intrinsic characteristic of the wider anglophone world. The 
creation of this missionary society in 1701 represented the most significant consequence of this 
impulse, but it was a project many years in the making, and one in which pirates came to play a 
significant role. 
It was in Pennsylvania, riven by confessional strife after 1691, that a select group of Anglicans 
saw their greatest opportunity. Robert Snead was an architect and carpenter by trade who relocated 
from London to Jamaica sometime during the 1680s, before then moving to the Quaker colony in 
1695.6 A public disgrace suffered by Snead in 1691 possibly explained his move, but he evidently 
retained some status, as he was appointed a magistrate.7 Like many who identified with planter 
interests, Snead was an Anglican and he held an enduring antipathy towards the Society of Friends. 
In two narratives he produced in 1698, the magistrate wrote extensively of his attempts during 
previous years to apprehend pirates arriving from Madagascar into Philadelphia, a town he claimed 
to be flushed with stolen money and goods from the Indian Ocean. Yet Snead was not, as he 
claimed, simply a loyal crown servant and impartial observer of recent events. The remainder of 
his two accounts, sent to the prominent Tory William Blathwayt and to Henry Compton, Bishop 
of London, consisted of claims that Quaker pacifism not only encouraged pirates, but also disguised 
secret Jacobite sympathies and crypto-popery. His purpose was to convey that a dangerous society 
had arisen on the Delaware, and to emphasise this point he connected support for pirates to Islam, 
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claiming he ‘had better live in Turky there is better morality amongst them’.8 Francis Nicholson, 
then governor of Maryland and a committed Anglican, agreed. After an earlier visit to Pennsylvania 
in March 1696, Nicholson claimed that ‘I fancied myself to have almost been in Barbary again, for 
I see little or no worship amongst them’.9 Continuity of association is revealing here. Some twenty 
years previously, when planters had begun ousting the buccaneers from Jamaica, one of their 
number claimed to be transforming the ‘Christian Algiers’ into an orderly ‘plantation’.10 Pirates 
and piracy created an opportunity to transpose variants of this same argument northwards and into 
entirely new contexts. In this instance, a self-appointed campaign to drive pirates from 
Pennsylvania resonated with Anglican clergy in England, who sensed the opportunity to build their 
presence in the Americas and associate radical dissent with immoral trade. 
This chapter will argue that the ensuing scandal of Quaker trade with pirates in Pennsylvania 
was created specifically to advance this Anglican missionary project. By the 1690s, Church of 
England clergy became increasingly aware of how successful the Society of Friends had become 
in the Americas, growth that was allowing them to exert influence in England. This fact emphasised 
to Anglicans the need for action against the Quakers, but existing ecclesiastical structures did not 
provide a means to effectively do so. Three initially separate contexts would interweave to provide 
a solution. They were attempts to extend the Anglican Church into Maryland, a religious Schism 
triggered in Pennsylvania and the subsequent investigation into the colony’s sponsoring of pirates. 
Together, they suggested not just the need to create a missionary society to move against American 
Quakerism, but how to win the wider support necessary for this project to succeed. Through the 
coming together of these three contexts, Anglicans were able to construct the Society of Friends as 
enemies in league with both Catholics and pirates, aligning the advancement of their religion with 
a defence of commerce and through it the process of overseas expansion more broadly. Across this 
decade and into the eighteenth century, these strands began to converge on both sides of the 
Atlantic, seeing this missionary project grow in ambition, before eventually becoming integrated 
into larger plan to establish the Church of England across the North American Continent, creating 
an empire built upon common Anglicanism. 
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In making this argument, the following chapter also synthesises the existing literature on early 
modern pirates, missionary Anglicanism and Atlantic Quakerism. At the time of writing, Gary 
Nash’s study of early Pennsylvania politics remains the blueprint for how the presence of pirates 
in the colony is more widely understood. While a thorough analysis, it remains confined almost 
entirely to Pennsylvania and centres upon the Quaker struggle to actually act against pirates, with 
only a cursory examination of any wider context.11 Histories of early modern pirates largely follow 
after Nash, though in recent years they have added valuable further details about participation in 
the Madagascar trade in the colony.12 To these works, this chapter adds the contexts of both a larger 
Anglican design for the Americas and the transatlantic dimension in detail, situating the presence 
of pirates there in local, regional and oceanic contexts. Studies of particular religious confessions 
persistently emphasise the significance of the 1690s in creating transatlantic faiths, but remain 
largely separate from one another and retain their own particular emphases. When accounting for 
the creation of missionary Anglicanism, scholars neither touch upon the role played by Madagascar 
pirates, nor dedicate a great deal of space to Pennsylvania. In fact, they tend to be interested 
predominantly in the English contexts of the formation of the SPG, rather than allocating an 
especially important role for the Americas.13 Equally, studies of the Quakers as an Atlantic 
denomination have traditionally remained self-contained. They have tended to present an image of 
a closed sect, rather than one engaged with the wider world, a tendency that has begun to be 
challenged in recent years. 14 The chapter that follows presents a history of both denominations as 
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far more entangled than is often conveyed, the issue of Quaker trade with Madagascar itself coming 
to demonstrate how much the two faiths exerted an influence on one another. 
The chapter is structured in four sections. The first considers how shifting trans-Atlantic 
migration patterns during the seventeenth century served to concentrate Anglicanism in English 
plantation colonies, but how at the same they precipitated the rise of Quakerism as a transatlantic 
confession. The latter fact was something that English Anglicans first became aware of when they 
two began to spill over into Maryland, where the clergyman Thomas Bray began to conceive of the 
need for a missionary society and to conflate the threats presented by Quakers and Catholics. It 
then tracks the Schism triggered in Pennsylvania by George Keith during the early part of the 
decade, in response to a fear of creeping worldliness within the Society of Friends. His own 
arguments about how they should deal with pirates eventually saw him cast out of the Society of 
Friends, a position from which he was able to stress the dangers posed by the Quakers and win 
favour within the Anglican Church. The third section follows the initial investigation into pirates 
in the colony, tracing how Anglicans attempted to make it an issue of Quaker pacifism and veiled 
crypto-popery. The fourth and final part demonstrates how the Quakers began to respond to this 
growing threat from an emergent missionary Anglicanism. It considers how William Penn first 
began to dismantle the allegation that Quakers alone sponsored pirates and his subsequent efforts 
to scupper a larger plan to rescind all non-royal colonial charters that Anglican efforts had fuelled. 
*** 
The contest that emerged in Pennsylvania between Quakers and Anglicans did not exist in isolation 
from the rest of North America. In fact, it was the product of long-term trends in Atlantic migration 
and religious conversion, which began to converge from the 1680s. It was within the context of 
Maryland, initially a haven for Catholics, that these two American confessions met and, as a 
consequence, initial plans for an Anglican missionary project were conceived. There, the 
background of war with France informed how advocates of this future society argued for its 
necessity, presenting it as an endeavour confronting the entwined threats of Catholicism and radical 
dissent, the case eventually made in parallel in both Pennsylvania and England. 
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The colonisation of the Americas by migrants from England has often been portrayed as a 
dissenting phenomenon, but the majority of those who made the crossing before the 1680s had not 
separated from the Anglican Church. In the years before the founding of Pennsylvania in 1681, up 
to 400,000 people migrated westwards into these dominions, around 200,000 of who travelled to 
the Caribbean and 120,000 to the Chesapeake Bay. New England, the only region with an 
established dissenting majority, received around 20,000 white immigrants around the Great 
Migration of the 1630s, while continuing small levels of migration and a natural increase thereafter 
saw its white population rise to around 60,000 by 1680.15 The majority of both whites and blacks 
initially migrated to plantation economies far to the south of New England. With the notable 
exception of Maryland, earliest settlement saw loose forms of religious toleration predominate, 
followed by some favourable status allocated for Anglicans.16 The nominal or assumed privilege 
granted to the Anglican Church in most of the plantation colonies primarily stemmed from the 
social and national backgrounds of migrants. Three quarters of those who emigrated were of the 
lowest socioeconomic status and did so under the terms of indenture; the majority were English 
but with a substantial minority of Irish Catholics.17 In these early plantation economies, the 
majority of both whites and blacks were “unchurched”, being ecclesiologically non-dogmatic but 
with a broad allegiance to Protestantism amongst the English colonists.18 Forms of religious 
diversity existed, but not necessarily along strict denominational lines, a state of being that 
appeared to most clergymen as a lack of religion. There was, however, a minority who actively 
supported the importation of formal Anglicanism into their societies. Wealthier planters 
increasingly saw the Church of England as a cultural anchor, an important source of authority in 
increasingly non-white and, largely as a consequence, non-Christian societies.19 Their influence 
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ensured that, before 1681, a small but steadily growing number of clergy were sent to both the 
Caribbean and the Chesapeake, in many instances at the behest of wealthier plantation owners.20 
When they did think about the Americas, the Anglican episcopate initially positioned itself against 
the “unchurched” nature of these plantation societies, bringers of order and stability to unnatural, 
immoral places. As Morgan Godwin remarked in 1680, the clergy faced a ‘dangerous Conspiracy, 
even against Christianity’ and their church had to ‘defend and preserve which, against the Hellish 
contrivances of our Anti-Religionists’.21 
In the thirty years following the Restoration, shifts in migration demographics produced a 
conspicuous growth of organised, churched dissent in the Americas. This was a change that 
occurred across North America and West Indies, including in plantation colonies. For instance, in 
the earliest years of the colony of Carolina, chartered in 1663, despite some attempts to allocate 
provisions for an Anglican minister there, the colony quickly became a haven for dissent.22 Two 
of the proprietors, the Quaker John Archdale and the latitudinarian Earl of Craven, actively 
recruited dissenters from Britain and France, with the result that more than half of the colony’s 
4000 white settlers were non-Anglicans by 1700.23 What the case of Carolina illustrates here is the 
tailing off of indentured migration, replaced by an expanding quantity of both dissenting and non-
English immigrants after 1660. Most notable was the rapid expansion of Quakerism, whose 
adherents were initially scattered around the northeastern Atlantic seaboard and the Caribbean. 
They secured initial converts through missionary tours by their ‘public friends’, as in the example 
of the radical Quaker John Perrot, who journeyed through Barbados, Jamaica and Maryland after 
1662, with his preaching winning a sizeable number of converts in each colony.24 These efforts 
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had commenced even earlier to the north in New England through figures such as Elizabeth Hooton 
and Mary Fisher, ensuring that by 1670 Quaker meetings existed from Barbados to Rhode Island 
and southern Massachusetts, from Oyster Bay on Long Island to the eastern shores of Maryland 
and Virginia.25 The visit of the Quaker leader George Fox after 1671 began to draw these dispersed 
converts together by organising them into a formalised meeting structure. However, the largest 
growth of Quakerism was still to follow, occurring through their emigration into the ‘Middle 
Colonies’, the region of North America spanning roughly from the southern shores of the Hudson 
River to the mouth of the Delaware Bay.26 Dissenters and non-English colonists flowed into this 
region, seeing the white population there swell from 4300 in 1660 to 32,000 by 1690.27 Quaker 
migration to the colonies of Pennsylvania and West Jersey made up a high proportion of these 
numbers, at least 10,000 by 1685 and with substantial growth thereafter.28 Meanwhile, white 
migration to plantation colonies did not keep pace; their population south of New Jersey fell from 
roughly 65% of the total number of North American whites in 1660 to fewer than 50% by 1690.29 
Only as migration demographics and destinations shifted following the Restoration did the balance 
in the Americas began to tip towards religious dissenters, and the Quakers represented this era’s 
greatest success story. 
At the same time that dissenters came to flourish in the Americas, they began to enjoy 
commercial success, in turn prompting the formation of transatlantic interest groups. The 
intensification of Atlantic exchange was the most fundamental factor in this shift, with the ocean 
coming to account for almost 20% of England’s overseas commerce by 1700.30 Towns such as 
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London and Bristol began to reorient themselves towards Atlantic exchange, as urban populations 
swelled and their people began finding employment in overseas trade.31 One result was that, as 
organised religious dissent in the Americas grew, the change was mirrored by English merchants. 
In 1660, commerce was generally conducted without preference as to region or religious 
denomination, but by 1690 these merchants had specialised regionally, with groups such as the 
Jews, Baptists and Quakers forming commercial associations.32 The common cause of entwined 
commercial and confessional interest also produced campaigns of political lobbying, as planters 
and merchants began to intervene in government on both sides of the ocean.33 The Quakers became 
the most effective and unified trans-Atlantic lobbying group, utilising their regular Meeting for 
Sufferings in London to offer financial support and political pressure in support of other Friends. 
The earliest recorded instance of their trans-Atlantic influence was an appeal for changes to the 
Barbados charter in 1677, one of a handful of their interventions before 1680.34 Over the following 
decade they consolidated these lobbying operations, first organising out of a coffee house near to 
Parliament in London, and then establishing regular contact between the yearly meetings in the 
Americas and London after 1687.35 The parallel regularisation of Atlantic commerce and growth 
of North American religious dissent saw trade effectively balkanise and the Society of Friends 
emerge as an assertive, institutionalised pressure group. In other words, while the Quakers 
remained a minority in England, who struggled under the Anglican hegemony that characterised 
the Restoration, their presence in the Americas increasingly served to give them a political voice 
on the other side of the Atlantic. 
For Anglicans, both the expansion of Quakerism in the Americas and the influence they were 
able to exert in England only came into focus over the latter’s attempts to expand their influence 
into Maryland. Henry Compton was pivotal in seeking to promote the Anglican Church’s presence 
in the colony, but he soon encountered an unexpectedly well-organised Quaker opposition. The 
bishop’s interest in the region came both from his position as one of the Lords of Trade and the 
jurisdiction of his see over the church beyond Britain and Ireland.36 Like many other Anglican 
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clergymen, his initial interest in the Americas was occasional and predominantly concerned with 
the “irreligion” of plantation colonies rather than dissent further north.37 Compton’s first 
interventions in Maryland are characteristic of initial Anglican attempts to secure a stronger 
position in the Americas, being conducted through favourable colonial legislation. In July 1677, 
the first such effort came when he attempted to secure salaries for Anglican ministers there paid 
out of the common purse. Maryland, at this stage, was a proprietary colony and promised full 
liberty of conscience, and on these grounds he was denied this measure.38 However, this basic fact 
changed in 1692, when, following the overthrow of the colony’s Catholic government in 1689 by 
John Coode’s “Protestant Associators”, Maryland was converted to a royal colony. The persecution 
endured by some Anglican clergy during this predominantly Puritan rebellion likely led to the 
orders given to the first royal governor, Lionel Copley, to ensure that the Church of England was 
protected there.39 Yet by this point Maryland had a substantial Quaker population, for whom this 
string of events quickly became unpalatable. In particular, the imposition of compulsory oaths of 
allegiance for official positions effectively excluded both themselves and Catholics from the 
colony’s representative assembly.40 This left an Anglican-dominated legislature free to pass an act 
providing salaries for Church of England ministers, and Quaker leaders believed their only recourse 
was to launch a campaign to repeal the act in England.41 Coordinated by the London Meeting for 
Sufferings, they pressured influential figures in London, culminating in their sending an address to 
William III in January 1696. They did not argue that the measures contravened religious toleration, 
but that they were invalid, as they asserted that the Magna Carta extended to North America.42 
Compton and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Tenison, lobbied hard to resist their efforts, 
but the Quakers’ arguments won through, and the act was declared void following their petition.43 
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Not deterred in their efforts, Maryland’s Anglicans continued their attempts to secure a form of 
establishment in the colony, stressing the danger presented by the pact between the Quakers and 
the Catholics that had emerged. Following the failure of the first act, Compton instructed the newly 
appointed governor of Maryland, Francis Nicholson, to pass a new version immediately.44 In June 
1696, Nicholson warned the Archbishop of Canterbury that Catholics and Quakers would oppose 
it and that the latter group was already setting out to secure its annulment in England.45 The 
measures Nicholson had introduced included annual salaries for Anglican ministers, as well as 
provisions for schools in the colony, with the objective of ‘putting a stop to Papists and Quakers 
and bringing them over to the reformed religion’.46 As anticipated, Maryland’s Quakers resisted, 
dispatching four of their number to England in 1697.47 Reports from the Maryland clergy to 
Compton stressed the importance of the acts for their future in the colony, claiming that the Quakers 
increased their numbers through conversion and Catholics through Irish immigration; if the acts 
did not pass soon, they warned, the colony would be ‘overrun with enthusiasm, idolatry & 
atheism’.48 Yet this alliance became central to the case being made by Maryland’s Anglicans in 
favour of the legislation. Their position was that an alliance of Quakers and Catholics threatened 
to replicate the situation in the northeast, where the French used Jesuits to destabilise the region.49 
Yet, amid another Quaker lobbying campaign, the new acts followed their predecessor and were 
eventually declared void in November 1699.50 Twice thwarted by their opponents, Compton and 
Maryland’s Anglican clergy were surprised by both the number and spread of Quakerism in North 
America and how they were able to translate it into political influence in England. 
Even though what Anglicans attempted in Maryland was a continuation of what they had applied 
further south in previous years, it quickly became evident that, in the face of Quaker and Catholic 
opposition, new strategies were required. Acting upon the comments of Godwyn and others from 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 ‘Francis Nicholson to Thomas Tenison, 12 June 1696’, Fulham Papers, vol.2, fos.53–54, LPL. 
46 ‘Nicholson to Board of Trade, 27 March 1697’, CSP Col, vol.15, no.862. 
47 ‘Maryland Yearly Meeting Epistle, 1697’, LYM Epistles Received, vol.1, pp.283–285, FHL. 
48 ‘The Clergy of Maryland to Compton, 14 May 1698, Fulham Papers, vol.2, fos.100–3, LPL; Michael J. Graham, 
‘Meetinghouse and Chapel: Religion and Community in Seventeenth-Century Maryland’ in Lois Green Carr, Philip 
D. Morgan and Jean B. Russo (eds.), Colonial Chesapeake Society (1988), p.247; McCusker, ‘Colonial Statistics’, 
p.652; Rufus M. Jones, The Quakers in the American Colonies (1911), p.xvi. 
49 ‘Clergy of Maryland to Compton, undated’, ‘A Memorial Representing the present case of the Church in 
Maryland, 1698’, Fulham Papers, vol.2, fos.139–140, 183–187, LPL. 
50 The new governor Nathaniel Blackiston put this failure down to Quaker lobbying efforts: ‘Nathaniel Blackiston to 




Virginia, during 1689 Compton appointed the Scottish priest James Blair as commissary in 
Virginia, a position intended to provide a clearer organisation for Anglican clergy there.51 In 
Maryland, he did the same in 1695, appointing the priest Thomas Bray as commissary.52 Even 
before departing, Bray believed that success in Maryland would be difficult to achieve through 
existing ecclesiastical structures. A parish system was unsuitable where the majority were not 
Anglicans, and they could not match the money, resources or influence that the Quaker meeting 
structure provided.53 To resolve this problem, Bray came up with a number of different projects. 
His first was a scheme to settle a series of libraries in Maryland and eventually elsewhere, although 
these would be funded by voluntary contributions rather than directly by the Church of England.54 
A supplementary scheme was the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (SPCK), intended 
to provide books and cheap print to aid in promoting Anglican worship more generally.55 
Significantly, sometime after the failure of the first act, Bray and Compton then drew up more 
formal plans for what was effectively an extension of Bray’s voluntary contributions for parochial 
libraries into a means to fund ministers’ salaries. This endeavour they eventually called their 
Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, an Anglican missionary society, which referenced the Catholic 
missionary organisation of the same name established by Pope Gregory XV in 1622.56 Bray and 
Compton looked to projects beyond the Anglican Church as it existed at the time and, as this initial 
proposal suggests, felt the need to position it as a rival to Catholic influence globally. 
Conflating the threat posed by Quakerism in the Americas with Catholicism was especially 
important, as only a society to combat the latter could command unequivocal support from public 
authorities in England. In 1699 Bray journeyed to Maryland, where he founded libraries, preached 
across the colony and attempted to rally support for the new acts. All the while, he worked to stress 
that Quakers and Catholics had begun to blur together.57 This sentiment was expressed most 
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succinctly in his letter to Compton in 1700, in which he stressed the continuing urgency of a 
missionary society, as they risked allowing ‘ye papists as well as ye Quakers to be one’.58 Despite 
the clergy’s persistent warnings, the SPG was founded the following year through a charter 
proclaiming that its principle purpose was to combat the influence of Catholicism in the Americas, 
not work against radical dissent.59 Nevertheless, during its earliest years, the SPG dedicated much 
of its attention to converting Quakers, far more than to working against Catholic influence. There 
was, therefore, a gulf between what Anglicans intended and the motivations that public institutions 
would actually support. Bray and Compton signalled their intention to close this gap when they 
initially spoke of their project as the Protestant Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, an attempt to 
render the advance of Anglicanism synonymous with that of Protestantism in the Americas. 
Making the case that Quakerism was indistinguishable from Catholicism was thus part of this larger 
design to draw together an empire unified through common Anglicanism. Events in Pennsylvania 
during the early part of the 1690s would come to substantially aid this effort. 
*** 
The greatest ally whom Anglicans in England and Maryland were able to enlist actually came from 
the ranks of Pennsylvania’s Quakers. That person was George Keith, who triggered a schism in the 
colony during late 1691. This division not only furnished Bray’s project with a pool of potential 
converts, but also allowed Anglicans in England to argue for the danger posed by Pennsylvania, or 
‘new Rome’, as one writer called the colony. In its earliest days, the Keithian Schism grew out of 
Quaker attempts to deal with very similar challenges to those faced by Anglicans. By the 1690s, 
the considerable commercial successes of Friends in Pennsylvania, aided by the influx of goods 
from Madagascar, raised questions about how to ensure religious principles were retained when 
overseas expansion was increasingly focused on personal gain. In January 1691, their founder 
George Fox expressed this anxiety when he wrote to the colony’s leaders that ‘you are not as you 
were in the beginning [and] if God give increase, lett not your heart be sett upon it, for outward 
things are uncertain’.60 In Quaker theology, this preoccupation with ‘outward things’ was known 
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as worldliness, a vice that extended to the pursuit of status as much as material wealth. It was 
Keith’s initial concern about this form of declension that would first spark this controversy among 
his coreligionists. 
Originally from Aberdeenshire, Keith was a respected figure within Scotland’s early Quaker 
movement.61 After spending almost two decades in and out of gaol during the Restoration, by 1685 
Keith had opted, like hundreds of other Quakers from Scotland, to relocate to the Jersies.62 
Following his arrival, Keith became concerned with the need to steer his coreligionists between 
what William Penn defined as those who ‘go beyond’ into heresy and ‘stay behind’ in 
worldliness.63 Initially, he detected problems of both varieties. Writing to the London Yearly 
Meeting in 1688, he began voicing his concerns about the practices of Quakers in America, 
complaining that Ranterism was still common amongst them.64 This heterodoxy was undoubtedly 
a result of the diverse origins of Friends in Pennsylvania and the Jersies, containing members from 
across England, Scotland and Ireland as well as the Low Countries and Germany.65 Equally and as 
he subsequently made clear, Keith had misgivings about the fact that Quakers both occupied 
positions of government and tended to also be Public Friends – elders who functioned as spiritual 
leaders for the denomination.66 The occupying of political office had in the past been shunned by 
many Quakers, particularly where it required the endorsement of violence or the ‘carnal sword’ as 
they termed it.67 
Keith believed it was his duty to act against both of these trends, but he ultimately placed blame 
for the growth of heresy with the Pennsylvania’s Public Friends. Believing that the provisions 
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offered by the meeting structure were inadequate to deal with these problems, during early 1691 
Keith first published a catechism and then produced a series of proposals entitled Gospel Order 
Improved, which he presented to a meeting of Philadelphia’s religious leaders.68 It proposed 
measures like the establishment of charity schools, but also complained about heresy among 
America’s Quakers, as well as those who ‘have taken up the outward profession not from a true 
inward convincement…but some worldly interest or advantage’.69 Some of the Public Friends 
perhaps interpreted its allusions to worldliness as a criticism, and their hostility became evident 
when two of their number accused him of heresy later that year.70 Keith interpreted this as an 
attempt to silence him and responded by making his criticism more explicit, responding that they 
‘cloak heresies & errors’ and that one of their members had remarked ‘when we are Kings we are 
not to begg and pray to God’.71 Many of the colony’s Quakers supported the criticisms that Keith 
made and began attending the separate meetings he established in December 1691; thereafter, his 
adherents became popularly known as Keithians.72 Throughout the controversies that followed, 
Keithian criticisms remained consistent, arguing that the colony’s leaders cared little for doctrinal 
orthodoxy and occupied their positions purely for worldly gain. 
It was amid these attacks on the worldliness of Pennsylvania’s leaders that pirates first surfaced 
as a problem for the colony’s Quaker leaders. The question of how they should respond to the 
presence of pirates had already emerged during early 1691, when a sailor named Babbitt and his 
crew were reported to have attacked shipping on the Delaware. Quaker pacifism made this a 
difficult issue to resolve, however. In the end, the Public Friends opted to send unarmed men to 
apprehend the crew, who, upon seeing what they must have believed to be an armed militia, fled.73 
Though quickly resolved, Keith would make a great deal of capital out of this episode. He was 
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aided by the fact that the sheriff who apprehended Babbitt and the colony’s only printer took his 
side during the Schism. Their defection made him both aware of this episode and able to distribute 
his arguments in print widely as a consequence. His most incendiary tract was the Appeal from the 
Twenty Eight Judges, which criticised the colony’s leaders for endorsing violence, citing their 
response to Babbitt.74 The Public Friends deemed that this attack went beyond a matter of 
conscience to become sedition and issued a warrant for the arrest of Keith and two of his supporters. 
In the warrant, they cited that Keith had ‘Traduced and vilely misrepresented…some Magistrates 
and others here, in their late proceedings against the Privateers, [viz.] Babitt and his Crew’, with 
the Appeal in general having ‘a tendency to Sedition, and Disturbance of the Peace, as also to the 
Subversion of the Present Government’.75 Keith and a number of his followers were then arrested 
sometime in late June 1692. 
The Public Friends may not have realised it at the time, but the biggest mistake they made during 
the Schism was to have Keith prosecuted. The prosecuting lawyer cited the Appeal’s criticism of 
their response to Babbitt, as well as other personal insults from Keithians that they felt represented 
both contempt of magisterial authority and a threat to Quaker unity.76 The Keithian’s defence, 
however, began with the insistence that any insults they offered were to ‘private persons’ in 
religious meetings, and they supported this with a lengthy condemnation of the Public Friends for 
betraying their commitment to nonviolence.77 The salient point, Keith argued, was that ‘as 
Magistrates they were obliged to do what they did and it was commendable in them who did so 
commissionate and hire Men to fight’, but ‘the great Question is, Whether they did not transgress 
as they professed to be Ministers and Quakers?’78 Despite Keith’s attempt to make the trial about 
the Public Friends, it concluded in favour of the prosecution; he and one of his followers were fined 
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£6 each. Keith vowed that he would fight on, by appealing the case to the King and the London 
Yearly Meeting, eventually sailing for England in 1693.79 
In the end, Keith’s criticism of the alleged worldliness of the Public Friends had gone some way 
to proving his point. What began as a controversy ostensibly about theology quickly became about 
whether Quakers were able to reconcile their principles with holding office. The apprehension of 
pirates required that they sanction violence and broke with their pacifist commitments. Their 
response had been to attempt to silence Keith through prosecution, a course of action that could 
easily be framed as an act of religious intolerance. This prosecution would resonate with Anglican 
ambitions in two ways. First, in Pennsylvania they would later use this connection between pirates 
and Quaker nonviolence to explain the sect’s complicity on the Madagascar trade. But second and 
of more immediate concern here, they made a very vocal enemy in Keith. For critics of Quakerism 
in England, his trial presented the opportunity to claim that Quakerism was a form of popery, 
conveyed as fundamentally secular, tyrannical and intolerant of dissent. 
Keith did find supporters for his cause on his entry into London, but not amongst the Public 
Friends of the London Yearly Meeting. As early as 1692, his followers began making their case in 
England, but it was a printed account of their leader’s trial that got them widespread attention.80 It 
was distributed so widely around London and the rest of England that William Penn claimed the 
prosecution had become a national scandal.81 His willingness to continue his verbal assaults on his 
fellow Quakers eventually led the London Yearly Meeting to disown him in March 1695.82 In 
particular, the Schism and its fallout were received with glee by a collection of former Quakers in 
London, outcasts who held their own meeting in London at Harp Lane.83 There, they 
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collaboratively produced texts that combined lengthy theological critiques of Quaker writings and 
Grub Street muckraking, alongside lobbying English Parliament to take action against the Society 
of Friends.84 Keith began attending at Harp Lane sometime during 1694, but the outcasts had 
already begun to take advantage of the Schism. One of their number, Francis Bugg, integrated 
Keith’s trial into his narrative of Quakerism as popery or a ‘new Rome’ – an anti-religion seeking 
the ultimate downfall of Christianity.85 In 1695, he wrote of the Public Friends that ‘by their 
Practice in Pensilvania in 1692, they say, they will not be affronted by anybody: They will Fight 
with Guns and Swords, and Persecute (such as tell them they go from their Principles) with Fines 
and Imprisonment’.86 Keith was similarly influenced by these writers, himself coming to write of 
Quakerism as a form of popery.87 These writings initially had a relatively limited resonance with 
Anglicans in England, the outcasts having a fairly spotted reputation among Anglicans as scurrilous 
writers with obvious ulterior motives.88 
Keith’s greatest advocate turned out to be the Irish nonjuror Charles Leslie, whose struggles 
featured extensively in what became the era’s core piece of anti-Quaker polemic. His Snake in the 
Grass, published in 1696, was effectively a compendium of all writings critical of Friends from the 
past forty years, one that similarly conveyed Quakerism as a form of popery, guilty in the same 
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breath of being both essentially secular and a form of witchcraft.89 The Babbitt case and Keith’s 
prosecution had a lengthy airing in the book’s enormous introduction, and he concluded the text 
by warning warned that ‘deputies come every year from the West-Indies, and all other their 
Colonies through the World’ and that ‘such Intelligence, and Politick Institution is no where else 
to be found, but among the Jews and the Jesuits’.90 The wider influence of Leslie’s book is difficult 
to pin down precisely, but it was undoubtedly popular and especially so among Anglican clergy. It 
ran to three editions in as many years, while the sermons and writings of London’s Anglican priests 
heaped praise on the book.91 The text clearly also had an impact on Thomas Bray, who included it 
in the parochial libraries he had sent to North America, as well as the packages of books sent out 
by his voluntary organisation, the SPCK.92 By 1696, therefore, Keith had won some support among 
High Church Anglicans. 
Keith’s acceptance within the Anglican Church only grew as Compton and Bray sought support 
for their missionary project. By 1697, his preaching against the Quakers had won him the attention 
and eventual endorsement of Compton, while the following year the newly founded SPCK began 
seeking his advice on how to proceed against Friends in England.93 Both he and Francis Bugg were 
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subsequently employed by the voluntary society to attempt to convert Quakers in England.94 The 
SPCK, however, only acted as a springboard for Keith to influence the founding of the SPG in June 
1701. He attended its first recorded meeting in February 1702 and, from the start, attempted to 
direct them towards Pennsylvania.95 In three separate reports he suggested they target regions with 
high Quaker populations such as Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Long Island, 
supposedly because of their disillusionment with their leaders following the Schism.96 Eventually, 
he would also be employed as their first missionary, arriving in North America again in 1704, 
underscoring the extent to which the society’s initial work was directed against the Quakers. 
While Keith did not initially set out to secure the approval of Compton, the bishop came to 
appreciate that they shared common enemies and objectives. It was no coincidence that Keith and 
the other outcasts were initially kept at a distance by the Anglican Church, but by 1697 – the same 
time when Compton and Bray were struggling to overcome Quaker opposition in Maryland – they 
began to reach out to them. By this point, the outcasts’ arguments against Quakerism and 
particularly its association with Catholicism had become useful, given that these two Anglicans 
sought to win support for a missionary project predominantly directed against dissenters. Yet when 
Keith made the case for the SPG to direct their efforts towards Quakers in America in general and 
Pennsylvania in particular, he was pushing at an open door. Already by 1701, Anglicans in 
Pennsylvania and Maryland had for some years been interested in the divisions caused a 
consequence of the Schism and had sought to capitalise on them by tying the colony’s Quakers to 
the Madagascar trade. 
*** 
Following Keith’s departure for England in 1693, like their brethren in Maryland, Pennsylvania’s 
Quakers came to experience the advance of Anglicanism northwards out of the plantation colonies. 
Migration, alongside the conversion of the Keithians, was responsible for this change, but these 
changes had a larger North American context, being encouraged by Francis Nicholson, the 
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Governor of Maryland. His objective was to weaken the Quakers and eventually pave the way for 
missionaries once Bray’s project came into existence. When the hunt for Avery’s crew across North 
America began, it opened a new front in this contest, as Nicholson and recently arrived Anglicans 
in Philadelphia attempted to turn the scandal against its Quaker leaders. Simultaneous with the 
warnings issued from Maryland and the outcasts in England, Anglicans would use pirates to claim 
that Quaker principles, specifically their pacifism, encouraged the presence of pirates in the 
Americas. As a consequence, Quakerism could be presented as exactly the combined religious and 
commercial threat they needed. 
Soon after Keith’s departure for England, the presence of the Anglican Church in Pennsylvania 
began to grow. The remaining Keithians, leaderless after 1693, graduated towards a number of 
different sects, including the Seventh Day Baptists and the German millenarian community led by 
the mystic Johannes Kelpius.97 As early as 1695, a substantial part of their number in Pennsylvania 
also began to follow their former leader in converting to Anglicanism.98 These conversions were 
being actively promoted from Maryland, from where Nicholson spent thousands of pounds 
sponsoring trips by ministers out of his colony into Pennsylvania and New Jersey.99 The first 
congregation formed in Philadelphia during 1695, and, owing to a substantial donation from 
Nicholson, construction of what became Christ Church in Philadelphia was finished the following 
year.100 This congregation initially comprised many converted Keithians from Chester County, 
Pennsylvania but also merchants and landowners who had arrived from the Caribbean or the 
plantation colonies of the South. Jasper Yeates and Robert Quarry, for instance, both came from 
the Carolinas, while the aforementioned Robert Snead migrated via Jamaica.101 This group 
remained in persistent contact with Nicholson from the early 1690s, but also expanded their 
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networks to include Henry Compton after 1697.102 Distinct from what historians describe as the 
“Anglican-dominated” lower three counties of Pennsylvania, these new arrivals came specifically 
intending to wrestle control of the colony from the Quakers. They represented Anglicanism spilling 
out of the plantation colonies, and, as had been the case in Jamaica during the 1680s, they believed 
that driving pirates from the colony would aid them in seeking control. 
Just as Francis Nicholson promoted the growth of this community, he was also the first to 
connect Quakers with the Madagascar trade. In June 1691, he claimed that their growth in the 
Americas presented a danger, as they were both pacifists and Jacobites, both facts that made them 
vulnerable to French attacks.103 The following year he also picked up on the Babbitt case, claiming 
in July that pirates had become drawn to the region, as the Keithian Schism had facilitated a 
collapse in government authority.104 The case he would later make was an amalgamation of these 
two arguments. During 1695, Nicholson complained to the Lords of Trade that Quakers received 
goods from Madagascar pirates, but as with his previous case, this claim gained no traction. This 
situation changed in early 1696, when Avery’s crew named Pennsylvania as somewhere they had 
previously traded.105 Nicholson then began gathering evidence of these links to send to the newly 
formed Board of Trade. An Anglican from Philadelphia, Francis Jones, gathered testimonies on his 
behalf, emphasising in a letter of August 1696 that Quakers there traded openly for stolen coins 
and east India goods emanating from Madagascar.106 He also described an episode in which 
Anglican magistrates in Philadelphia had appealed to Maryland for helping capture the pirate 
Captain Day and his crew, but this plan was scuppered when the men were disarmed and the 
suspected pirates released.107 In an inversion of what Keith had argued in the case of Babbitt during 
1691, therefore, Nicholson began to build a case that Quaker nonviolence was itself the cause of 
the Madagascar trade. 
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Pennsylvania’s Anglicans worked vociferously in the following years to reinforce this 
connection first made by Nicholson. From 1696 one of their number, the former Governor of South 
Carolina, Robert Quary, began supplying evidence of Quaker participation in the Madagascar trade 
to the Board, claiming that they had grown enormously wealthy as a result.108 For his initial efforts, 
Quary was awarded the title of Admiralty Judge for the newly established Vice-Admiralty Court 
in Pennsylvania, but he sought further measures to bolster his influence.109 In early 1697, he sailed 
for England, seeking to further convince the Board of Quaker complicity and to make connections 
that would aid the expansion of Anglicanism in the colony. After arriving in London, he met with 
Compton, and, while what they discussed is unclear, he was able to secure an Anglican priest for 
Philadelphia.110 Quary then attended a meeting of the Board of Trade in November 1697, 
presenting all the evidence he had been able to gather on Pennsylvania’s connections to the Indian 
Ocean. In a preface, he hints at how he framed the evidence to the Board, asserting that: ‘As long 
as the Government is in the hands of Quakers, as it is, it must be expected that pirates and unlawful 
traders will still be encouraged’, as ‘they may come for there is none to oppose them, here being 
no militia nor even power to raise any’.111 
On his return to Pennsylvania in July 1698, Quary began to use Quaker trade with pirates to 
argue more directly of the dangers he believed that the denomination posed. As was the case across 
the Americas, his attempts to prosecute captured pirates in Pennsylvania yielded few results, as the 
accused were persistently either broken out of jail or acquitted by juries.112 To explain this failure 
to the Board, he began to much more explicitly blame Quaker beliefs. In September he reported 
that the colony’s Friends resisted his efforts because a successful prosecution would serve to deter 
traders coming from the Indian Ocean. His explanation here came with a reference to Leslie, 
claiming that ‘I am confident that the cloven foote and snake in the grass cannot bee hid from your 
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lordship’s wisdom’.113 He pressed further in December. Like Nicholson, he claimed that secret 
Jacobite allegiances lay behind their cooperation with pirates, an accusation he supported by 
recounting a Pennsylvania Vice-Admiralty Court session in which one of the public friends and 
the colony’s attorney general, David Lloyd, was said to mock an effigy of William III to the 
amusement of the Quaker jury.114 Quary’s final piece of evidence was Pennsylvania’s 1698 Act for 
the Preventing of Frauds and Regulating of Abuses in Trade, which the colony’s assembly had 
been ordered to pass by the Board, but omitted the word armed, leaving justices, sheriffs and 
constables unable to apprehend any of the sailors who arrived from Madagascar.115 
By 1699, a substantial case had been constructed that Quaker beliefs in general and their pacifism 
in particular had driven trade with pirates in Pennsylvania. The three strands that facilitated the 
creation of missionary Anglicanism in 1701 were now clearly visible and began to converge. The 
first involved Anglican experiences in Maryland, which had stressed the danger posed by a pact 
between Friends and Catholics, an experience that was formative for Bray’s project. The second 
was the influence of Keith and the other outcasts, who readily supplied supporting accounts of 
Quaker crypto-popery in England and a pool of initial converts in Pennsylvania. Lastly, 
Pennsylvania’s Anglicans supplied a commercial dimension to the creation of missionary 
Anglicanism, providing evidence that Quaker pacifism served to encourage pirates. Over the course 
of the following three years, it would be this final context that would fuel efforts to not just aid the 
SPG’s formation, but to launch an attempt, through legislation, to begin unifying of English 
colonies in the Americas under common Anglicanism. 
*** 
As the challenges posed by the Schism eventually gave way to the prospect of an emergent 
missionary Anglicanism, Pennsylvania’s Quakers used their transatlantic meeting structure to 
organise a defence. In the first instance, they prepared to safeguard their membership from 
Anglican proselytes, but they were forced to take further steps when they became implicated in the 
Madagascar trade. Initially, Quaker leaders did not appreciate that the two were related, but they 
soon came to realise that a larger Anglican design was afoot. Their own investigations made these 
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motives plain, a perception that was then vindicated when a Bill was initiated in England’s 
Parliament to rescind all non-royal colonial charters. Public Friends viewed this act as a sleight of 
hand, in which commerce was a mere pretext to impose the Anglican faith across Stuart dominions 
in the Americas. They then began mobilising their lobbying machinery and accumulating evidence 
to fight its passage. 
The initial Quaker reaction to both the Schism and Nicholson’s support for his coreligionists in 
Pennsylvania was to begin instituting a programme of reforms not unlike those that Keith initially 
proposed. As early as 1692, Maryland’s Public Friends warned that divisions in Pennsylvania could 
be exploited by their opponents in the neighbouring colony, who already openly spoke of such 
plans.116 During the course of 1694, with Keith now in England, the Public Friends began to 
coordinate with the London Yearly Meeting to take measures that would strengthen the 
commitment of their members. A host of proposals were disseminated across the monthly and 
quarterly meetings in Pennsylvania to keep a check on creeping worldliness and heresy.117 From 
1695 onward, individuals were appointed throughout the colony to ensure that orthodox beliefs 
were upheld among Friends and taught in schools quickly established across the colony’s 
counties.118 These efforts were supplemented by increased circulation of print refuting the 
arguments of Keith, Leslie and Bugg, as well as writings detailing “orthodox” opinions.119 If the 
flow of texts rose sharply, so did the exchange of people. Dozens more travelling friends were also 
sent to the Americas to assist in both mediating the Schism and ensuring greater adherence to 
orthodox Quaker principles.120 As a consequence, formal disciplines and disownments rose across 
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the later 1690s, as the colony’s Public Friends began to exercise increasing control over the 
behaviour of its members.121 The Society of Friends in America, therefore, underwent a period of 
experimentation similar in many ways to that which the Anglican Church underwent, seeking to 
address the issues raised by the Schism and a projected expansion of Anglicanism. 
Yet these were not measures that could protect the Society of Friends from the news that they 
were complicit in trade with pirates. As the accounts of Quary and Nicholson arrived in London, 
Pennsylvania’s founder William Penn was placed under increasing pressure to take action. He first 
wrote to chastise Pennsylvania’s Public Friends for not doing more to curb Quaker participation in 
the Madagascar trade following Quary’s presentation of evidence to the Board in July 1697.122 
Penn initially saw the proof offered as evidence of the growing worldliness among Friends in 
Pennsylvania, suggesting proclamations against vice to the colony’s Public Friends, including the 
closer monitoring of taverns and stricter punishments for all forms of immoral behaviour.123 At the 
same time, he was wary of the threat they faced from the Anglican Church. Penn believed that the 
association served to encourage the efforts of Keith, Leslie and Compton, all of whom he believed 
were working with Tory MPs, William Blathwayt in particular, to secure the passage of an Act in 
English Parliament rescinding Pennsylvania’s charter.124 This idea had been proposed as early as 
1695 by Edward Randolph but, by 1698, had not yet been formally presented.125 With evidence 
growing of Quaker sponsoring of pirates, in January 1698 and under pressure from the Board of 
Trade, Parliament and the Privy Council, Penn was ordered to travel to Pennsylvania and resolve 
the problem himself. The Quaker leader, therefore, appreciated the potential of the scandal to 
advance Compton and Bray’s plans, but did not yet understand that it had been engineered for their 
benefit. 
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Penn finally arrived back in Pennsylvania in December 1699, where he soon came to realise how 
Anglicans had used the Madagascar trade against his coreligionists. In his first few months there, 
Penn aided Quary, having the current governor and attorney general dismissed and ensuring bills 
were drafted to suppress pirates and illegal trade.126 Penn also helped with the hunt for William 
Kidd’s crew, who were filtering back to North America. He helped to secure the capture of the 
ship’s surgeon Robert Bradenham, dutifully sending the sailors and his east India goods to 
England.127 By February, however, he began to develop misgivings about the investigations. In a 
letter to the Earl of Bellomont, he remarked on how he was overseeing the arrest of poor farmers, 
many of whom had been pardoned before and against whom the evidence was generally scant.128 
He also came to understand that sailors arrived from Madagascar into neighbouring Maryland as 
well, placing some pressure upon Quary’s claim that it was Pennsylvania’s Quakers in particular 
who drew them to the region.129 During the month of March, Penn witnessed a session of the Vice-
Admiralty Court where two men, named as Churchill and Stowe, stood accused of piracy and 
assaulting a customs officer.130 What intrigued Penn here, however, was the jury. According to 
Quary, Friends packed juries with their coreligionists, who would always vote for an acquittal, yet 
at the trial of Churchill and Stowe the majority of the jury were Anglicans and Lutherans. Both 
men walked free, and Penn found it remarkable that the Quakers were taking the blame for these 
trials failing to secure a prosecution.131 His most significant discovery was still to come, however. 
Back in April, he had found the rector of the Philadelphia’s Anglican church drinking with 
Bradenham, Kidd’s surgeon who Penn had formerly arrested. His subsequent trial in England had 
revealed that he had used the rector as a broker for his stolen goods, evidence that Penn was only 
too happy to supply to the Board of Trade. Penn claimed that the priest would ‘inveigh against the 
Quakers for their being too tame and easy too pirates…while he himself at the same time stood 
possest of a pirates treasure’.132 He demanded that Compton and Nicholson take responsibility for 
securing Portlock’s arrest, the priest having since fled to Maryland, as well as for an immediate 
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investigation being held into Pennsylvania’s Anglicans.133 In less than a year, Penn successfully 
unpicked the evidence supporting the case that Quakerism was particularly to blame for the 
Madagascar trade. Yet his discoveries would have little immediate impact in England, where the 
Resumption Bill was already progressing through Parliament, supported by evidence gathered 
previously in Pennsylvania. 
The Resumption Bill was intended to annul all private and proprietary charters, converting them 
into royal colonies. During 1698, efforts were already underway to lay the groundwork and ensure 
that, in law, sponsoring pirates and illegal trade was sufficient grounds to annul colonial charters. 
That year members of the Board of Trade, in which William Blathwayt was now dominant 
following Locke’s retirement, worked to ensure the passage of a new anti-piracy act through 
English Parliament, the Act for the more effectual suppression of Piracy, finally passing on 23 
March 1700.134 The actual contents of the revised Act hint that its objective was to support 
resumption, it stipulating that failing to act against pirates was grounds to rescind a colonial 
charter.135 This provision alarmed Penn, who understood that Pennsylvania’s was now in ‘danger 
of being quo warranto’d by the late act against piracy’.136 On 26 March, just three days after the 
passage of the Piracy Act, members of the Board introduced the Resumption Bill to Parliament, 
citing widespread illegal trade and ‘the great countenance given to pirates in some of the 
plantations, and chiefly in the proprieties and charter-governments’.137 Indeed, the initial evidence 
given to the Commons was arranged to disproportionately convey these colonies as encouraging 
trade with the Indian Ocean and Pennsylvania most of all. They also had space in their evidence 
for criticism of how Bellomont had behaved in the northeast and his handling of the Madagascar 
trade there.138 There was, of course, no mention of religion in the evidence presented, the Board 
being at pains to demonstrate that the act was about issues of law and commercial regulation. 
The formal efforts to influence parliamentarians, however, stress how much the act was about a 
larger plan to impose Anglicanism throughout the Americas. In February 1701, the London 
Meeting for Sufferings began making efforts opposing the legislation on the grounds that it was 
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part of an attempt to roll back religious toleration.139 Quary was recalled to present evidence to 
Parliament after the act was proposed in earnest on 29 March, and Penn wrote that his inclusion 
confirmed that the efforts were the work of ‘ye Bishop of London and Comr. Blathwayt’.140 By 
this time, supporters of the missionary project had already been seeking to influence the MPs who 
would vote on the Act’s passage. Thomas Bray was back in England by this point and set about 
promoting his missionary society in print, claiming that the establishment of Anglicanism across 
North America would combat Catholicism and Quakerism, as well as promoting trade.141 Publicly, 
a number of Quakers made their own case in reply, arguing that any attempts towards establishment 
had nothing to do with commerce, but were instead renewed persecution.142 At the same time, the 
SPCK had been sending large numbers of writings by Keith and the other outcasts as well as copies 
of Snake in the Grass to MPs, with Quaker writers consistently working to publish replies.143 
The strategy of the Society of Friends, therefore, was to refute the claim that the Act was a purely 
commercial measure and make plain its religious dimension. During March, the Meeting for 
Sufferings began appointing Public Friends to lobby and delay the Bill, alongside drafting petitions 
to William III and blanketing MPs with printed material emphasising the sufferings of the Quakers 
during the Restoration.144 Their first concerted attempt to disrupt the Act’s passage came when it 
reached the House of Lords. On 11 May 1701, Quary presented his list of the evidence submitted 
to the House, which included letters from Nicholson, Jones, Snead, himself and even early letters 
by Penn, alongside a testimony from Pennsylvania’s Anglicans collectively complaining that the 
pacifism of Friends encouraged pirates.145 The later letters written by Penn reporting the complicity 
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of Pennsylvania’s Anglicans in the Madagascar trade were conspicuously absent.146 This was an 
omission that the Quakers had already anticipated. William Penn Jr had already testified the day 
before Quary’s evidence was presented to the House of Lords, that he and the Board of Trade were 
suppressing evidence of Anglican complicity. Some days later, he provided the additional material 
sent over by his father.147 It was not just London’s Quakers who were moved to oppose the Act, 
with the very coalition of dissenters and Catholics that Bray had warned about coming out to 
oppose it. Agents spoke on behalf of Congregationalists in Connecticut, Catholics in Maryland and 
Quakers in Rhode Island, and they were also joined by the proprietors of the Carolinas.148 The 
arguments offered by these combined interests were given publicly in a pamphlet of that same year, 
which argued that resumption would actually harm trade, as well as reducing the rights of 
dissenters.149 Flooding the Lords with arguments, evidence and speakers proved an effective 
strategy, pushing the vote forwards until after Parliament’s summer recess.150 
Across the summer, Penn began to coordinate a more decisive reply to the evidence that Quary 
had presented about Quaker trade with pirates. In June 1701, Penn wrote to his agent, Charles 
Lawton, detailing a strategy for how they could do so. He proposed that they argue Pennsylvania 
had never encouraged trade with Madagascar and that, in fact, Maryland under Nicholson had 
participated with far more enthusiasm.151 During August, the London Yearly Meeting received this 
letter, along with additional evidence Penn sent of Anglican involvement in the Madagascar 
trade.152 His London agent was also instructed to hold talks with other North American dissenters 
on turning the Madagascar trade against the Anglicans, claiming that ‘if this were well insinuated 
to the chief of the Presbyterians, Independents and Baptists methinks they would see the common 
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cause’.153 By the time that Parliament resumed in the autumn, therefore, members were poised to 
nullify any renewed attempt to pass the Bill by further emphasising that it was a predominantly 
religious matter, rather than a commercial issue. 
Fortunately for London’s Quakers and their allies, two events occurred before Parliament sat 
once again. First, William Kidd was executed on 18 May 1701, in what was a symbolic victory 
over the Madagascar trade, and second, war erupted two months later on 9 July. When MPs 
resumed with now altered priories, both Compton and the Board of Trade struggled to keep the 
case they had initially made relevant. To do so, they attempted to repurpose it as a wartime measure, 
shifting their arguments from trade to defence. In January 1702, Blathwayt put to the Commons 
his complaints about North American plantations, in which propriety and private colonies no longer 
stood accused of entertaining pirates but of being defenceless.154 A similar address followed to the 
House of Lords on 16 February.155 At the same time, Pennsylvania’s Anglicans attempted to make 
their voices heard once again.156 Their complaints now predominantly related to liberty of 
conscience, asserting that the colony’s Quaker leaders had formerly used the judiciary to oppress 
dissidents and advocates of the Church of England.157 Only Quary continued to supply reports of 
Quaker failure to deal with pirates, but also began to shift his emphasis to defence. He wrote to the 
Board of Trade that Anglicans ‘have lately felt the fatal effects of their being thus naked and 
defenceless, having been most barberously robbed and plundered by pirates’.158 Despite their 
renewed efforts, the Bill was not considered seriously again by Parliament, and by May it 
disappeared as a consideration altogether. Penn was delighted with the outcome, voicing his 
satisfaction that Quary’s as well as Compton’s ‘mountain would now become a molehill’.159 
As Pennsylvania’s founder knew well, this Act had represented a particular moment in which an 
Anglican empire could have come into being. Bray’s missionary project would have ensured a 
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supply of ministers to royal colonies where sympathetic governors worked to pass supporting 
legislation. Bellomont’s successor in New York, the Tory Edward Hyde, was a case study in what 
they had in mind, a man who oversaw the installing of Anglican missionaries across the colony, 
drafted laws for their benefit and clamped down on dissenters.160 Complaints that the Quakers were 
growing in strength in the Americas or were as one with Catholics were made publicly and in 
private, persuading some Anglicans of the need to act. Yet alone these arguments were not enough 
to secure public sanction, and it took the connection of Quakers to pirates, made by Pennsylvania’s 
Anglicans, to make the case for it. In the end, not just the Society of Friends, but other American 
dissenters worked against this legislation by confessionalising it, stripping back the commercial 
veneer to reveal the religious motivations beneath. Even under the reign of Queen Anne, a monarch 
considerably more loyal to the Church of England, no such legislation would be proposed again. 
*** 
This chapter has traced how an emerging transatlantic coalition of Anglicans created and sought to 
capitalise on the scandal of Quaker trade with pirates. This coalition initially did so not out of any 
particular concern for suppressing criminality, but to aid the formation of a missionary society, an 
organisation intended as one step in the creation of an empire unified by common Anglicanism. 
The missionary project itself was first imagined by the clergyman Thomas Bray as a response to 
the failure of his coreligionists in seeking to overcome the resistance of Quakers and Catholics in 
Maryland. It was events in the neighbouring colony of Pennsylvania that further strengthened 
Bray’s plan. The Schism that George Keith fomented there cracked the facade of Quaker unity, 
suggesting a pool of potential converts in the form of Quakers disaffected with their spiritual and 
political leaders. Keith’s subsequent attacks on his former coreligionists as crypto-papists only 
further substantiated the argument that his former followers presented a great opportunity for the 
Anglican Church. 
Yet it was the connection between Quakers and pirates made by Pennsylvania’s Anglicans that 
served to amplify the scheme’s potential. Conflating Quaker religious principles with deviant 
commercial practices allowed this emergent transatlantic network of Anglicans to seek a legislative 
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underpinning for their faith’s establishment across the Americas. Their common interest 
materialised in the form of the Resumption Bill, which the Anglican clergy and its supporters 
believed to be a major step in bringing their vision of an Anglican empire into being. In the climate 
of religious toleration in England after 1688, the arguments they and their sypathisers on the Board 
of Trade advanced in the Bill’s favour had to be largely commercial. As a result, they focused upon 
illegal trade with pirates in the proprietary and private colonies, regions of North America that just 
so happened to hold the majority of North America’s dissenters. Quaker resolve to oppose the Act 
was strengthened by William Penn’s own discoveries of Anglican trade with pirates in 
Pennsylvania, while the Quakers mobilised their own transatlantic networks against the legislation. 
In cooperation with other dissenting groups, they were then able to successfully confessionalise 
the debates surrounding the Bill and aid in its eventual defeat. 
George Keith arrived back in North America in 1704, disembarking at Boston harbour on 14 
June. This time, he came as a missionary for the SPG, intent on targeting his former followers 
throughout Pennsylvania and New Jersey for conversion, believing that an Anglican resurgence 
was still possible. Within four years, however, he was on a ship back to England, disappointed with 
his rather limited success; he lamented that the Quakers had been ‘misled and prejudiced by their 
leaders (and) seemed too generally reject my labour of love’.161 Keith, like other Anglican clergy 
in this period, had to adjust to the fact that they had not initially succeeded in making the case that 
their objectives were inherently beneficial to commercial gain, and that, rather than bending trade 
to their will, they, like their adversaries in the Society of Friends, now had to take their place within 
the Atlantic ‘marketplace of religion’.162 Nevertheless, this position was an improvement for the 
Anglican Church. The SPG provided Compton and others within the episcopate a means to 
successfully expand their flock in North America, seeing them secure thousands of converts in the 
following decade. The scandal of Quaker trade with pirates may not have facilitated the dramatic 
resurgence they imagined, but it did place them on an even footing with their dissenting opponents. 
In a sense, these events did see religious denominations in the Atlantic come to accord more closely 
with commerce. Greater circulation of missionaries saw confessions begin to spill beyond their 
traditionally established borders, be they in New England, Maryland or Pennsylvania. A freer 
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movement of preachers facilitated a greater diversity of Protestant belief within anglophone 




V: The Assada Projects, Pirates and East India Companies, 1688–
1707 
Sometime in February 1682, a merchant ship appeared off the coast of the Island of Mozambique, 
part of an ill-fated venture to procure slaves for the sugar plantations of Barbados.1 The Old London 
carried a crew under the employ of the EIC, and its cargo comprised highly valuable bars of gold 
and silver. Putting ashore, the sailors proceeded to buy over a hundred unfortunate captives from 
either Bantu or Portuguese merchants, conducting the exchange out of sight of the nearby Estado 
da Índia fort. They believed such caution was necessary as, should they be discovered, officials on 
the island would surely enforce their prohibition on other Europeans trading there. The voyage 
ended in dramatic fashion soon thereafter. Immediately following its departure for the Caribbean, 
the Old London’s interpreter, a Swahili speaker originally from the region, instigated an uprising 
among the slaves aboard, killing several of the English crew before casting the ship’s officers 
adrift.2 Driven again to the coast, these remaining EIC sailors quickly fell into the hands of the 
Portuguese authorities, but from here the story develops further significant details. The vessel’s 
captain, Samuel Davis, was transported to Goa for trial, but, when he finally set foot on the Indian 
Subcontinent some months later, he found that additional criminal charges awaited him. Witnesses 
at Goa asserted that he was guilty of piracy, having allegedly robbed a Portuguese merchant vessel 
twelve years previously.3 At the same time, there are indications that the uprising on the Old 
London was premeditated. Shortly after gaining control of the ship, the Bantu sailors transferred 
the bullion they had acquired to another English vessel, the Firebrass of London, which was funded 
by the EIC’s opponents in the capital. Both vessels then disappear from the Company’s records, a 
brief, if dramatic glimpse of life in the Indian Ocean often obscured to historians.4 
On the southeastern coast of Africa, each of these crews came seeking a means to bridge the 
trade of the Atlantic and Indian oceans. Across the seventeenth century, sailors from around the 
anglophone world came to this region intent on linking the two most lucrative trades that they 
knew: plantation goods from the Caribbean and luxury goods from the east. Yet, as the case of 
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Davis demonstrates, many European companies claimed the right to control this chokepoint and 
were keen to prosecute interlopers. This impediment made this aspiration difficult to realise, but 
nevertheless would-be colonisers continued to try. 
Madagascar and its surrounding islands became connecting points of special interest for early 
modern Europeans. The promotional literature for one colonial project there, intending for the 
island of Nosy Be, called their prospective settlement Assada and enthused about the great riches 
it would bring. Recounting a meeting between an English sailor and one of the island’s Malagasy 
rulers some years previous, the tract described how this king allegedly presented the sailor with a 
shipment he had recently received. It apparently included ‘treasure, which was a Massy Silver 
Staffe, some peeces of Eight, peeces of cloth of Gold, of Sattin and silke stuffes, Arabian Coates, 
which the Arabians brought from India, being bought of them for Ambergreese, Tortle-shels’. Not 
only did this lucrative trade sit untapped by Europeans, but the Malagasy king ‘invited our men to 
come againe, and promised all his Country should be at their command’.5 Into the later seventeenth 
century, this same image of “Assada” endured, being a settlement on, or around, Madagascar, from 
which settlers would be able to buy slaves to trade into the Americas, source bullion from 
continental Africa or the Red Sea and traffic goods from India as well as East Asia. In other words, 
they imagined Madagascar could become an entrepôt linking east and west. One successful 
instance of this project was instituted by migrants from the Americas during the later 1680s on St 
Maries (Nosy Boraha), which, of course, became notorious in England and North America as a hub 
for pirates.6 Yet, the application of this label had something in common with the fate of Davies 
when he attempted to trade at Mozambique. It was first applied by the EIC as a means to eliminate 
competition, rather than as a means to restrain robbery at sea. 
The hunting of pirates by the EIC constituted just one dispute over this project’s realisation and 
was part of a contest between rival east India companies, which stretched over many decades. An 
entrepôt at Madagascar was attempted by Stuart subjects at least three times before 1707, first by 
the Assada Company in the later 1640s, then by colonists from the Americas during the 1680s and, 
finally, by the Company of Scotland after 1701. Each instance came when political support for the 
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EIC’s monopoly appeared to be ebbing away in England and, in the latter two cases, rivalries 
resulted in criminal prosecutions. 
Madagascar was of especial interest to prospective colonisers in England and Scotland, because 
they viewed it as a strategic chokepoint between the Atlantic and Indian oceans. By the mid-
seventeenth century, the experiences of Stuart subjects in both maritime spaces differed 
substantially. In the former, they flocked predominantly to the Caribbean, seeking precious metals 
and plantation goods, or entered the region as unfree workers. In the case of the Indian Ocean, they 
instead had to accord with established and cosmopolitan practices of exchange in the basin’s many 
port-polities. This separation had been given legal form by Elizabeth I when she issued a charter 
establishing the EIC in 1600. The document stated that the Cape of Good Hope would be the barrier 
between these two oceanic systems, a division that ensured trade flows from both oceans were 
directed into England. Yet, as the Americas were colonised by people from England, Scotland and 
Ireland during the seventeenth century, maintaining this boundary became a recurring challenge 
for the EIC. Global flow of bullion from production centres in the Americas to eventual sinks in 
China and the Indian Ocean had little practical need to be channeled through Europe, and the same 
was true for the people and goods that followed them. As a result, Madagascar was a natural point 
of convergence in a way a port like London was not. Merchant opponents of the EIC came to see 
Madagascar as well situated for a lucrative colonial venture, it being a project that would help break 
the Company’s monopoly and, with it, the legal barrier to freer movement between the two oceans. 
Controlling this chokepoint, therefore, allowed prospective colonisers a level of control over how 
far economic and socio-cultural practices unique to each maritime space were transferred to the 
other. 
The following chapter will be divided into four sections. The first sketches the period preceding 
1688, beginning with an outline of how national monopoly companies formed as a response to the 
particular circumstances of Indian Ocean trade, with piracy prosecutions emerging as one means 
by which companies enforced jurisdiction. It then demonstrates how the English followed this same 
pattern when they entered trade with the east, stressing the emerging role of Madagascar in two 
competing visions for its organisation, articulated by the Assada Company and, later, the EIC 
president, Josiah Child. The second part focuses on how the two were placed in direct competition 
during the 1690s. Initially, it follows how advocates of a regulated company in England used the 




by migrants from the Americas, considered as a realisation of the entrepôt imagined by the Assada 
Company some years earlier. Against its decaying monopoly and the formation of a rival Company 
in Scotland, the EIC had to respond, and it did so by denouncing the St Maries colonists as pirates 
to reassert the necessity of monopoly rule. The third section details the attempt of the Company of 
Scotland to institute this same project. It recovers their plan to assume control over the St Maries 
colony, a scheme that quickly became entangled in jurisdictional disputes with the New EIC, 
precipitating one further piracy trial. The final part then examines the trial of the New EIC captain 
Thomas Green for piracy in Edinburgh. The prosecution mirrored the prosecution of William Kidd 
four years earlier, challenging the Company’s right to control transoceanic movements through a 
monopoly and asserting the rights of Stuart subjects to conduct free trade into the east. Finally, it 
traces how members of the EIC responded, sowing so much discord between England and Scotland 
over the trial that it made a conclusive case for the further reassertion of an English monopoly, 
expressed finally through Anglo–Scottish Union in 1707. 
Tracing this larger context to the EIC’s campaign against pirates contributes to three separate 
areas of historiography. First of all, it engages with recent work on early modern pirates. For the 
most part, these works remain confined to the Atlantic and do not consider events around and 
beyond Cape Horn in any great detail.7 Exceptions include Robert Ritchie, who has similarly 
viewed the pursuit of pirates as a strategy by the EIC and, more recently, Kevin McDonald, who 
has fleshed out the details of Madagascar’s links to New York.8 Yet the approach here demonstrates 
that the Company’s efforts against pirates had a far longer history than is popularly realised. Events 
like the prosecution of William Kidd were not isolated occurrences, but part of an ongoing 
competition between rival visions of how connected the two oceans should be, a debate that 
extended beyond England. Secondly, it speaks to histories of the Indian Ocean littoral, which have, 
in recent years, come to challenge older perceptions that it was an initially pacific maritime space 
made violent by Europeans.9 As part of this revision, scholars have come to take an interest in 
earlier instances of maritime predation and, as a result, to be interested in prosecution of Hindu and 
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Muslim sailors as pirates from the early eighteenth century. The work of Lakshmi Subramanian is 
most notable here.10 To these studies, this chapter adds detail on how Europeans themselves came 
to accord with these existing practices, as well as highlighting that piracy prosecutions in the Indian 
Ocean were first honed among Europeans before then being applied to other peoples. Lastly, it 
contributes to the scholarship on Anglo–Scottish Union. Writing on the Union of 1707 has tended 
to downplay the significance of trade with the east in driving the process, a tendency recently 
criticised by Andrew Mackillop.11 This chapter adds to this debate by elevating the significance of 
the trial of Thomas Green in driving Union, it being a component of the process oriented around 
the question of trade with the east. In a sense it restores this emphasis, as Green’s execution was 
emphasised in the very first history of Anglo–Scottish Union by Daniel Defoe, although it has since 
been downplayed.12 
*** 
The engagement of Europeans with the Indian Ocean initially proceeded very differently to 
overseas expansion in the Atlantic. Early expeditions out of Europe deployed similarly violent 
strategies, but were unable to seize large swathes of territory as they did in the Americas. Instead, 
they seized a scattering of port towns or came to be confined to enclaves within those that proved 
more resilient. European sovereigns responded to this pattern by creating corporate entities with 
state-like characteristics, allocated monopolies and intended to organise flows of people and goods 
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between Europe and the east. Such bodies were by no means unusual during the early modern 
period, and their members were predominantly traders, but with shifting responsibilities for the 
administration of justice, diplomacy, warfare, religious life and taxation.13 These companies 
quickly came to function as intermediaries, required to adhere to local laws and traditions, as well 
as appearing to serve the interests of distant European sovereigns. Yet they were also buffers, 
preventing the markedly more cosmopolitan practices of exchange common to the Indian Ocean 
from feeding back into the Atlantic. The ability to punish interlopers and convince audiences in 
Europe of its effectiveness as intermediaries became essential for any successful monopoly, an 
objective that piracy prosecutions came to form an important part in achieving. This dynamic was 
no different when English sailors, colonists and traders first began to move eastwards. The EIC 
itself had to weather the opposition of established companies, especially accusations that they acted 
as pirates. These were strategies they would themselves come to deploy in order to protect their 
monopoly from fellow subjects as they arose to challenge it during the late seventeenth century. 
The Portuguese founded the first company-state and, in the process, set the terms upon which 
European sovereigns sought to manage engagement with the Indian Ocean thereafter. By the 
fifteenth century, it was a maritime space chequered with trade networks already many hundred 
years old, extending from Cairo to Canton (Guangzhou) and Calicut (Kozhikode) to Mombasa. 
These routes carried luxury goods, such as silks, spices, ivory and slaves, and did so stepwise 
through the ocean’s innumerable port-polities.14 Over the centuries, cosmopolitan communities of 
predominantly Islamic merchants had formed in these towns to facilitate trade, but the Ocean was 
neither as pacific nor as tolerant as this description might suggest.15 Writing in the mid-fourteenth 
century, the Moroccan sailor Ibn Battūtah remarked that the Maldives were often raided by ‘the 
robbers and thieves of India’, while whenever ‘the war-vessels of the infidel Hindus pass by these 
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island, they take whatsoever they can find, without being resisted by anyone’.16 Upon their entry 
into the Indian Ocean during the late fifteenth century, the Portuguese initially replicated and 
expanded these more predatory practices, viewing the basin through the more reified confessional 
lens of the Mediterranean.17 Some Islamic polities responded in kind, but, across the sixteenth 
century, cooperation rather than crusade came to offer greater rewards.18 The employees of the 
Estado da Índia, the body established in 1505 and charged with organising flows of bullion out of 
Iberia into the east, began to adjust to the cosmopolitanism that underpinned Indian Ocean trade. 
At Mozambique, for instance, Mestiço populations gradually established themselves as Prazos – 
rulers of landed chiefdoms – becoming brokers between the Ocean and the African Continent, 
while similar positions were held by Luso-Indian populations in and around Goa.19 An initially 
violent entry into the Indian Ocean allowed the Portuguese to carve a place for themselves 
somewhere that would have otherwise been closed to them, before then giving way to 
accommodation with existing trading practices, managed by a monopoly company to ensure the 
enormous rewards this trade brought were channeled northwards into Europe. 
By the seventeenth century, other Europeans followed after Portuguese explorers, merchants and 
sailors in seeking to organise trade with the east, a threat that the Estado da Índia sought to contain. 
By this point, the flow of goods around Cape Horn had served to make Iberia extraordinarily 
wealthy. Following the union of the crowns of Spain and Portugal in 1580, Philip III claimed 
control over 80% of the world’s gold and silver supply, drawn from production centres in the 
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Americas, before being directed into Cadiz and Manilla.20 Flows of bullion served to supercharge 
the economy of the Indian Ocean, allowing the Iberian Peninsula to flourish but producing 
comparative shortages of specie elsewhere.21 At the beginning of the century, Dutch sailors also 
began venturing eastwards and, after 1602, did so under the employ of their own corporate 
monopoly, the newly-formed VOC. Halting the military efforts of the Dutch, then at war with the 
House of Habsburg, required that the Estado da Índia break new legal ground. Papal sanction as 
well as the treaties of Tordesillas and Zaragoza forbade the presence of these newcomers in the 
east, as was the case in the Atlantic.22 Borrowing from Spanish practice, the Portuguese began 
charging Dutch sailors they captured with piracy, the first being the crew of Jacob Corneliszoon 
Van Neck, who were executed for the crime en masse at Canton in 1602.23 The VOC again stood 
accused of piracy in 1603 following the capture of the Santa Caterina near Hong Kong by Jacob 
van Heemskerk and likewise with the capture of the silver-laden Santo António two years later.24 
The Amsterdam High Court of Admiralty declared these seizures legal on 4 September 1604, and 
in so doing it asserted the right of the VOC to operate in the east. This episode inspired Hugo 
Grotius to forward the more formal case for the verdict in his De Iure Praedae. In the text, he laid 
out the Company’s rights in international law, claiming that it had a right to defend itself in reprisal 
against a hostile foreign power, an argument developed in his published pamphlet Mare liberum in 
1609.25 In the following decades, the VOC would expand aggressively at the expense of the Estado 
da Índia, before similarly coming to find their place in the Ocean’s port towns and coming to accord 
with existing Indian Ocean trade practices. 
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The case of these two corporate bodies offers a template for how the jurisdiction of monopoly 
companies would be challenged and defended in future. Newcomers came seeking to break into 
existing markets, either by trading in disregard of existing claims or through more violent means. 
They would support their actions by stressing that existing monopolies stifled commerce and seek 
a means to undermine their privileges in law. When challenged, corporate bodies would then 
attempt to delegitimise and criminalise those who violated their monopoly. In particular, 
condemning rivals as pirates or as interlopers and seeing to their prosecution allowed for the 
enforcement of a charter and, more importantly, suppressed the ambitions of rivals who came 
advocating that the grip of existing companies on trade be loosened. 
During its earliest years, the EIC similarly had to weather accusations that English mariners 
acted as pirates. Established by royal charter in December 1600 by Elizabeth I, the Company was 
granted a monopoly on the trade, but also government over English and Irish subjects beyond the 
Cape of Good Hope.26 During the first four decades of their existence, both the Estado Da Índia 
and the VOC regularly complained that English sailors acted as pirates and that they targeted 
Muslim shipping. The EIC initially dismissed these claims as politically motivated smears, but a 
clear pattern of behaviour began to develop.27 These attacks were directed towards the treasure-
laden vessels dispatched by the Mughals between Surat and the port towns of the Red Sea, ships 
that also carried pilgrims on hajj to and from Mecca and the other holy sites of Islam on the Arabian 
Peninsula.28 In 1637, the EIC recorded the robbery of several of these vessels in the Red Sea, 
prompting the Mughal Shah Jahan to have several of the English Company’s ships seized in 
reprisal.29 The Company deplored these attacks as acts of piracy and explained that they were 
carried out by “interlopers”, those who departed from Britain and Ireland without regard for the 
Company’s charter. Here, the EIC referred to merchants who opposed the organisation of exchange 
through a monopoly, funded from the later 1610s by Puritan magnates such as Robert Rich, Earl 
of Warwick, but also by established international merchants who were excluded from the EIC’s 
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stock.30 Yet the Mughals were under no obligation to appreciate the finer points of this distinction. 
As a monopoly company, the EIC was held responsible for the behaviour of their fellow subjects, 
and it was preferable for Shah Jahan to recoup losses from Company’s ships, rather than enforce 
its laws for them. These attacks therefore ate into the EIC’s profits, but also caused diplomatic 
complications, harming its ability to act as an effective intermediary. To make the situation even 
more challenging, responsibility of restraining these attacks fell to the EIC alone. 
In practice, the Company was almost completely hamstrung from preventing these raids. Its 
representatives had good reasons to stress that interlopers sponsored these pirates, as the attacks 
conducted in the Red Sea during 1637 were carried out by sailors in the employ of Courteen’s 
Associates, a company established by the Anglo-Dutch merchant William Courteen in December 
1635, through a license from Charles I.31 With this support, there was little the EIC could do to 
stop them. This new Association included those who had been previously cast out of the English 
Company, alongside Puritan merchants such as Maurice Thompson, who had coincident roles in 
the initial colonisation of the Caribbean.32 The creation of Courteen’s Associates, with their 
experience in the trade of two oceans, heralded the beginnings of an alternative vision of how 
movements between the two oceans could be organised. 
The midcentury conflicts in Britain and Ireland provided a climate in which the Associates could 
advance their vision, and they did so through a proposed colony at Madagascar. Following their 
founder’s death in 1636, the Associates continued trading into the Indian Ocean, as well as colonies 
like Barbados in the Caribbean.33 The idea for a project to colonise Madagascar was first conceived 
in the mid-1630s by Prince Rupert as a kind of African El Dorado, but after 1640 became seen as 
a means to transfer the plantation model developed in the Caribbean into the Indian Ocean.34 More 
than any other group at the time, the Associates viewed themselves as well equipped to put these 
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ideas into practice, leading to their first attempt to found a colony on to the east coast of 
Madagascar. Their ambitions went beyond the cultivation of sugar, however. Plantations were 
simply the first stage in a venture that would, in time, transition to become an entrepôt linking the 
trades of the Atlantic and the Indian oceans.35 Remaining members of the EIC of course opposed 
the settlement. They denounced the colonists as interlopers and claimed that the island would 
quickly become used as a base to expand the attacks they continued to commit in the Red Sea.36 
By later 1646, this attempt had failed, but the Associates remained convinced of a colony’s 
potential. After a further three years of promotion and planning, in 1649 they changed their name 
to the Assada Company, after their name for the island of Nosy Be, and launched a second 
attempt.37 Yet by 1650 this colony had also failed. Following the death of Charles I, the resistance 
of the EIC to a takeover by their opponents was finally broken in a manner that killed off this 
project. The Assada merchants were progressively subsumed into the EIC, giving them little reason 
to then seek to undermine monopoly rule. 
The Assada Company set a precedent that later challengers would seek to replicate. Madagascar 
had been identified as potential free port where colonisers could bridge the trade of the Atlantic 
and Indian oceans. Strategically, the island provided access to the Indian Subcontinent, a supply of 
slaves who could be shipped to the Caribbean and access to the Red Sea and the bullion carried by 
Mughal shipping. It was also a region over which the EIC and other European companies held little 
influence, ruled by a host of autonomous Malagasy rulers, with whom alliances could be forged. 
Assada symbolised a kind of liberum oceanum for those seeking to break the corporate monopoly 
that prevented the greater integration of commercial traffic from the two basins. After the 
Restoration, when this project began to take form once again, the EIC would develop its own plans 
for Madagascar, instead conducive to consolidating its grip on the trade of the Indian Ocean. 
It was not until the early part of the 1680s that the EIC again began to face a threat comparable 
to Courteen’s Associates. Over the previous twenty years, monopoly rule was reaffirmed and even 
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extended with the creation of the Royal African Company, putting up further barriers to exchange 
between the two oceans.38 As one contemporary stated in a speech to the English Parliament during 
1675, he and the weavers he was representing believed that poor employment ‘arises from the great 
restraint on trade by the East India and Guinea Companies, they having monopolised the sole trade 
of above half of the world, and utterly excluding all other subjects from trading to any places within 
their charters’.39 Despite these continuing complaints, during 1681 large numbers of Company 
employees were purged, especially Whigs, for relatively minor infractions against its charter.40 
These ejections were mirrored in the Company’s factories and colonies, where the EIC began to 
enforce the letter of its monopoly more closely. Yet this was a policy that soon provoked two 
separate uprisings. The first was in Bombay (today Mumbai, in the Indian state of Maharashtra) 
where, on 27 December 1683, the militia commander Richard Keigwin seized control of the 
English fort.41 At the same time, mutiny also brewed far to the south on St Helena. In recent years, 
the island had come to be not just a provisioning centre, but also a plantation colony, becoming the 
base from which the EIC oversaw the passage of its shipping between the two oceans.42 On 21 
October 1684, around a hundred soldiers there marched to the island’s fort demanding the 
resignation of the EIC’s officials.43 Strong commonalities existed in the arguments articulated by 
both groups of rebels. As employees, they complained of stringent measures barring them from 
entering trade and failures to fund adequate protection. Both Keigwin and the St Helena colonists 
vowed that they would lay open trade to all subjects, accusing the EIC of using its monopoly to 
stifle commerce.44 The following year, Keigwin began to form his own trade networks. Working 
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with merchants recently excluded from the Company, he secured alliances with the Maratha 
Chhatrapati Sambhaji, the Estado Da Índia and the VOC, as well as the Greek adventurer and royal 
favourite Konstantine Phalkoun in Siam (Thailand).45 These traders began to describe themselves 
as a Company, but the EIC’s agents decried the practices of these “interlopers”, counter-intuitively 
suggesting that they had both converted to Islam and begun to sponsor attacks upon Mughal 
treasure shipments.46 These merchants, therefore, were presented not just as a threat to the existence 
of a monopoly but as acculturating with Indian Ocean practices. 
Yet in contrast to the 1640s, the EIC were able to organise an effective opposition. The 
company’s more assertive behaviour after 1681 owed to the appointment of the merchant and 
economic writer Josiah Child as its President.47 While a firm Tory who allowed Catholics as 
stockholders within the Company, it was to the VOC that he looked for guidance. To become more 
like the VOC, he believed that the EIC should seek greater powers to punish interlopers, the 
expansion of the populations and territories of its factories and the use of armed trading vessels.48 
When James II assumed the throne in 1685, Child’s wish for greater powers was granted in the 
form of a new charter, which bestowed the right to establish admiralty courts as well as institute 
martial law across its colonies and factories.49 During 1687, the former rebels at St Helena were 
executed under martial law, while newly established admiralty courts prosecuted dozens of 
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“interloper” merchants.50 He believed that Madagascar presented the best means to expand the 
population of the EIC’s outposts. At the same time, Child thought that it was important to prevent 
any factory or colony from becoming in majority English, claiming that it could promote common 
opposition to the Company. Instead, he suggested importing large numbers of slaves into them 
from Madagascar, where they would work on surrounding plantations, serving to both bolster 
defences and deter English employees from rebelling.51 Particularly from the mid-1680s, EIC 
merchants began transporting human cargos in their hundreds to a number of different factories, 
but particularly to Bencoolen on Sumatra (part of what is now Bengkulu City), which Child used 
as a test case for this form of colonisation to mirror Batavia (now Jakarta).52 By February 1687, 
participation in this trade first made the EIC aware of the colony recently founded at St Maries by 
sailors from colonies in North America and the Caribbean.53 Realising the threat it presented, the 
directors sought to establish an outpost on the island to secure a regular supply of slaves, which 
they could send eastwards, but they first had to first eliminate the competition. Later in the month, 
they implored the governor of New York to seize all vessels trading there.54 Yet no action is 
recorded against these ships in North America and the Caribbean, instead the colony continued to 
expand alongside this slave trade out of Madagascar into Bencoolen.55 Part of Child’s attempt to 
reassert the EIC’s monopoly was its own reiteration of the Assada project. His initial plan was to 
try and redirect this slave trade eastwards, severing Madagascar’s connection to the Americas and 
expanding the populations of the Company’s outposts in the process. 
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The EIC’s attempts to drive these colonists from Madagascar took place in the following decade, 
but were foreshadowed by legal proceedings in England during late 1685. The case involved a 
number of former Company traders based in London who owned shares in the Andalucia, a trading 
vessel with investors such as Thomas Pitt, formerly resident at Siam, and Thomas Bowrey, a 
merchant with extensive experience trading to Malaysia.56 Without securing the permission of the 
EIC, the vessel was dispatched to Cadiz in January 1686, where it took on around £100,000 in 
bullion before departing for the Coromandel Coast in southeastern India. There, they picked up 
local crewmembers and bought calico fabrics.57 By September, the Andalucia was in Balasore 
(today Beleswar, in the Indian state of Odisha), where the captain became embroiled in a dispute 
over the ownership of some saltpetre with another English merchant. The Mughal governor of the 
town initially imprisoned him on suspicion of theft but eventually, through the mediation of a Dutch 
factor in the port, the Andalucia was granted permission to take the cargo of saltpetre from a vessel 
in the harbour.58 This was a somewhat eventful but ultimately unremarkable voyage. Yet in mid-
January 1687 when they arrived into Portsmouth, the vessel was immediately seized by admiralty 
officials there.59 The EIC’s directors appear to have been informed of the Andalucia’s arrival and, 
on 11 January, complained of the ship’s voyage to King James, who accordingly ordered the vessel 
to be confiscated.60 The Company then arranged for two separate suits, one against the vessel itself 
in the Court of King’s Bench for interloping and another for its crew in the High Court of Admiralty 
for piracy.61 The former charge was simply on account of their departing without permission from 
the EIC, but to justify the latter prosecution, they cited that the sailors had “seized” cargo under 
permission from a Muslim ruler, a sanction not valid in common law.62 The penalty for piracy 
would, of course, have been death, and the directors wrote of their hopes that the exacted 
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punishment would mean they would not be ‘hearing of interlopers in India during the generation’.63 
Although both cases initially proceeded quickly, the King interceded in April to halt the piracy 
charge by pardoning the sailors, believing it too severe to seek the execution of the crew in addition 
to the forfeiture of the ship’s goods.64 Just as the Estado da Índia had been before them, the greater 
powers awarded to the EIC now placed them in a position to prosecute newcomers for piracy. 
By 1688, contrasting colonisation projects for Madagascar, and the island of St Maries in 
particular, had emerged to reflect the now decades-old debate about the conduct of exchange with 
the east. The first was represented by the efforts of the Assada Company during the 1640s. Its 
vision had comprised of a settlement in which the commerce of two oceans could interlink, 
countermanding and undermining the monopoly allocated to the EIC and, in practice, shifting the 
centre of global trade and migration southwards. The second was the product of Child’s own 
economic thought. He imagined a militarised monopoly company with powerful executive and 
judicial powers, which, through the control of slave labour, could prevent this convergence of the 
two oceans in a manner that largely bypassed England. By this point, it was unclear which of these 
projects would succeed. 
*** 
As a consequence of having bound itself so closely to James II, the EIC was placed in a difficult 
position by the 1688 Revolution. The traders who they had first excluded and then prosecuted 
during the previous decade were able to make substantial capital out of the Company’s ascent at 
the behest of a Catholic king now widely deemed a tyrant. Against the eruption of war with France, 
this argument was enough to loosen the monopoly of the EIC, but not to see it overthrown entirely. 
Two rival companies in the form of the New East India Company (the New EIC) and the Company 
of Scotland began to form across the decade, seeking to take its place, while the colony at St Maries 
began to swell with those displaced by war. To fight back against these threats, the Old EIC came 
to characterise the colonists at St Maries at pirates, using their prosecution to emphasise the 
necessity of a quasi-state monopoly and suppress links to the Americas. 
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During 1689, opponents of the Old EIC in England began to conduct a sustained print campaign 
against the Company, presenting Child’s associates as a drain on England’s war effort and a 
remnant of James II in corporate form. The issue touched upon with the greatest force was the issue 
of bullion. Pamphleteers argued that the trade as it existed under the EIC’s monopoly only caused 
an outpouring of gold and silver, benefitting only a handful of wealthy stockholders and ruining 
domestic industries.65 The application of the Company’s enhanced powers after 1685 was also 
heavily criticised. Numerous printed works also outlined the efforts the Company had gone to in 
using its judiciary to impoverish traders and mariners – the Andalucia was specifically referenced 
– while also using martial law to crush dissidents at St Helena.66 Consideration of previous 
parliamentary lobbying efforts against the EIC reveals the many enemies it had made. Its opponents 
included not only those who had been expelled and prosecuted for interloping, but also the St 
Helena planters, the Levant Company and English cloth manufacturers.67 Following campaigns 
and debates in Parliament, the EIC’s charter was forfeited in 1693, and, that same year, legislation 
was proposed that opened trade with the east to any company established by statute.68 This victory 
was not capitalised upon fully until 1698, however, with the establishment of a separate regulated 
joint-stock company by Act of English Parliament, comprising, in majority, of EIC outcasts and 
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those previously condemned as interlopers.69 Challengers like Keigwin, who had aspired to 
establish a rival company, had managed to secure legal sanction amounting to a duopoly, but the 
Old EIC was far from defeated. 
The most significant practical challenge to how trade with the east was conducted remained at 
St Maries. While it is difficult to determine the precise size of this settlement, it certainly grew 
from a few hundred people in the late 1680s to as many as 1400 by 1697.70 The precise nationalities 
of these migrants are difficult to determine, but while their primary westward trade was with the 
Americas they certainly originated from France, West Africa, Denmark and the Low Countries, as 
well as Britain and Ireland.71 What precisely drove this process of colonisation has been examined 
in greater detail in Chapter 3, but it is worth reiterating that the settlers traded for textiles and 
manufactured goods in India, procured stolen coinage from the Red Sea and funneled all this into 
the slave trade with the Caribbean.72 They linked the trade of the Caribbean and Indian Ocean, thus 
realising the project initially attempted by the Assada Company fifty years previously. A significant 
reason why they succeeded where others had failed owed to the fact that the diverse backgrounds 
of the colonists allowed them to navigate the Indian Ocean’s trade comfortably. Accounts testify 
that their vessels held crews of many nationalities and were able to convincingly sail under the 
colours and papers of different nations to overcome attempts by monopoly companies and local 
rulers to impose restrictions.73 One of these sailors, captured after being driven into port at Bandar 
Abbas in the Persian Gulf during 1696, reflects how some of the Madagascar colonists were able 
to claim different nationalities. The sailor stated that he was ‘an Irishman and says his father was 
a Dutchman and his mother an English woman’.74 So not only did these newcomers shift Atlantic 
trade networks southwards, they succeeded in doing so by according more closely with existing 
practices in the Indian Ocean. 
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Yet, unlike the New EIC or Courteen’s Associates, they lacked the protection of any kind of 
sovereign for their presence at Madagascar, making them vulnerable to prosecution by the EIC. An 
example of how these colonists operated and the Old Company’s growing interest in their activities 
can be found in the early efforts of ship’s captain James Kelly (who went by the alias Gillam or 
Guillam). Of uncertain origins, he was most likely Irish or English and possibly fought for James 
II during the Jacobite War, having a career in the Indian Ocean that spanned at least seven years 
between 1691 and 1698. While he was later condemned for piracy after having attacked a Mughal 
treasure shipment, details of his life in the Indian Ocean imply that was also a trader. By September 
1691, Kelly had assembled a crew at St Maries and intended to sail north for the Malabar Coast, 
arriving at the EIC factory in Calicut during October. In a letter to the factory’s governor, he 
claimed to be captain of a crew of English sailors driven from Europe by war, yet the governor 
refused them the opportunity to trade and sent details of the episode back to London.75 From 
Calicut, they then proceeded north to Mangalore (now Mangaluru, in the Indian state of Karnataka), 
arriving there in March 1692. The city itself fell within the dominion of Keladi Chennamma, the 
Lingayat queen of the Keladi Kingdom, who was at this point allied with the Marathas and the 
Portuguese.76 Given the EIC’s alliance with the Mughals, English sailors would not have been 
welcome at the port, which likely explains why Kelly claimed upon arrival that they came from 
France and ‘there was of all nationes amongst them’.77 Possibly sensing the opportunity to secure 
a further trade partner in the French, Mangalore’s governor invited them to dinner. The situation 
then quickly escalated for Kelly. Halfway through the meal, guards were called into the room and 
he was arrested – quite why is unclear.78 EIC sources testify that the governor did so because the 
sailors were suspected of attacking Maratha shipping nearby and that he had sought to entrap 
them.79 Kelly, however, wrote his own account of the proceedings to Surat, claiming again to be 
English and pleading that the Company negotiate their release. He asserted that their imprisonment 
resulted from the false impression on the governor’s part that they were Danes.80 Kelly eventually 
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escaped and remained in the Indian Ocean for some years thereafter, becoming conspicuous 
through his service in William Kidd’s crew some years later.81 By 1700, he had established himself 
in New York as a broker in goods from Madagascar, before eventually being arrested during the 
Earl of Bellomont’s investigations and subsequently executed in England.82 
The activities of sailors and traders like Kelly operating out of Madagascar soon became an 
opportunity for Child and the Old EIC to win back support for their monopoly. The Madagascar 
colonists were not, of course, the first to go after Mughal shipping: Courteen’s Associates did so 
previously.83 As recently as 1691, raids by sailors from Madagascar had caused a deterioration of 
relations with Shah Muhi-ud-Din Muhammad, the Mughal Emperor commonly known as 
Aurungzeb, provoking him to enact reparations upon the EIC at Surat and bar them from trading.84 
These attacks and reparations were, therefore, a cyclical setback. When Henry Avery attacked the 
Ganj-i Sawa’i on 8 September 1695, the Mughal response was consistent: Aurungzeb seized 
English shipping at Surat, barred the EIC from trade there and demanded that the perpetrator be 
captured. In the aftermath of the attack, the Company went to lengths that they had never attempted 
previously to ensure Avery was tracked and captured.85 In June 1696, the directors provided the 
Privy Council with a mass of first-hand accounts of his crimes and warned of the dire consequences 
of Mughal retaliation.86 The same pieces of evidence made their way to the Board of Trade.87 The 
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core difference between Avery’s deed and the similar situation in 1691 was that it occurred after 
the Company had lost its full monopoly in 1694 and the formation of the Company of Scotland a 
year later.88 A letter written from Bombay in 1696 best demonstrates what the EIC’s employees 
believed they had to gain from stressing the significance of the pirate issue. It was included in the 
evidence sent to both the Privy Council and Board of Trade: 
…which disorders (pirates) the factors conclude certainly in a very great measure 
spring from the licentious principles and practices of the interlopers, who have to the 
utmost of their power in India endevoured to banish all reverence of government out 
of the minds of men, and how far the actions of some of that sort in England have 
continued thereunto by declaiming against all acts of justice done in India against 
malefactors, stiling all in authority arbitrary.89 
Madagascar pirates, this letter claimed, were as one with interlopers, and it could only be 
resolved by a strengthening of the EIC’s powers. The support it received in the following years 
would be a vindication of this belief. 
The strengthening of the Old EIC’s powers to respond to the attacks of Madagascar pirates began 
soon after the Company had initially reported the consequences of Avery’s attack. While its 
admiralty jurisdiction had been stripped from it in 1693, the Company’s representatives consulted 
with William Oldys and the other admiralty advocates in August 1696, who informed them of their 
best methods to secure prosecutions in piracy cases brought in England, as well as confirming that 
they could apply the crime to any who took foreign commissions in the Indian Ocean.90 As printed 
accounts of the captain’s crimes and the trials of captured crew members followed, the Old EIC 
began, once again, to accumulate political support. It received convoys to protect its shipping 
alongside the right to issue commissions to seize “pirate” vessels and their goods.91 The further and 
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very public trial of Captain Kidd some years later functioned to demonstrate the Old EIC’s 
effectiveness when backed by royal authority. There are signs that these public performances also 
strengthened its standing with both the Estado da Índia and the VOC, who cooperated with the 
Company in working to capture vessels operating out of Madagascar.92 The Old EIC grew 
sufficiently confident in 1699 to make representation to Aurangzeb that it was his cooperation with 
“interlopers” in the past that had caused this upsurge in attacks.93 By February 1699, some of its 
old opponents were already considering coming to terms with the Old Company. Less than a year 
after the New EIC’s creation, the two entered talks about merging into a single monopoly company, 
to the outrage of those who had first supported the campaign against the Old Company.94 Stressing 
the dangers posed by Madagascar pirates ultimately helped the Old EIC avert disaster and begin to 
absorb one of its new competitors. 
Yet, despite the flurry of activity in the Indian Ocean, England and the Americas, by 1701 
European settlement at Madagascar endured. In the ensuing years, correspondence continued to 
mention colonists of all nations on the island trading and attacking Mughal shipping.95 Kidd’s death 
was, not least, a symbolic bookend to the issue of pirates in the Indian Ocean. However, 
connections between the Americas and Indian Ocean remained. The limited impact of this fervour 
is testified by proclamations issued by William III in 1698 and 1701, both of which offered pardons 
to all pirates but Avery and Kidd’s crews, should they surrender themselves.96 Even in attempts to 
administer these pardons there were issues. During the summer of 1699, the ship’s captain Thomas 
Warren was sent with several vessels to find the colony at St Maries, administer the former pardon 
and make an example of any who refused to surrender. Yet, after sailing to the island, he claimed 
he was unable to find the colony.97 Furthermore, across the 1690s, few sailors ever stood trial 
before the English High Court of Admiralty for piracy committed in the Indian Ocean, far fewer 
of them than the considerably more obscure Irish sailors who were prosecuted in the early part of 
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the decade.98 The low rate of actual executions owed to the fact that many who stood accused of 
robbing Mughal shipping were pardoned, after having given information that allowed the investors 
and benefactors in the Americas who supported the Madagascar colony to be traced.99 In other 
words, unlike the Irish sailors, many of the denizens of St Maries were given a second chance 
provided that they were willing to give up their investors. All along, the Old EIC had been seeking 
– and in piracy trials found – a means to prevent these transoceanic links, as well as to eliminate or 
absorb formal competitors. 
Over the course of this decade, the merchants of the New EIC had successfully used the outbreak 
of war with France and the older Company’s connections to James II to argue that a powerful 
monopoly association depressed trade and oppressed subjects. In doing so, they managed to secure 
their own incorporation through statute, stopping far short of promoting a more open trade with the 
east. In response to this formation of a duopoly, the EIC had chosen to proceed against the 
inhabitants of St Maries, who could claim no such state sanction. In inflating the danger they 
represented, the Old EIC sought to demonstrate the benefits of Child’s vision of a Company with 
extensive legal and political power. It showcased its ability to prevent commercial streams from 
both oceans merging and to mend diplomatic rifts – making the case that being mere merchants 
was not enough. By the eighteenth century the Old EIC had begun to extinguish one competitor, 
yet another remained in the Company of Scotland. 
*** 
Even while they were committed in Panama, representatives of the Scottish Company came to see 
that a colonial project on Madagascar presented a substantial opportunity. The plans they drew up 
did not intend a colonial project of their own as much as they sought to assume control over one 
that already existed. They planned to create an outpost that would draw the colonists from St 
Maries, a labour force with network that would enable them to create another free port, but this 
time, connecting the Americas to the Indian Ocean. The Scots’ growing interest in the east did not 
go unnoticed, however, and it soon drew the attention of the New EIC, whose opposition would 
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serve to pit the two companies and their respective visions of trade with the east against one 
another. 
The Company of Scotland considered several prospective trades with the east across its lifetime. 
During the course of 1700, its directors first considered trade links with Armenian merchants at 
Surat, followed by its dispatching of a vessel to trade at Macau in southern China, where it was 
eventually seized by representatives of the Old EIC.100 It was instead through the slave trade that 
the Scottish Company began to realise its first profits. In late 1699, an Edinburgh merchant under 
license from the Company completed a voyage to West Africa and the Caribbean, bringing modest 
returns.101 That this venture led the directors to consider the slave trade out of Madagascar is 
testified to by an anonymous proposal presented to the Court of Directors in 1699. Written by an 
inhabitant of New York, the tract asserted that they could secure both slaves and goods from India 
at Madagascar to trade into the Americas. To gain a foothold there, the writer advocated that, in 
the long term, they create a factory on or close to St Maries, so that they could easily draw these 
“pirates” as colonists at little cost.102 The directors only acted on this proposal as the Darien Scheme 
began to run into difficulty. On 4 March 1701, the Company’s directors gave the order to begin 
outfitting a ship named the Speedy Return for a voyage to Madagascar. Their choice of captain was 
Thomas Drummond, a survivor of the first expedition to Panama, who they ordered to take on gold 
and silver at Madeira before sailing to the island for slaves.103 The Speedy Return then departed 
from Leith Harbour during May 1701. 
A similar scheme was possibly being considered at the same time by the New EIC merchant 
Thomas Bowrey. He had left the service of the Old EIC at some point during the 1680s but 
continued to trade into the Indian Ocean, where he ran afoul of Childs’s crackdown in the later part 
of the decade, being one of the investors behind the Andalucia in 1685.104 A later proposal, this 
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time written by Bowrey in 1707, shows that he had planned to establish deeper connections with 
Madagascar for some time. Its resemblance to the proposal that the Company of Scotland 
considered is uncanny. He advocated that, following initial voyages, the New EIC offer pardons to 
the colonists at St Maries and then establish a settlement on a nearby island, where they would be 
a cheap labour force.105 During the end of 1701, Bowrey and a number of other investors obtained 
a license from the New EIC to charter a ship, the Worcester, before recruiting sailors for its voyage. 
Quite what they intended is unclear. Some sources testify that the vessel was intended for St Maries 
and then the Malabar Coast, but others claim that there was no intermediate step and the Worcester 
was instead bound directly for Surat.106 Either way, no correspondence survives from any of the 
crew between the Cape of Good Hope and their arrival in India, so its proposed route cannot be 
determined with certainty. On 8 March 1702, many months after the Speedwell had departed, the 
Worcester, captained by Thomas Green, set sail from the Downs in southeastern England.107 
Two conflicting stories – given respectively by the Company of Scotland and the New EIC some 
years later – provide an unclear picture of how entwined the voyages of these two vessels were. In 
the accounts of both companies, Madagascar played a central role. The Speedy Return arrived at 
the island sometime in the middle of 1701, where the crew purchased slaves before sailing to 
Rodrigues in the Mascarene Islands.108 There they supplied a town recently established by French 
colonists, who had themselves been able to siphon European settlers from St Maries.109 What then 
happened to the ship following its departure is contested. Sources produced by members of the 
Scottish Company claim the Speedy Return then went to the Malabar Coast, where it met with the 
Worcester, the crew of which then robbed the vessel and murdered many of the Speedy Return’s 
sailors.110 These accounts also state that Green and his men continued to attack and raid two further 
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vessels, before returning to Madagascar and taking passage home.111 In contrast, English 
testimonies linked to the New EIC assert that the two vessels never met on the Malabar Coast and 
that the Scottish ship instead departed from Rodrigues to St Maries, where some of its sailors 
mutinied with the aid of “pirates” on the island.112 There is also the possibility that the two vessels 
did indeed meet, and this was, in actuality, an attempted seizure of some kind gone wrong, the 
Worcester carrying a commission to seize pirates. 
These voyages would not become a source of acrimony until later, however. During late 1703, 
the Company of Scotland dispatched the Annandale to secure its cargo that had been confiscated 
at Macau, but during February 1704 customs officials had the vessel seized when it was recruiting 
in the Downs.113 It was the New EIC who had appealed for the capture, on grounds that English 
sailors and money were on board, forbidden by the Navigation Acts.114 Despite the efforts of the 
Scottish directors, the vessel was condemned in London on 8 July, part of its cargo going to the 
New Company.115 At this point, the Company of Scotland’s directors opted not to accept these 
further setbacks but to retaliate. In August, they appealed to the Scottish Parliament for assistance 
in obtaining compensation on the grounds that reprisal was their right as a corporate body 
established by statute and that, if they tolerated the seizure, they could be treated as pirates, a clear 
reference to the fate of Caledonia.116 It was at this point that the Worcester became significant. 
Following its return to London, the ship’s owners had ordered Green to depart for Leith to avoid 
French privateers and await further orders.117 On 12 August, it was seized in reprisal by Roderick 
Mackenzie, Secretary to the Company of Scotland.118 Through the Annandale’s seizure, the two 
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companies attempted to navigate the vagaries of Anglo-Scottish jurisdiction for their own benefit. 
Representatives of the New EIC, many of whom had suffered through interloping prosecutions 
before 1688, turned these very same tactics against the Scottish newcomers, only citing statute, 
rather than a royal charter. At the same time, the Company of Scotland replied by escalating the 
dispute through a similarly unclear legal precedent, placing two statutes, passed by two different 
parliaments in conflict. 
What might have otherwise been a swiftly resolved dispute soon escalated. With the Annandale 
already condemned, the legal grounds for the taking of the Worcester came before the Scottish 
Privy Council in the ensuing months. Interests representing the Scottish Country Party argued in 
favour of the seizure, claiming that the New EIC had condemned its ship illegally, there being no 
English subjects concerned on the ship and that this act bestowed the right to enact reprisals for 
such a measure. Thomas Green and the Worcester’s owner Thomas Bowrey, in contrast, counted 
on the support of a broad coalition, including the directors of the New EIC, members of the Scottish 
Court Party, England’s admiralty advocates and the predominantly Tory English Ministry.119 With 
their backing, Green’s defence depended to a far greater extent on royal prerogative. First, he 
claimed that they were not actually employed by the EIC but were simply private traders – partially 
true, as they had been granted a license under the New Company’s looser regulations.120 At the 
same time and more potently, he argued that there was no precedent for reprisals between subjects 
of the same sovereign.121 From here, what had been a dispute between two corporate authorities 
became woven into the pervading climate of discord between England and Scotland. Further legal 
posturing between the two parties only served to articulate more explicitly that this was not a 
relatively routine commercial dispute, but a matter of evident national conflict. By November 1704, 
it became clear that the Privy Council would not support the Scottish Company’s position.122 
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Fearing the further financial and political consequences of losing, the Company of Scotland’s 
representative, Roderick Mackenzie, began searching for further evidence that would allow the 
case to be transferred out of the hands of the council. On 3 December, he appeared before them 
with new evidence, citing an account from the Worcester’s cook that the crew had attacked a vessel 
on the Malabar Coast, supported further by allusions to ‘wickedness committed at sea’ by another 
of the sailors.123 Green and his men were then immediately arrested on suspicion of piracy, and the 
case was remitted to the Scottish High Court of Admiralty.124 Some days afterwards, a member of 
the council wrote an anonymous letter to the Duke of Hamilton – widely held to be the leader of 
the Country Party – which further supports that this remission was the product of political 
maneuvering. The writer claimed that he had influenced the council to remit the case to the 
Admiralty Court in spite of limited evidence and made sure that two of its allies were appointed 
assistants to the judge.125 Irrespective of whether Green and his crew committed the crime or not, 
the trial had now become too important for the Company of Scotland to lose. 
Jurisdictional disputes between these two competing east India companies quickly escalated, 
producing a piracy trial in which the purpose was to assert the rights of the Company of Scotland. 
While, at this stage, the Speedwell and its venture to Madagascar was absent from proceedings, the 
colony at St Maries came to loom large in the subsequent months. The trial of Thomas Green would 
become a counterpoint of that of William Kidd some years earlier, a challenge to the EIC’s right 
to a monopoly over all Stuart subjects, supporting the case for more widespread participation in 
trade with the east, whether emanating from England, Scotland or the Americas. 
*** 
In the case of Green, the Company of Scotland’s attempt to defend their right to trade with the east, 
manifested in their intended colonial project at Madagascar, became the most substantial challenge 
to the EIC to date. The differing state sanction that each party enjoyed served to make the case into 
a matter of more than simply corporate jurisdiction but national conflict. The situation that occurred 
bore greatest resemblance to the initial dispute between the Estado da Índia and the VOC, with one 
side seeking to close off trade into the Indian Ocean, the other to establish their legitimacy in 
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participating. In law, and subsequently through a contest for public opinion, the question of how 
the anglophone world should engage with the east was now played out between advocates of a 
single powerful quasi-state monopoly and those who claimed the rights of any association that 
gained state support. 
The national dimension to Green’s trial owed a great deal to the recent history of Scotland. 
Previously, the Company of Scotland had suffered through the fact that William III had effectively 
declared their colony at Panama illegal, resulting in several of their sailors being condemned for 
piracy in Seville.126 Many of the Company’s directors were in fact committed members of this 
political faction and at the time saw events in Spain as jeopardising the Company’s future. In 1700, 
they petitioned the Scottish Parliament, arguing that a precedent had been set for all of their future 
schemes to be condemned as piracy unless they passed legislation and sent a letter to the king, 
asking him to retroactively declare Caledonia legal.127 They then put these proposals to Parliament 
in Edinburgh during January the following year.128 Securing an Act was their greatest challenge, 
so in the days that followed, Country politicians such as John Hamilton, Lord Belhaven and 
William Keith, Earl of Mariscal, spoke of the urgency of having Darien declared legal. The former 
argued that, if they did not do so, then the Company of Scotland would be deemed ‘pirates and 
unjust invaders of another nation’ wherever they dared venture. The Scottish captain, who has 
previously been condemned for piracy by the Casa de la Contratación but then pardoned, was 
brought in to testify on 14 January as a further reinforcement of this point.129 Yet, despite their 
efforts, the act failed to achieve a majority vote, and a petition was instead sent to William III, 
claiming that the Scots’ efforts at Darien served to thwart the ambitions of France and requesting 
that he repeal his earlier proclamation declaring the Caledonia project illegal.130 The King, of 
course, declined to do so. 
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Despite this setback, the prospect of looming Anglo–Scottish Union spurred the Country Party 
to vociferously promote its agenda during the following years. Throughout 1703, its members 
altered the Act of Security (1704), initially designed to secure a Hanoverian succession, 
transforming it into an attempt to formally obtain access to English markets for Scotland. Finally 
passing in 1704, it asserted that, unless access to overseas markets was formally granted to 
Scotland, they would select a different monarch to England’s in the event of Queen Anne’s 
death.131 The Kirk, similarly a symbol of Scottish nationhood, also made political gains during 
these years. Greater confirmation of its status as a national church was allocated to the church 
during 1703, while at the same time blocking the grant of formal toleration to Episcopalians.132 In 
other words, those who opposed union had recently enjoyed some success and victories, but they 
had been unable to secure assurances that the Company of Scotland would be able to continue its 
operations in future. 
The trial itself began on 17 March, and the question of how differing criminal law jurisdictions 
conducted piracy prosecutions became central to the case. A key distinction between English and 
Scottish piracy trials was that the latter took place entirely under Roman law, while the criminal 
jurisdiction of England High Court of Admiralty operated largely under common law procedures 
and standards of evidence. Green was assigned seven advocates to support his defence, with John 
Spottiswood appearing to be his lead counsel. In a manner common to Scottish criminal 
proceedings, the trial began with Spottiswood questioning the jurisdiction of the Court in the 
case.133 He opened by claiming that the indictment against Green was invalid, as admiralty courts 
did not have the right to prosecute foreigners, and that in law the Scots remained foreign to and 
distinct from the English. The advocate for the defence then proceeded, arguing that the case should 
be abandoned and the sailors translated to an English court.134 Such an argument may have won 
through to the south, but in Scotland the civil law technically applied in criminal proceedings before 
the admiralty. In response, the prosecuting advocate, Alexander Higgins, cited a Grotian 
understanding of piracy, arguing that all courts retained the right to prosecute them, they being the 
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‘common enemies of mankind’, so could claim no national status.135 The latter case was accepted 
by the Court’s judge and assistants, while the very arguments of the defence inflamed Country 
Party observers, with one remarking that: ‘Mr Spotswood impunged the authority of the Scotish 
Nation to judge of English men for any crimes perpetrated by them beyond the line and wher we 
had ane settlement, the advocat argued like ane angell one yt head and sylenced the other with 
shame’.136 The first verdict of the trial, therefore, was that the legal jurisdiction the EIC understood 
itself to have in the Indian Ocean did not apply in this case. 
The central witness for the prosecution was the assistant to the ship’s cook known as Antonio 
Ferdinando, who claimed to be from Quilon on the Malabar Coast (today Kollam, in the Indian 
state of Kerala). Not able to speak English, he communicated with the Court through an interpreter 
who understood the lingua franca used on ships in the Indian Ocean, describing that the Worcester 
attacked a vessel under ‘English colours’.137 It is worth noting that at no point during the trail was 
this vessel identified. Green’s advocates countered this testimony with the argument that 
Ferdinando was not a Christian, so his testimony could not be accepted by the Court.138 The witness 
himself claimed that he had been baptised a Catholic, but there was some disagreement about how 
this fact might be demonstrated. Ultimately the judge and assistants ruled that, owing to high 
evidentiary standards of the law of nations, in exceptional cases the Court could accept testimony 
from non-Christians and those normally barred from testifying.139 Ferdinando’s statement was 
accepted as a result and became the central piece of evidence drawing together the more tangential 
evidence given by seven other witnesses.140 Had the trial taken place in England, the verdict would 
have stood. At stake was the question of how piracy should be defined and prosecuted, but also 
whether the EIC had an exclusive jurisdiction over all subjects east of the Cape of Good Hope. The 
case had become a kind of Santa Caterina in reverse, as if the newly-founded VOC were 
prosecuting sailors employed by the Estado Da Índia. A guilty verdict would demonstrate the 
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authority of the corporate body advocating that trade be opened further, challenging the monopoly 
claimed by an established rival. 
Following the outcome of the trial, Green became directly connected to the failed St Maries 
venture undertaken by the Company of Scotland. On 15 March, the jury not only returned with a 
guilty verdict, but with a substantial margin of ten to five.141 Green and his lawyers obviously 
sought to overturn the verdict, so immediately placed the legitimacy of the Court’s proceedings in 
question. The Worcester’s sailors and owners submitted petitions to Queen Anne, as did the 
directors of the New EIC, all condemning what they claimed was a show trial and asking that the 
sentence due to be delivered on 27 March be stayed until more evidence could arrive.142 The Queen 
granted their request and the execution date was delayed by two weeks.143 In Edinburgh, the 
Country Party busied themselves, arguing that this action constituted a willful disregard of Scottish 
law orchestrated by nefarious EIC influencers in England. As already stated, the ship supposedly 
robbed by Green remained unnamed in the trial, but this changed in the charged atmosphere of 
Edinburgh during early April. Rumours circulating there claimed that the Worcester was in fact 
operating as a pirate vessel out of Madagascar and had attacked the Speedy Return, but done so 
deliberately to enforce an English monopoly on trade with the east.144 Printed accounts in Scotland 
were circulated making exactly this claim, and anonymously published English counterparts 
argued that the trial had been a deliberate attempt to connect Green to the failed St Maries 
expedition.145 Affidavits procured by Bowrey in England and dispatched to Scotland during early 
April were viewed and dismissed as insufficient evidence by members of the Court, who claimed 
that they could find no record that the witnesses existed.146 In response, Bowrey appealed for an 
extension of the reprieve to examine the Court’s conduct as a whole.147 
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Popular anger in Edinburgh grew in response to the news that the Scottish Privy Council was 
considering this second reprieve, as the integrity of the Court process and the execution of Green 
stood prominently as signs of Scottish independence from English influence. 11 April was the date 
set for the Privy Council to decide on whether to extend the reprieve. A sense of the popular mood 
was provided by one of the councilors, known to be of the Court Party, who was detained by a 
crowd demanding that he vote against the extension.148 They presumed correctly, as the councilors 
did indeed have their reservations about the case. One remarked of the trial that ‘in short, nobody 
believes it’, but ‘I doubt much that it’s in the power of man to convince this nation of it’.149 When 
the Council finally met, numerous members absented themselves and abstained, only six voted 
and, as the number was too low to constitute a quorum, the execution stood by default.150 It was at 
this point that any wider support in Scotland for the Worcester’s crew and owners seemed to drain 
away. The captain and several of his crew were hanged shortly thereafter at Leith on 11 April 1705 
in front of a crowd said to be 10,000 strong. 
But Bowrey still did not accept defeat, even with Green’s execution. The trial itself had further 
weakened the position of the New EIC, who had failed to muster the necessary public support to 
stop the prosecution. To respond and to recoup his losses, he redirected his energies towards 
eliciting public sympathy for the captain in London. As early as 4 January 1705, Bowrey began to 
take his case to the public, placing a notice in the Post Man claiming that the trial relied on falsified 
evidence.151 However, his efforts in England only began in earnest after the captain’s death. 
Working with the Worcester’s other owners and his few remaining allies in Edinburgh, they 
together produced a broadsheet claiming to report Green and his first mate’s speeches from the 
scaffold, which they then dispersed in large numbers across London.152 The contents of the speech 
were as questionable as the connection drawn between Green and the Madagascar venture, casting 
as it did the captain as an English hero. It is clear that the paper was designed to appeal to Tory 
sensibilities, as Green appeared as a pious devotee of the Church of England and a victim of judicial 
murder by envious Scots. The target was not only a popular audience, but also the incumbent Tory 
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ministry who had the capacity to provide restitution. Alongside the speech, he also arranged for the 
transcript of the trial to be published, allowing readers to pour over the details.153 
The dozens of anonymous responses to the speech and transcript that entered circulation in the 
following weeks show, or perhaps were designed to show, that it did indeed resonate with 
committed Tories. Printed material spoke of Green the ‘English hero’ and ‘pious captain’, a martyr 
whose speech should be written in ‘letters of gold’.154 The Malabari, who had testified and since 
died, was most commonly seen to be responsible, denounced in terms normally reserved for 
enslaved Africans, as vengeful, dishonest and cruel.155 At the same time, the Kirk and English 
dissenters were targeted, accused of working with the Company of Scotland to bribe and cajole 
members of Green’s crew into confessing.156 Lastly, accounts denounced the supposedly nefarious 
commercial practices of Scotland. The nation, the writers claimed, were comprised of ‘pedlars 
turned merchant’ and ‘bullies, traitors and robbers’ who illegally thrived on the back of trade with 
other nations.157 This last remark certainly implies that the source of information or perhaps the 
writers themselves remained affiliated with Bowrey, as the accusation of bribery first occurs in the 
merchant’s correspondence.158 Whether it was a real outpouring of support in elite circles or a 
calculated public campaign, popular anger in London following the publication of Green’s speech 
was real.159 
Following on the commotion he raised over the execution of Green, Bowrey found that little 
support was forthcoming in England. In June 1705, he petitioned both Queen Anne and English 
Parliament, requesting the right to sue both the Company of Scotland and the High Court of 
Admiralty, receiving only cursory responses from the Tory ministers.160 The sentiment of the 
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responses to his speech would suggest that he should have received outright support, but in fact the 
actions of the merchant and his rivals in the Company of Scotland had generated so much discord 
that they had, together, strengthened the case for two processes of union. Following Green’s 
execution, those who imposed the projected union between England and Scotland had begun citing 
the trial as a justification for war between the two neighbours, driving many moderates to support 
the proposed union negotiations.161 The EIC’s monopoly, while it had its critics, had never 
provoked such animosity; therefore, it is not surprising that the Scottish Company found itself 
abolished with the Act of Union in 1707 and its members excluded from the EIC.162 If this was bad 
news for the Company of Scotland, it was not entirely positive for the New EIC, either. The actions 
of Bowrey, a former interloper employed as a private trader under the freer regulations of the New 
Company, had seen one of their captains condemned as a pirate and very publically magnified the 
threat represented by the Company of Scotland. Indeed, following Green’s trial, the Old EIC had 
been careful to make sure that it represented that none of its sailors had ever been convicted for 
piracy.163 Two weeks after Green’s execution, negotiations for unifying the two companies had 
begun in earnest, ultimately completing in 1709.164 It was to be a monopoly company, chartered 
by both Crown and Parliament, notable for its substantial powers over employees and heavy 
restrictions on foreign participation.165 Through one more piracy trial, the Old EIC had ultimately 
fought off the challenge of another company, which had come seeking to link the trades of the 
Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, placing the Old EIC in a stronger position to absorb its English 
competitor. As a stockholder, Bowrey was paid a substantial sum as part of this process, yet he 
continued to seek restitution for the Worcester for some years afterwards.166 
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In the following decades, Madagascar and particularly the island of St Maries continued to occupy 
an important place in the imagination of British adventurers.167 None, however, would be 
successful in gaining the control over the colony first imagined by Courteen’s Associates during 
the 1640s, least of all the victorious EIC. In this sense, the second incarnation of this project, which 
emerged during Child’s tenure, was the most successful, as informal linkages between the Indian 
Ocean and Americas continued to exist. Yet, while these colonists were still known as pirates, no 
large-scale campaign emerged again on the part of the EIC to hunt them down and ensure their 
prosecution. Instead, after 1709 the Company sought to further expand its powers by prosecuting 
Indian (Maladari and Muslim) sailors, rather than focusing on Europeans. The Madagascar colony 
had presented a threat because it materialised when the EIC was at a low ebb, on account of its ties 
to James II and the prospect that it might be harnessed and formalised by a competitor, causing its 
star to descend further. In a sense, the case of the Company of Scotland demonstrated that the EIC 
was not incorrect. In the end, while conducted with markedly different stakes, the piracy trials that 
had emerged as part of the contest between these companies were in part performative action, 
disputes over how future engagement between the anglophone world and the east could be 
conducted, rather than with an eye to how it currently existed. No rival company would, ultimately, 
be able to secure the much-sought state support for an enduring traffic between the Americas and 
the east, channeled through an entrepôt at Madagascar. In doing so, the EIC successfully kept its 
barrier between the trades of the two oceans in place, preventing the further movement of global 
trade flows southwards. 
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The period that followed the 1688 Revolution was a crisis that spanned not just Britain and Ireland, 
but all of the dominions William III came to rule. While the shock of the initial event had its 
significance, its consequences went far beyond politics and were being dealt with long afterwards. 
In particular, the war that ensued against a familiar Catholic enemy was decidedly unfamiliar in its 
global extent, displacing people, threatening large expanses of territory and disrupting the trade 
flows that linked the anglophone world together. Commercial, political and religious elites came 
to believe that these movements had to be controlled and effectively utilised to ensure that they 
were turned to the purposes of common defence and to organise an empire with a clear centre and 
dependent periphery. Yet no consensus, either ideological or practical, existed on how this end 
should be reached. This gap was to be filled by individuals, largely of middling means or indifferent 
social status, coming forward to advocate solutions. Their proposals, as contemporaries 
understood, heralded an Age of Projects, the global dimension of which crystallised in a range of 
colonial and imperial schemes. These projects included settlement plans, institutional creations and 
innovations, missionary work, campaigns of political influence, network-building and the 
establishment of new commercial markets. Projectors claimed that they knew best how to turn 
these movements of people and goods away from dangerous private interests towards a common 
benefit, but in reality, all had particular ideological agendas, be they commercial, political, religious 
or legal. This cacophony of voices called for solutions that contradicted and obstructed one another, 
with the result that their architects struggled to be heard by the public authorities and patronage 
brokers whose support they coveted. Claims that they would thwart Catholic influence, fill public 
coffers and thwart French designs were no longer sufficient. Instead, it was pirates and all that they 
came to represent and stand for who became the new enemy in the competition to legitimise the 
many schemes of this era. 
This thesis has been a study of these many projects, including the motives behind them, what 
they proposed to achieve and how they were implemented. None of them was truly as novel as its 
proponents claimed, as each was an attempt to realise colonial or imperial ambitions that had been 
developed, and usually only partially implemented, across the seventeenth century. The particular 
precarity of the 1690s allowed for an unusually high concentration of projects to be promoted and 
implemented, often reopening debates long believed settled. Exterminating or harnessing the 




predation had grown noticeably, or that, even if it had, there were any particularly negative 
consequences for the anglophone world. Instead, pirates had been molded and created in 
accordance with individual taxonomies, traceable to the causes and consequences best befitting 
partisan visions of empire. It was no coincidence that concern with combatting the problem of 
pirates beyond the shores of Europe coincided with the growing usage of the word ‘empire’ by 
English contemporaries, conceived as a thalassocratic arrangement of territories positioned around 
a common centre. Maritime empires needed enemies, and no adversary had a longer pedigree than 
that of the ‘pirate’. 
These schemes were the product of not just the specific circumstances of the 1690s, but also 
global movements of people and the history of European colonialism. Preceding chapters have 
each been structured to convey how they both informed the creation of projects and pirates. They 
began with macro sketches of migration patterns and colonial ideas, before moving to orient the 
consideration of the particular projects around close studies of individuals. This micro-macro 
approach has shown how these undertaking played out in dialogue with numerous larger contexts 
that were not always immediately apparent in the source material. It has allowed for the 
reconstruction of a different, connected history of anglophone world in the 1690s. The actions of 
pirates, however conceived, affected many different people in often dispersed localities and, as a 
result, they represented an ideal lens for a study of this kind. The chapters themselves were as 
follows: 
The first considered the attempted prosecution of Irish Catholics for piracy during the Jacobite 
War. It argued that their capture and the attempted prosecutions that followed were conducted 
within the ongoing debate about the purpose of Protestant colonisation schemes and how their 
objectives were best transferred across the sea. The suppressing of Franco–Irish networks were 
viewed by politicians in England as part of a plan to reduce Ireland to a dependent supply colony, 
while Protestants in Ireland sought to repurpose them to promote what they claimed was the 
island’s prosperity, but which largely meant their own profits. Attempts to prosecute Irish Catholics 
for piracy were part of the former design. Its content began with a consideration of how Catholics 
had long used their connections, first with Spain, then with France and the French Caribbean, to 
offset the impoverishing consequences of Protestant colonisation projects across the seventeenth 
century. It then traced these same networks following the Treaty of Limerick (1691), as they 




contrasting perspectives on how these links should be addressed then emerged, the first emanating 
from Protestants in England and the second from their coreligionists in Ireland. Disagreements 
between the two manifested in the seizure of the Postillion, a dispute in which both and neither 
party emerged victorious. The chapter then moved on to how the advocates of the English High 
Court of Admiralty, in particular Charles Hedges, saw the opportunity to establish themselves as 
the arbiters of Ireland’s coastlines. In achieving this objective, the prosecution of Irish Catholic 
privateers under the commission of James II for piracy became their first test. The advocates 
attempted to manipulate the definition of the crime in law to achieve this end, but their actions had 
unexpected consequences. Their plans became tangled in the challenge of reconciling practices of 
civil and common law, as, while Hedges was able to force through the piracy conviction, they were 
thereafter forced to opt for treason trials, resulting in the high-profile trial of Thomas Vaughan. Yet 
these were also largely unsuccessful, as many Irish sailors were able to obscure or deny their place 
of birth. Ultimately, this attempt by the admiralty court to reinvent itself as an agent of English 
influence on Ireland’s coasts failed. Protestants continued to conduct trade internationally and 
Catholics continued to move relatively freely in and out of French territories. 
Chapter 2 followed the attempt by the Company of Scotland to establish a colony in eastern 
Panama between 1698 and 1701, known to historians as the Darien Scheme. It traced why 
accusations that they acted as pirates dogged the project throughout its existence. This accusation 
signified how the scheme was positioned within a much older debate about colonisation within the 
Caribbean Sea, manifested in the contrasting colonial models of the plantation colony and the 
entrepôt. The first section considered ‘venture Calvinism’ in the Caribbean Sea – how, from the 
mid-sixteenth century, reformers used gold and silver stolen from Spanish shipping and settlements 
to fuel religious reform in Europe and colonisation projects in the Americas. Piracy prosecutions 
became the means by which the Spanish crown sought to deter these sailors, a definition that 
English planters on Jamaica later came to accept and use to drive the buccaneers from their island. 
The chapter then provided the background of William Paterson and his long-held project for an 
entrepôt in the Gulf of Darién, modelled on the former practices of buccaneers, a plan eventually 
adopted and set in motion by the Company of Scotland in 1697. Paterson’s plans, however, fell 
prey to the lobbying efforts of planter interests opposed to the colony, who successfully argued that 
the project would draw pirates and strengthen France’s position in the region, successfully winning 




Panama and how local actors, including local merchants and indigenous groups, ensured that the 
colonists came to replicate the behaviours of the buccaneers on whose legacy they sought to build. 
Finally, it provided an account of the Scottish domestic response to Spanish opposition and 
attempts to reposition the venture as an anti-Catholic endeavour, being a means to win support in 
England. Their efforts did not succeed, however, driving the colonists to more closely replicate 
venture Calvinism by launching attacks on Catholic Spain in the name of Reformed Christianity. 
The eventual failure of the project and the victory of the planters was then marked in Seville during 
1701, when several Scottish colonists were, like Huguenot and Dutch sailors before them, 
condemned for piracy. 
Chapter 3 explored the time spent in the American northeast by the Anglo-Irish peer Richard 
Coote, Earl of Bellomont. It drew out how he attempted to use anxiety, first over the vulnerability 
of the American northeast to French influence and then over trade with pirates, to translate Irish 
colonisation strategies across the Atlantic. He eventually attempted to do so by instituting a naval 
stores project in New York and New Hampshire. The chapter first accounted for the existence of 
Madagascar pirates, beginning with a discussion of how regional competition within the northeast, 
stretching back to earliest settlement, stimulated closer connections with the Caribbean. As a 
consequence, the northeast came to develop a subordinate place in the Atlantic economy as a 
provisioning centre, and the shortage of specie this trade caused then drove the colony’s merchants 
to develop commercial links with Madagascar. On the island, sailors from the northeast took on 
goods stolen from Mughal treasure shipments, which they then layered into the slave trade to 
conceal its origins. The second part began with an overview of Coote’s background in Ireland and 
his particularly Anglo-Irish political ideology, before establishing that he owed his appointment to 
a particular moment when John Locke dominated the newly established Board of Trade. Locke 
intended that Bellomont should institute many of the ideas he had previously intended to apply in 
places like the Carolinas and, more recently, Virginia. Following his arrival in New York, 
Bellomont attempted to place the blame for the Madagascar trade at the feet of his opponents on 
New York’s council, a strategy that then backfired when it surfaced that he had himself sponsored 
the accused pirate William Kidd. The Earl was, however, able to survive the scandal through his 
further attempts to track down pirates across the northeast. Finally, this chapter laid out his naval 
stores project, beginning with its origins in the many schemes of the Huguenot merchant Gabriel 




the Madagascar trade to produce manufactures for export, while at the same time planting soldiers 
from Ireland on the frontiers to secure the region from Catholic influence. It then finished by 
following his attempts to secure the breakup of land grants and missionaries in preparation for the 
arrival of these soldiers, before outlining the reasons for the project’s collapse. While he failed in 
his undertaking, the scheme would later be picked up in 1709, when one of his successors attempted 
the same with refugees from the Rhineland.1 
The fourth chapter analysed how the alleged presence of pirates in Pennsylvania was engineered 
to benefit the establishment of an Anglican missionary society. Anglican plans to associate support 
for pirates with the Society of Friends (Quakers) was one branch of their overall strategy, which 
also included the presentation of the denomination as a form of Catholicism and securing converts 
among their disaffected. The body of the chapter first relayed the early successes of Quakerism in 
the Americas and how the Anglican Church became aware of the denomination’s expansion over 
its attempts to secure converts in Maryland. As a consequence, the Bishop of London, Henry 
Compton, and his commissary, Thomas Bray, realised that a voluntary society was required to 
overcome Quaker resistance, which they conflated with the threat posed by Catholicism. It then 
considered events in Pennsylvania during the early 1690s, focusing on the Schism fomented by the 
prominent Scottish Quaker George Keith. This division partly escalated as a consequence of 
Quaker willingness to apprehend pirates in violation of peace testimony and the subsequent 
prosecution of Keith when he criticised the colony’s leaders for doing so. When he joined with 
other Quaker outcasts in London to argue for the dangers posed by “new Rome” in North America, 
he won the support of Compton, who saw the opportunity to secure converts among his former 
followers. It then worked through attempts by Pennsylvania’s Anglicans to use the presence of 
alleged pirates from the Indian Ocean in Pennsylvania against the Society of Friends. Most of the 
former had recently arrived from plantation colonies to the south. The commercial dimension to 
this transatlantic campaign against Quakerism became quickly subsumed into a larger attempt to 
have all proprietary and private charters annulled in England. It was William Penn who then 
unearthed how the presence of pirates in the colony had been turned to benefit Anglican expansion, 
and who then successfully coordinated a coalition of dissenting interests in England to obstruct the 
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passage of the Resumption Bill. They did so by arguing that the motives for the Bill were as much 
religious as commercial. These efforts then blunted the eventual impact of the Church of England 
missionary society that emerged in 1701, derailing the larger project to establish Anglicanism 
across the Americas. 
The fifth and final chapter centered on the island of Madagascar and three separate schemes to 
establish an entrepôt there to link the trades of the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans. The first came 
from the Assada Company during the 1640s, then colonists from the Americas in the 1680s, 
followed eventually by the Company of Scotland after 1701. Each attempt threatened the monopoly 
of the EIC, who, in each instance, sought to reassert their position and ensure that flows of people 
and goods were channeled north through London, rather than proceeding directly from the 
Caribbean and North America. The first section laid out how corporate monopolies were created 
as a response to trade practices as they already existed in the Indian Ocean, before then 
demonstrating how piracy trials were first used by the Estado da Índia to deter rivals. Next, it 
sketched the attempts of Courteen’s Associates, later the Assada Company, to establish a colony 
at Madagascar, followed by the strengthening of the EIC’s powers under Josiah Child to match the 
VOC. The second part then considered how the EIC’s monopoly was weakened on account of its 
relationship to James II after 1688, encouraging rival companies. The next challenge that the EIC 
faced was a colony founded on an island off the coast of Madagascar, known to English-speakers 
as St Maries. This settlement became a realisation of the entrepôt imagined by the Assada colonist’s 
decades earlier, as it successfully channeled trade from North America and the Caribbean directly 
into the Indian Ocean. Prosecuting the denizens of this island as pirates then became a means for 
the EIC to demonstrate its effectiveness in managing flows of people and goods, making the case 
once again for monopoly rule. Next, the chapter worked through the attempt by the Company of 
Scotland to establish a colony that could draw the labour of the “pirates” at St Maries, in a mirror 
image of the Darien Scheme. Yet their attempts to establish connections with the east quickly 
brought them into conflict with the New EIC, elevating the competition between these rival east 
India companies into a national dispute between England and Scotland. It then concluded with a 
study of the trial of Thomas Green, understood as a direct attack on the EIC’s monopoly claims 
and the effective inverse of William Kidd’s prosecution some years earlier. The acrimony between 
the two companies fomented so much public discord that it eventually served to make the case for 




which abolished the Company of Scotland. The colony at St Maries continued to exist, but the EIC 
was nevertheless satisfied, as it had already been able to use piracy prosecutions to recover from 
its falling fortunes and eliminate its competitors. 
On one level, the Age of Projects suggested many potential ways for the anglophone world to 
achieve closer integration. Yet none of these projects succeeded on implementation. No empire 
emerged that was built upon a common belief in and adherence to Anglicanism, nor practices of 
free or regulated trade, nor indeed a unified system of common law. Outcomes often cited by 
historians, such as the formation of the Board of Trade and the passage of statutes in England and 
Scotland, alongside the execution of key individuals for piracy, were the product of contradictory 
aims and campaigns of influence, rather than being the means by which some semblance of central 
authority was exerted over peripheries. Rather than cohering into an ‘imperial state’, what endured 
was a ‘mildly centripetal agglutination of bewilderingly heterodox elements’, not a monolithic 
block, but a people who continued to be organised by allegiance and connected, above all, by 
diverse processes of exchange.2 Viewed from this perspective, the Act of Anglo–Scottish Union 
passed in 1707, which claimed to give Scots access to English overseas possessions, was in fact 
surrender by both sides, a legal gloss applied to a continuing status quo in which many centres and 
peripheries already existed. Colonists from the Americas could continue to receive goods via 
Madagascar and Irish Catholics could pursue futures in France and the French Caribbean, while 
the Atlantic basin’s commerce was drawn into the orbit of the Caribbean. The process of overseas 
expansion was increasingly driven not by a metropolitan design or land-hungry colonists, but by 
individuals who were able to marshal the support of a range of formal institutions and direct 
movements of people and goods, while integrating historical contexts as they made their plans. As 
a consequence, the anglophone world remaining loosely bound itself facilitated expansion, driven 
by these intermediaries, or “projectors”. 
At the same time, the place of pirates within these schemes suggests a significant shift in how 
contemporaries understood the common endeavours that bound this world together. The fear of 
Catholicism and the threat of France, in particular, were used to promote or denigrate particular 
projects, but were never strong enough as arguments to win on their own. Bray and Compton could 
not simply turn opinion against the Quakers in England by conflating them with Catholicism, the 
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EIC’s support for James II was not enough to destroy it completely and Jamaican planters could 
not secure support against Darien by simply claiming that it aided French ambitions in the 
Caribbean. Connections to pirates stressed that an opponent also presented a commercial threat, an 
association which became of greater benefit to the realisation or frustration of particular schemes. 
The ever-present and conspiratorial papist was no longer sufficient as an absolute enemy, and 
others had to be imagined and fought to take its place. In fact, the common manipulation of the 
definition piracy and pirates displays how religion was coming to be accorded a subordinate place 
to commerce in emergent justifications of empire. Quakers and Irish Catholics needed to be 
presented as commercially deviant in order for larger action to be taken against them, while 
Fletcher’s councilors in New York were brought down by their alleged support for pirates, rather 
than accusations of Jacobitism. The materialisation of the pirate as an enemy of thalassocracy at 
this point was part of the larger process of secularisation that had begun to take hold amongst 
Europeans by the later seventeenth century. The early modern conception of the pirate was part of 
this transition, shifting from Islamic and Reformist enemies of Spain at sea to outlaws who preyed 
upon global trade.3 
Yet this stretching and reworking of how the pirate was understood in order to suit particular 
interests had its drawbacks. All of the four prominent piracy trials here, of the Irish sailors, Avery’s 
crew, William Kidd and Thomas Green, were a foregone conclusion before they even began. The 
individuals involved had to be executed for reasons external to the courtroom: the Irish sailors for 
the sake of the Admiralty Court’s future prospects, Kidd and Avery to bolster the EIC’s jurisdiction 
and to effect the outcome of projects in the Americas, Green to assert the rights of the Company of 
Scotland. All of these trials were printed and heavily publicised, but popular belief did not follow 
the intended conclusion that these were simply dangerous criminals who had to be exterminated. 
By the end of this period, the pirate had begun to assume a place in popular culture, as tropes of 
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exactly the kind of free movement across maritime space that projectors had sought to harness.4 
Yet, even as the pirate came to assume a great many meanings, the definitions of piracy as a crime 
became less plastic. While at the beginning of this period it could be reasonably conflated with 
treason, tyranny or a host of other landed crimes, instead piracy began to settle more comfortably 
as the common law crime of robbery in a maritime jurisdiction, decoupling it further from the 
vernacular usage of pirate. Ultimately, the allegorical pirate would not endure as a popular enemy. 
There was no event equivalent to the Marian persecutions or 1641 Uprising to make it assume an 
equivalent status to the papist in the minds of anglophone Protestants. Instead, the war against the 
pirates had a particular discursive purpose at a moment of crisis, resulting in show trials, which, by 
their very publication, worked to create the problem of indiscriminate robbery by the later 1710s. 
Contemporary printed material and many other sources stress that two maritime regions had a 
particular appeal for pirates in the late seventeenth century: the Caribbean and the Red Sea. Sailors 
gravitated to both of these regions because they presented the opportunity to directly acquire gold 
and silver, which was otherwise closely guarded or flowed away from Europe and the Americas. 
This desire to secure bullion and specie was not unique to pirates, however; in fact, how to best 
harness global flows of precious metals was at the heart of the Age of Projects. Bellomont believed 
his naval-stores scheme would direct them northwards into New York and New England, William 
Paterson intended to have them concentrated into his colony at Panama and the American colonists 
at Madagascar sought to divert them back across the Atlantic. This ambition stresses continuity 
within processes of European overseas expansion. Historians have often compartmentalised 
European colonialism into national frameworks to emphasise difference, rather than searching for 
commonality. The extent to which the pirates and projects laid out here were preoccupied with 
precious metals suggests that greater attention should be paid to the fact that there was actually 
considerable continuity between them all. Colonisers persistently created mechanisms to generate, 
protect and legitimise the fact that, even by the early-eighteenth century, Spain’s initial aspirations 
for gold and silver remained a core motivation across national boundaries.5 It was Iberian 
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enterprises that initially served to create global asymmetries in bullion flows, a phenomenon that 
pirates and colonial schemes continually worked to reverse into the eighteenth century. 
The fact that pirates became a locus for so many different controversies of religion, law and 
commerce emphasises that ideas, just like people, moved freely around the anglophone world. 
Often, particular debates are seen to be confined to localities or delimited within pre-determined 
geographical boundaries. The issues that were confronted within “empire” are frequently hived off 
from those conducted within the “nation”, which can serve to obscure how ideas were transmitted 
back and forth across seas and oceans. The contest between proponents of free trade and regulation 
were conducted as much at Panama, in Madagascar and on the coasts of Ireland as in pamphlet 
literature produced in Boston, Edinburgh or London. The limitations of religious toleration were 
tested in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island, as well as in Ireland, but at the same time also determined 
in London. The jurisdiction of the common law over the oceans was discussed in the courtrooms 
of Edinburgh and London, but also challenged and reinforced by events on the coast of Munster 
and the Indian Ocean. At the same time, the fact that pirates were considered to have implications 
for so many areas of early modern life, shows how these domains, which historians often study 
through themes, were interrelated. The most prominent example here has been the connection 
between notions of economy and religion. Irish links to the French Caribbean were about 
reinforcing the strength of Irish Catholicism as much as securing a livelihood, a fact that Protestant 
commentators understood. What Bellomont attempted in the northeast sought to draw trade flows 
northwards, an objective he believed to be mutually reinforcing with the creation of a society of 
tolerant Protestant freeholders. For the colonists at Caledonia, striking a blow against Catholic 
Spain became as one with achieving eventual prosperity. A focus on pirates, who were at once 
considered enemies of commercial, religious, lawful and moral society, provides a means to trace 
the widespread transmission, confluence and implementation of debates that might otherwise 
appear unrelated. 
Finally, this doctorate has shown how the process of overseas expansion served to more closely 
entwine the lives of people from Scotland, England and Ireland. Nowhere was this mixing more 
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clearly illustrated than within the ranks of the pirates featured throughout the preceding chapters. 
Among them were exiled Irish Jacobites, English Calvinists from New England and Scots such as 
William Kidd. This phenomenon was not unique to maritime communities, however. The projects 
considered were advanced by Anglo-Irish Protestants and Lowland Scots, as well as Quakers or 
Anglicans from England and Scotland. The combining of people from the three kingdoms in the 
Americas and the east had been underway across the seventeenth century, but was accelerated 
during the 1690s and became the Age of Projects, as many more people began to look overseas for 
opportunities. To speak of English America or an English Empire serves to obscure the fact that, 
by the later seventeenth century, individuals from across Britain and Ireland cooperated in the 
Indian Ocean, Caribbean and North America, in turn serving to forge closer links between their 
places of birth in Europe. Across the eighteenth century, these connections between the three 
kingdoms would only deepen, as the experience of overseas expansion bound them more closely 
together. 
The first history of the pirates in English was published almost two decades after Thomas Green 
was executed at Leith. The book was almost certainly written by Daniel Defoe under the 
pseudonym Charles Johnson, and the initial 1724 edition carried the title A General History of the 
Robberies and Murders of the Most Notorious Pyrates.6 The text is probably the most widely read 
history of pirates of all time and is to this day a central primary source for historians. Yet Green is 
nowhere to be found within its pages. Henry Avery features, as do later pirates such as the 
Barbadian Stede Bonnet and Edward Low. William Kidd is also conspicuously absent. In fact, with 
only two exceptions, all the captains in Johnson’s book are English.7 In the introduction, which 
was certainly written by Defoe, he does give some indication as to a motivation for why this history 
was anglicised. He argues that pirates were the sailors that the labour market had failed to utilise, 
a problem afflicting the English, as they failed to provide work during peacetime for sailors 
formerly employed as privateers. Continuing, he then argues for the establishment of a national 
fishery, which would ‘prevent pyracy, employ a number of the poor, and ease the nation of a great 
burthen’.8 Such a proposal gives the impression that, as a serial investor in commercial projects 
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during his lifetime, Defoe stood to gain by such a scheme and thus from defining pirates as a 
national problem of labour organisation. He did not see who the pirates were, but who his interests 
and convictions dictated they should rather be – one final way in which the Age of Projects has 
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